The politics of anticommunism in Massachusetts, 1930-1960. by Holmes, Judith Larrabee
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1996
The politics of anticommunism in Massachusetts,
1930-1960.
Judith Larrabee Holmes
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Holmes, Judith Larrabee, "The politics of anticommunism in Massachusetts, 1930-1960." (1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 -
February 2014. 1229.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1229

THE POLITICS OF ANTICOMMUNISM
IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1930-1960
A Dissertation Presented
by
JUDITH LARRABEE HOLMES
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1996
Department of History
@ Copyright by Judith Larrabee Holmes 1996
All Rights Reserved
THE POLITICS OF ANTICOMMUNI SM
IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1930-1960
A Dissertation Presented
by
JUDITH LARRABEE HOLMES
Approved as to style and content by
I^filton Cantor, Chair
Bruce G. Laurie, Member
Bruce G. Laurie, Department Head
Department of History
DEDICATION
For Sandy
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am very grateful for the personal and professional
support of many people who stood by me throughout the
process of writing this dissertation. It gives me great
pleasure to be at the point where I can acknowledge them.
Milton Cantor has been the best of advisors—kind and
gentle while expecting rigorous research and writing. He
has always been available when I needed him yet never
intruded in my own process. Bruce Laurie taught me a great
deal in several graduate school courses, and then became a
discerning reader of my dissertation. I have been
constantly amazed at the generosity of Milton and Bruce in
carefully reading and commenting on all the drafts. Their
erudition and editorial skills greatly improved my writing.
Sheldon Goldman of the Political Science Department and
Stephen Arons of the Legal Studies Department graciously
served on my dissertation committee as well. Their comments
brought a fresh perspective to the topic.
The History Department has been my academic home for
these past eight years. Paula Baker showed me history could
be good fun intellectually, as well as how much hard work it
takes to do it well. Barry Levy taught me how to do primary
research. Paul Dosal taught me not to be afraid of using my
heart to study history. Gerald McFarland was the first one
to hear my fledgling thoughts for this dissertation and gave
support when I needed it. I want to thank the History
Department as a whole for its financial support, especially
V
a Bauer-Gordon Summer Research Grant that made me feel like
a real historian for the first time. Thanks especially to
Mary Wilson for all her support as graduate program
director
.
I have been travelling this path with a coterie of
fellow graduate students who have shared the traumas and
helped break the isolation dissertation writing engenders.
Thank you to Larry Goldsmith, Tim Ashwell, Maggie Lowe,
Sumita Chaterjee, Bruce Saxon, Margaret Orelup, Julie
Foulkes, Anne Wood and K.G. Janayath.
Along the way, I have met scholars from other
institutions with whom I have had fruitful discussions.
They are Bruce Cohen, Tom Whalen and Michael Bonislawski.
The scholar who helped me decide in 1987 to make the
transition from law to academia is Gilda Zwerman . I was
inspired by her commitment to teaching, research and social
justice and thank her for the initial nudge and ongoing
support
.
I am blessed with a rich personal life that has
nourished me throughout this process. I can study the past
best when I am firmly grounded in the present. My deepest
gratitude is to Sandy for her sustaining love and support.
I work and write within an eccentric and loving household.
Special thanks to Sandy, Jay, Jeanie, Richie, Anna and Libby
for being themselves. My thanks also to Jan and Diane for
giving me a home away from home on all my research trips to
Boston
.
vi
ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF ANT 1 COMMUN 1 SM
IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1930-1960
MAY 1996
JUDITH LARRABEE HOLMES
A.B., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
J.D., COLUMBUS SCHOOL OF LAW, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Milton Cantor
This dissertation tells the story of how anticommunism
operated on the state and local level in Massachusetts from
the depression through the 1950s. Using analytic tools from
both political history and social history, it asks: what
initiatives were driven by anticommunism, who were the
people behind these initiatives, why did they want to
suppress political dissent, and where did their ideas
originate
.
The findings show that anticommunism on the state and
local level was far more complex than has been appreciated.
In Massachusetts, political ideas travel through a prism of
class and ethnicity before taking shape as political
actions. Neither the pluralist analysis of McCarthyism as a
mass based movement from below, nor the revisionist analysis
of McCarthyism as an elite rivalry over political power
adeguately explain what happened in Massachusetts.
vii
A more accurate picture reveals pockets of
anticommunist activity throughout the state. These pockets
were peopled with conservative Yankees, professional
anticommunists, Catholic legislators and opportunist labor
leaders. However, the ideas driving each group were quite
different. What this study shows is the usefulness of
ant icommunism in helping Americans find common political
ground across class and ethnic differences. For most people
it was a lot easier to agree on what was un-American than it
was to agree on what was American.
Massachusetts anticommunists maintained an unbroken
thread of activity throughout the period of this study, 1930
to 1960. Evidence of anticommunism and antiradicalism
during the Second World War—expressed as opposition to
conscientious objectors and support for the Christian
Front— links the "little Red Scare" of the depression to
postwar McCarthyism.
The same groups of people supported anticommunist
initiatives during the cold war as had during the depression
and war years. The Catholic Church continued to be the
single most influential source of anticommunism. Union
leaders used anticommunist Catholic labor doctrine to oust
rivals from power within the electrical workers union. A
legislative commission dominated by socially conservative
Irish Democrats investigated subversion among liberal
Yankees. Cold war anticommunism on the state level was
driven by ethnic conflict not party rivalry.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This tells the story of how anticommunism operated on
the state and local level in Massachusetts from the
depression through the early cold war. Using analytic tools
from political history and social history, it asks: who were
the people behind anticommunist initiatives, what was their
rationale for suppressing political dissent, and where did
their ideas originate? The findings are both expected and
unexpected. In some instances, anticommunism in
Massachusetts was similar to what other writers found
elsewhere; in many others, it was not. Political ideas In
Massachusetts travel through a prism of class and ethnicity
before taking shape as political action."^ Since no two
states have quite the same configuration of local
characteristics, the refraction of anticommunist ideology at
the state and local level produced a far more complex
history than has been appreciated.
To date, scholarship on anticommunism focuses primarily
on the national level and on events during the early cold
war, the period usually referred to as "McCarthyism . " Two
explanations for the emergence and virulence of McCarthyism
have emerged from this work. Neither adequately explains
what happened in Massachusetts.
Historians writing in the 1950s argued that McCarthyism
is best understood as a mass based movement from below. To
Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, and others, McCarthyism
represented American totalitarianism. They characterized
Senator McCarthy as a demagogue tapping into the same grass
roots sentiments that had produced earlier Populist revolts
against modernization. This interpretation is based
primarily on psychoanalytic inference, an emerging field of
study in the 1950s. Major analytic categories are loosely
studied ethnicity and "status anxiety."^
In the late 1960s, political scientist Michael Paul
Rogin shattered this analysis by examining voting records in
the mid-West. He found McCarthy's electoral support came
from industrial counties that elected traditional Democratic
or Republican candidates, not from rural counties with
Populist traditions . Revisionist historians who followed
Rogin argue that McCarthyism was a product of conservative
and liberal elites contending for political power. To them,
Senator McCarthy was another player in the partisan power
struggle between elites in Congress.^ Most work done on
McCarthyism since then accepts this revisionist framework as
a starting point for focusing on a particular manifestation
of anticommunism on the national level.
Pluralists and revisionists both characterize
McCarthyism as an outbreak of political repression in the
early cold war years. Revisionists recognize previous
episodes of anticommunism—the Red Scare after World War I
and the "little" Red Scare during the late 1930s—but do not
try to find links between them. Revisionists explain
McCarthyism as a product of contemporary events,
specifically the cold war and conservative reaction to the
New Deal. A recent work by Michael J. Heale, a British
historian of U.S. political history, takes a longer view.^
He argues that antiradicalism is an ideological imperative
of American nationalism with deep roots in the political
culture, and that McCarthyism is its most recent
manifestation. A host of factors account for the virulence
of McCarthyism, according to Heale, including "the incessant
and complex interplay between popular opinion, private
interest groups, and public officials." Thus, Heale
sidesteps the top down vs bottom up debate of pluralists and
revisionists
.
Heale 's analysis is helpful for this study.
Anticommunism did not simply break out in Massachusetts with
the rise of Joe McCarthy; rather, it was a constant undertow
in the political culture of the state throughout the
depression, the war years, and the early cold war. One
question this study asks is how anticommunism changed during
these three periods. In taking the "long view," the subject
matter is expanded from "McCarthyism, " the term generally
used to denote the Red Scare in the early postwar period, to
"anticommunism," a term that encompasses opposition to the
activities and ideology of the Communist party as well as
more general opposition to left-of-center liberal and
radical ideas. In Massachusetts, anticommunist initiatives
were about more than eradication of the Communist party;
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they were also about anti-intellectualism and cultural
hegemony.
Ellen Schrecker's introductory essay to The Age of
McCarthyism sketches a new direction in the scholarship on
McCarthyism.^ Schrecker argues that the countersubversive
tradition, standing alone, is not enough to explain the
pervasiveness of McCarthyism. For her, McCarthyism was also
"the mid-twentieth-century manifestation of a continuing
backlash against the modern, secular world. ""^ This echoes
the concerns of pluralist historians who identified great
anxiety in the lower middle class as a key force driving
anticommunism. Such cultural factors account for the
leading role of conservative institutions, like the Catholic
Church, in shaping and promoting anticommunist initiatives
on the state level.
Other than the work done on voting records, neither
pluralists nor revisionists tested their interpretations
with local studies. Until recently, the little work done on
the state level concentrated on legislative investigations
Q
and enactment of repressive legislation . Without benefit
of studies that examine sources of state and local
initiatives , historian Robert Griffith and others argue that
anticommunism on the state level was "derivative" of
national initiatives and that state legislatures "responded
almost slavishly to the force of federal law and precedent
and to the anxieties aroused by national leaders." One
local study, designed specifically to test this theory.
concludes that "the Communist issue did not originate on the
national level and then spread to the states and local-
ities. Another, however, suggests that local
anticommunism resulted from an "elite-led, federal
campaign. "^-^
The evidence from Massachusetts refutes the copycat
thesis. On the state level, anticommunist initiatives were
driven by local factors, such as ethnicity and class, as
much as by national and international events. These local
factors gave anticommunism in Massachusetts a particular
character, just as local factors in other states gave
anticommunism a particular character there. To explain
anticommunism on the state and local level as being merely
derivative of federal initiatives fails to capture the
complexity and variation of anticommunist political culture.
Two examples from Massachusetts illustrate the falsity
of Griffith *s sweeping generalization. The conventional
wisdom of revisionist historians is that anticommunism was,
in part, a conservative backlash against New Deal policies.
It was a way for Republicans to attack Democrats without
having to attack New Deal programs that proved popular with
voters. In Massachusetts, however, it was traditional
Democrats, like James Michael Curley, who championed
anticommunist initiatives. At the same time, these urban
Democrats embraced New Deal programs and the growing power
of the federal state. Chapters three and six explain why.
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In 1950, Massachusetts workers in locals of a
Communist-led union, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America (UE), had to decide whether to stay with
their union when it was expelled from the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) for failing to purge
communists from its leadership, or to secede and join the
staunchly anticommunist rival union, the International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (lUE). It was a
clear choice. In 1949, federal anticommunism was at an all-
time high. President Truman's Loyalty Security Program had
been in effect for three years, the denunciations of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities garnered front
page headlines, the leadership of the Communist party was on
trial in Manhattan federal court, and Chinese Communists
defeated the United States' ally, Chiang Kai-shek, amidst
accusations of communist treachery in the State Department.
Given the level of national rhetoric, one would expect
anticommunism to carry the day in local union elections with
workers bolting from the UE. This is not what happened.
Twenty-eight Massachusetts locals remained in the ousted
Communist-led UE, while only twelve locals voted to secede
from the UE and join the anticommunist lUE. Chapter six
explains what happened.
If conventional explanations do not describe what
actually happened in Massachusetts, then what does? A more
accurate picture depicts pockets of anticommunist activity.
Some pockets were peopled with conservative Republicans,
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reacting to and copying national anticommunist initiatives
as Robert Griffith predicts. Some pockets were part of the
"wide-ranging anti-Communist network" of the political right
wing that Ellen Schrecker identifies
. Indeed, leaders of
national, conservative organizations, like Sentinels of the '
Republic and the John Birch Society, lived in Massachusetts
and were part of the Yankee elite. However, most pockets of
anticommunist activity in Massachusetts, were peopled with /
socially conservative Irish Catholic Democrats and new v /
immigrants
.
Revisionist historians identified the political roots
of anticommunism while ignoring its social roots. Their
protagonists believed communism was subversive because it
aimed to overthrow the government. These politically
conservative anticommunists saw the growing power of the
state as a dangerous prelude to communist takeover. By
emphasizing politically conservative sources of
anticommunism, revisionists overlook socially conservative
sources of anticommunism. Other Americans, who were not
politicians, opposed communism because they believed it was
immoral. Led primarily by the Catholic hierarchy, they
feared communism would replace Christian values with godless
materialism. These socially conservative anticommunists saw
the growing power of the state as a threat to the authority
of the church.
Both politically conservative and socially conservative
anticommunists used politics to fight communism. However,
7
social concerns are brought to politics more easily at the
local level than at the national level. Since the
revisionists studied anticommunism on the national level, it
is not surprising that they missed localist, socially
conservative sources of anticommunism. In Massachusetts,
the political culture of anticommunism was socially
constructed as much as it was politically constructed.
Because the meaning of anticommunism was malleable enough to
embrace both sources, it became enormously powerful in
helping Americans find common ground across class and ethnic
differences. With working class, middle class and ruling
class allied to fight communism, reminders of class
antagonism were branded un-American. When the national
internal enemy was vanquished, along with it went class
analysis leaving poor and working class people with no tools
to confront underlying inequities.
The methodology of this study is straightforward.
First I tried to identify as many anticommunist initiatives
as possible; then, I worked backwards from these events to
identify the people behind them. As much as possible, I
have used the words and ideas of the actors themselves to
explain their motivation. The next chapter paints a social
portrait of Massachusetts during the period under
investigation. The third chapter looks at anticommunist
initiatives in the context of the depression, and the fourth
chapter does the same thing in the context of international
conflict and the Second World War. The fifth chapter
8
explores red-baiting in the labor movement and workers
response to anticommunist rhetoric. The sixth chapter
analyzes anticommunist initiatives in the state legislature
and in local communities at the height of McCarthyism. The
seventh chapter concludes the study by comparing the
experience of Massachusetts to that of other states.
9
Notes
In other states, race and/or gender may also play
significant roles in the operation of anticommunism at the
local level. In the South, for instance, anticommunism was
a powerful tool for segregationists to derail the Communist-
led interracial movement for social justice in the 1940s and
the black-led civil rights movement in the 1950s.
Race is not a determining characteristic of
anticommunism in Massachusetts because there were so few
African-Americans in the state from 1930-1960, and they were
relatively powerless politically. When African-Americans do
appear, they tend to be more tolerant of political dissent
than their counterparts in white ethnic groups. From the
research I have done, there were no major anticommunist
players or spokesmen in the African-American community.
Scholars are just beginning to investigate the impact
of gender on anticommunism. See, e.g., Kate Weigand, "The
Red Menace, the Feminine Mystique, and the Ohio Un-American
Activities Commission: Gender and Anti-Communism in Ohio,
1951-1954," Journal of Women's History 3 (1992), No. 2, pp.
70-94. In Massachusetts, women were visible and active on
both sides of the issue. I have not, however, uncovered any
gender-driven explanations of anticommunist initiatives in
the state.
^The classic work of this school is The New American
Right, a collection of essays edited by Daniel Bell and
published in 1955 by Criterion Books. This book was
republished with additional essays in 1962 as The Radical
Right. Contributors to the original edition included Bell,
Richard Hofstadter, Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset,
and Peter Viereck. See also, Richard Hofstadter, The
Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New
York: Knopf, 1965); Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1962); and Peter Viereck, Shame and the
Glory of the Intellectuals: Babbitt Jr. vs the Rediscovery
of Values (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953).
^Early works of the revisionists include Michael Paul
Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967); Robert Griffith, The Politics
of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Amherst, Mass.:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 1987); and Athan
Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the
Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971).
The antidote to Bell's Radical Right is a collection of
essays edited by Griffith and Theoharis, The Specter:
Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of
McCarthyism (New York: Franklin Watts, 1974).
10
The sprawling bibliography of McCarthyisin includesbooks on the entertainment industry's response to
McCarthyism, the career of Senator McCarthy, the role of
Congressional cominittees
, the labor movement and the
Communist Party, prosecutions of communists, the FBI's
shadowy role in fueling McCarthyism, liberal reaction to
communism, and McCarthyism in higher education. For
comprehensive bibliographical essays, see Ellen W.
Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and the
introduction to the second edition of Robert Griffith's, The
Politics of Fear (1987). David Caute ' s book. The Great
Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978) contains an exhaustive
but unannotated bibliography.
^M. J. Heale, American Anticommunism, Combating the
Enemy Within, 1830-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1990). For a similar analysis from a different perspective,
see Michael Paul Rogin, Ronald Reagan: The Movie and Other
Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987).
^Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism, A Brief
History With Documents (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
Schrecker is presently at work on a full synthesis. This
book is a college level textbook containing a collection of
documents and an introductory essay. In the essay,
Schrecker sets forth only the skeleton of a much fuller
argument
.
^Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, p. 10.
^The earliest work on the state level is Walter
Gellhorn, ed. , The States and Subversion (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1950). Other state and local
studies include: James Truett Selcraig, The Red Scare in the
Midwest, 1945-1955 , A State and Local Study (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1982); M.J. Heale, "Red Scare
Politics: California's Campaign Against Un-American
Activities, 1940-1970," Journal of American Studies 20
(1986), 5-32; Don E. Carleton, Red Scare! Right-wing
Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their Legacy in Texas
(Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985); Ronald W. Johnson, "The
Korean War Red Scare in Missouri," Red River Valley
Historical Review 4 (Spring 1979), 72-86; Dale Rich
Sorenson, "The Anticommunist Consensus in Indiana, 1945-
1958," (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1980; Thomas
Michael Holmes, "The Specter of Communism in Hawaii, 1947-
53," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1975);
Ingrid Winter Scobie, "Jack B. Tenney: Molder of Anti-
Communist Legislation in California, 1940-49," (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970); Edward Robert
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Long, "Loyalty Oaths in California, 1947-1952: The Politics
of Anti-Communism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, San Diego, 1981).
^Robert Griffith, "American Politics and the Origins of
•McCarthyism, '
" in Griffith and Theoharis, eds., The
Specter, pp. 14-15. See also, Robert Justin Goldstein,
Political Repression in Modern America (Cambridge, Mass •
Schenkman Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 348-349, and Ellen"
Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, pp. 41 and 71. Schrecker
argues that anticommunism may have been even more extreme on
the state and local level because close collaboration among
people connected with the "anti-Communist network" provided
expertise and information for anticommunists working on the
state and local level.
^°Selcraig, Red Scare in the Midwest, p. 150.
^^Gary Paul Henrickson, "Minnesota in the 'McCarthy'
Period: 1946-1954" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Minnesota, 1982 ) .
1
2
Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, pp. 9-15, passim.
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CHAPTER 2
A COMMONWEALTH OF IMMIGRANTS
Massachusetts is home to many symbols that define core
values of America's political culture. The Mayflower
Compact, Boston Tea party, Battle of Bunker Hill, minutemen
and town meetings are part of every schoolchild
' s catechism
of American history. These symbols of freedom and
representative government were familiar anchors for the
commonwealth as it grew and changed dramatically in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Massachusetts
residents continue to celebrate Patriot's Day with a
reenactment of the day the shot heard round the world was
fired on the Lexington town common. Bostonians take a
holiday in March to commemorate the day hated British troops
withdrew from the city in 1776. By the twentieth century,
however, there were far more immigrants than Yankees
celebrating these patriotic high holy days. In 1930, when
this study begins, two out of three Massachusetts residents
were either immigrants or children of immigrants.
Massachusetts, the proud symbol of America's Yankee
heritage, had become a commonwealth of immigrants. Of
course the original patriots were immigrants too, but this
fact seemed lost on their Yankee descendants who felt
besieged by the newcomers and clung tenaciously to their
ancestry and past.
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From 1930 to 1960, the period under investigation here,
the tide of new immigration slowed considerably. At the
same time, immigrants who decided to stay struggled to be
incorporated into the social, political and economic life of
the commonwealth. In the course of these struggles,
immigrants both altered and were altered by the rich
political culture in Massachusetts. They recast traditional
political values and ideas to incorporate their experiences
into those of eighteenth century Yankee patriots. There was
a great deal at stake in this period of economic and
political upheaval as both immigrants and Yankees struggled
to define what it meant to be American. For most people, it
was a lot easier to agree on what was un-American than it
was to agree on what was American. Since they equated
communism with un-Americanism, anticommunism became the
common ground between Yankee and immigrant political \y
culture
.
As stated in chapter one, I have defined anticommunism
as encompassing both specific opposition to the Communist
party as well as more generalized opposition to ideas that
threatened the established order. Before presenting the
analysis of how anticommunism operated in Massachusetts,
however, we need to know more about the respective social
position of immigrants and Yankees, the players in this
drama, and their political loyalties. We also need to know
14
more about the institutions that shaped their political
values. These topics are the focus of this chapter.
Immigrant Majority
Four million people lived in Massachusetts in 1930; by
1960, there were five million."^ The great period of
population growth in the commonwealth
,
caused by massive
immigration in the late nineteenth century , was over . From
1840 to 1910, the population grew by at least twenty percent
each decade ; in the 1930s, growth dropped to only two
percent; and in the 1940s and 1950s it climbed back to nine
percent. Population growth was not spread evenly throughout
the state . Older textile centers— Fal 1 River, New Bedford,
Lowell, Lawrence, and Holyoke—experienced a net decline
from 1930 to 1960. While Boston grew slightly from 1930 to
19 60 , its suburbs , such as Med ford and Newton , grew
dramatically . As the overall population stabilized, the
ratio of recent immigrants to native born decreased
substantially. Table 2.1 summarizes these data.
Although immigrants came to Massachusetts from the four
corners of the world, a few countries predominated. Before
1880, most immigrants came from the British Commonwealth,
particularly Ireland and Canada, with the remainder coming
from Germany and Sweden. In 1882, a new stream of
immigrants began arriving from southern and eastern Europe,
particularly Italy, Poland and Russia.^ By 1930, the
15
Table 2.1 Percent of Massachusetts popula-
tion born in U.S. and born abroad, 1900-1960
1900 1930 1960
Native born, na-
tive born parents
38 33 61
Native born, at
least one foreign
born parent
32 41 27
Foreign born 30 26 11
Source: 1900, 1930, 1960 Census
country of origin of foreign stock in Massachusetts (meaning
foreign born plus native born with at least one foreign born
parent) in descending order of magnitude was: Ireland (20%),
English-speaking Canada (14%), French-speaking Canada (12%),
Italy (12%), England/Scotland/Wales (10%), Poland (7%),
Russia (5%), Scandinavia (4%), Germany (3%) and Portugal
(2%)
It is no surprise to find that the Irish were the
largest of all immigrant groups in Massachusetts in 1930.
In fact, the percentage of Irish was even larger than the
figure above indicates because census takers did not
identify third and fourth generation immigrants. If they
had been included in the foreign stock, the proportion of
Irish in Massachusetts in 1930 would have been 20 to 25
percent of the total population. Of course, in urban areas
the percentage was even higher. The figures in Appendix A
bear this out. Not only were the Irish the largest
16
immigrant group, they had also been in Massachusetts the
longest and were the most settled. Table 2.2 shows the
percent of foreign stock that was second generation
(children of immigrants) for different countries of origin
and again, the Irish lead the list.
Table 2.2 Percent of Massachusetts
foreign stock that is second genera-
tion (children of immigrants ) by
country of origin, 1930
Ireland 72
Germany 71
French-speaking Canada 6 6
Poland 62
ALL 62
Italy 61
Engl and/ Scot land/Wales 60
Portugal 58
English-speaking Canada 5 5
Russia 44
Source: 1930 Census
Immigrants who arrived in Massachusetts settled in
urban areas all across the state. In 1930, 90 percent of
the foreign stock lived in one of five metropolitan areas
defined by the federal Census Bureau: Boston, Worcester,
Springfield, Lawrence-Lowell, and Fall River-New Bedford.
These metropolitan areas included center cities as well as
smaller cities and towns surrounding them. Boston was by
far the largest of these metropolitan areas and was home to
over half the foreign stock in the state, as shown in Table
2.3. Immigrants did not spread evenly throughout these
metropolitan areas. Different nationalities followed
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Table 2.3 Percent of all Massachusetts foreign
living in Metropolitan Districts
stock
Boston Metropolitan District
Boston city
Outside Boston
55
20
6 b
Worcester Metropolitan District
Worcester
Outside Worcester
9
5
A
ft
Springf ield-Holyoke Metropolitan District
In central cities
Outside central cities
10
5
c
Lawrence-Lowell Metropolitan District
In central cities
Outside central cities
8
5
3
New Bedford-Fall River Metropolitan District*
In central cities
Outside central cities
8
6
2
*The Census Bureau includes Providence in this District
as well. They are not included here.
Source : 19 30 Census
relatives and jobs to different places in the state . For
instance, while French-speaking Canadians went to textile
cities, English-speaking Canadians went to commercial
centers; Portuguese went to New Bedford and Fall River;
Swedes to Worcester; Italians to Boston and Lawrence but not
Lowell; Russians to Boston. One exception were the Irish
who, by 1930, were a presence in every urban area in the
state. These differing patterns of settlement meant that
the ethnic makeup of urban areas varied considerably.
Appendix A presents this data for cities of 50,000 or more.
Religion is another way to look at the ethnic diversity
that defined Massachusetts from 1930 to 1960, although hard
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data is very hard to find. In 1926, the U.S. Census Bureau
conducted its third, and last, census of religious bodies.
Unlike the population count made at the beginning of each
decade, it was a census of religious organizations rather
than a census of individuals. Data were collected by-
sending the pastor of every church and congregation a
schedule to complete. Given this method of data collection,
the accuracy of the census of religious bodies is even more
dubious than the count of individuals. Nevertheless, it is
of some value and is all that is available.
The 1926 census of religious bodies reported that there
were 2.5 million church members in Massachusetts; that
figure represents about 60 percent of the total population
at that time.* Of the reported church members, 65 percent
belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 26 percent to various
Protestant denominations, and 9 percent to Jewish
congregations. Table 2.4 presents this breakdown in more
detail
.
Even though immigrants had numerical superiority in
Massachusetts in 1930, Yankees clung doggedly to social and
economic power. The key to maintaining this control was to
keep the doors of key institutions firmly shut. Through the
depression and well into the postwar era, the Yankee elite
operated within a very insular world. Bound together by
lifelong ties formed at prep schools. Ivy League colleges,
and exclusive social clubs, these men controlled access to
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Table 2.4 Number and percent of Massachusetts church
members in denominations with 10,000 or more members,
1926
Number of
church members
Percent of all
church members
Roman Catholic i ,629,424 65 . 2
Jewish 213,085 8 .5
Protestant , total 657,695 26 . 3
Congregational 159 252 u A
Episcopal 141, 952 5 . 7
Northern Baptist 89,635 3 .4
Methodist 84, 929 3 . 4
Unitarian 28,203 1 . 1
Lutheran 20, 887 .8
Universalist 14, 997 .5
Greek Orthodox 13 , 452 .5
National Spiritualist 11,805 .4
Presbyterian 11, 270 .4
Negro churches 10, 563 .4
Other 70, 750 2 . 8
Source : Census of Religious Bodies, 1926, Table 2
their ranks . Cultural identifiers—ancestry, religion,
residence and schooling—necessarily excluded immigrants no
matter how well educated or wealthy they were. Also
excluded were native born white Americans without the right
social credentials
.
One way to look at the class structure in the
commonwealth is through the 8,000 biographies collected in
Who's Who in Massachusetts , a book published in 1940 by
Larkin, Roosevelt & Larkin. The publishers, lacking none of
their own hubris, subtitled the book: "A Volume Containing a
Biographical History of Every Important Living Person in The
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Commonwealth." It appears from the acknowledgements that
information was gathered through the alumni offices at
Harvard, MIT, Williams, Amherst, Simmons, Boston University
and Babson. Other sources must have been polled as well
since many entries do not include a reference to one of
these colleges. It seems likely that professional
organizations such as bar associations, medical
associations, and academic associations were also consulted.
Noticeably absent among the acknowledgements are any
officials from Catholic colleges and fraternal organizations
in the state.
A random sample of the biographies reveals that 75
percent of these "Important Living Persons" belonged to one
of the high status Protestant religions (Episcopalian,
Unitarian, or Congregational) while only nine percent of the
sample are Catholic and five percent are Jewish. The sample
is politically homogeneous as well— 80 percent are
Republicans, 10 percent are Democrats and 10 percent are
Independent—and well educated, for nearly 80 percent went
to college. Of the college graduates, 40 percent went to
Harvard College or one of Harvard's graduate schools.
Occupationally , the sample represents wealthy men in high
status jobs: eight percent owned mills or other factories,
15 percent were managers or technical advisors, nearly 15
percent were bankers and investment advisors, nearly 20
percent were college professors or school administrators,
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nearly one-third were doctors or lawyers. The remaining
eight percent were artists, ministers, and small
businessmen. The Catholic and Jewish men in the sample were
in solidly middle class professional positions: lawyers,
school administrators, engineers, and a dentist.^
What is remarkable about this sample is that Jews and
Catholics, who constitute 75 percent of the church members
in Massachusetts in 1926, make up only 15 percent of "Every
Important Living Person" in 1940. On the other hand.
Episcopalians, Congregationalists and Unitarians represent
13 percent of all church members, yet they are 75 percent of
the "Important Living Persons." While these sources may
lack statistical reliability, they point in the general
direction of a society that permitted some movement to its
middle ranks, but was very closed at the top.
A study that examines occupational mobility and
ethnicity in Boston confirms this description.^ Stephen
Thernstrom set out to investigate social mobility in Boston
from 1880 to 1970. He was interested particularly in which
men changed their class—either up or down—over a lifetime
of work. Thernstrom defined class on the basis of
occupational category. Overall, he found that 25-30 percent
of all semiskilled male workers and 20-25 percent of all
unskilled male workers ended their working careers in white
collar jobs. One exception was the depression generation
—
men just beginning their work life when the panic hit. The
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unskilled and semiskilled workers among them were never able
to catch up, and did not experience the same mobility as
their fathers or sons.
While there was some prospect for upward mobility in
occupational level, inherited social advantages counted
most. If you started at the top, you were almost guaranteed
to stay there throughout your working life. Approximately
95 percent of the men who started in high status white
collar jobs ended their working career at the same level.
If you started at the bottom, you might gain respectability,
but certainly not wealth or power. It was very hard for a
poor man's son to break into the top occupational ranks.
Only nine percent of the sons whose fathers were skilled
laborers and five percent of the sons whose fathers were
unskilled laborers made it into high status white collar
jobs. These data confirm the findings from the Who's Who
sample: that men in high status jobs were most likely to be
well-educated, Protestant, Yankees.
Thernstrom found variations in occupational mobility
among different immigrant groups. Irish and Italian men
were overrepresented at the level of semiskilled and
unskilled workers as late as 1960. First generation Irish
and Italians lagged behind other immigrant groups in
occupational mobility, although the Irish did slightly
better than Italians at finding low status white collar
jobs, probably because of their language advantage. Middle-
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class Irish men tended to work for other people in clerical
jobs and as salesmen. They did not become private
entrepreneurs, a position that would have given them more
economic and social power. Sons of Jewish immigrants did
extraordinarily well with 75 percent ending up in solidly
middle class jobs at the end of their working career.
Thernstrom also compared job classification by
religion. He found that while Catholic and Protestant
working class men moved up the occupational ladder at the
same rate, Catholic white collar workers skidded down to
blue collar jobs much more often than Protestant men did.
He also found that sons of middle class Protestant men were
much more likely to end their careers in high status white
collar jobs than sons of middle class Catholic men. These
numbers corroborate the conclusions drawn from the Who's Who
sample
.
Thernstrom concludes Irish and Italian men were locked
out of white collar jobs by the cultural values of peasant
life they brought with them to the New World. According to
Thernstrom, immigrants ' "attitudes towards education , work
,
thrift and consumption" determined occupational patterns of
their sons. This explanation ignores the impenetrability of
Yankee society. Where you got a job depended on who you
knew; who you knew depended on where you went to school and
where you lived; where you went to school and where you
lived depended on where your father went to school and where
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you grew up. Massachusetts was not a meritocracy in the
thirty years from 1930 to 1960. As more and more immigrants
flooded into the commonwealth in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, Yankee elites kept access to high
status jobs closed to newcomers.
The case of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti
illustrates best the deep gulf separating Yankees and
7immigrants. Sacco and Vanzetti were Italian immigrants
charged in 1920 with robbing the payroll of a South
Braintree shoe factory and killing the paymaster and guard.
Both men were anarchists; both men were armed when they were
arrested on a street car late at night. From the moment of
their arrest, police treated them as dangerous radicals.
Sacco was a shoe worker and Vanzetti a fish peddler. While
both defendants had solid alibis, all their corroborating
witnesses were Italian immigrants like themselves
.
Judge Webster Thayer, a 70 year old Yankee patrician
who presided over the six week trial held in Dedham in 1921
,
was widely reported to have made comments such as "I'll get
the bastards." Compounding Thayer's bias, the prosecutors
were much better lawyers than the defense attorneys . Both
Sacco and Vanzetti testified on their own behalf. Neither
man used an interpreter making them easy prey for the
prosecutor who belittled their alibis and hammered home
inconsistent statements they made to police interrogators.
They were painted as un-American foreigners who carried
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weapons and fled to Mexico to avoid fighting in World War I,
Although Sacco tried to explain his anarchist beliefs to the
jury, the language barrier and ineptness of his lawyers made
him look more like a criminal than a political prisoner.
The jury convicted Sacco and Vanzetti of first degree
murder and Thayer sentenced them to death. There was some
local publicity of the case during the trial, mostly
negative. After Thayer pronounced the death sentence,
radicals and liberals all over the world rallied to Sacco
and Vanzetti 's defense. New defense lawyers began a lengthy
appeal process as criticism of the trial mounted nationally
and internationally. All appeals were eventually denied.
People all over the world petitioned Republican Governor
Alvan Fuller to grant Sacco and Vanzetti executive clemency.
In 1927, Fuller responded by appointing a three man advisory
committee—consisting of Harvard president A. Lawrence
Lowell, MIT president Samuel Stratton, and former probate
judge Robert A. Grant—to review the evidence for him, and
by postponing the execution date while the Lowell committee
held hearings. Over the course of ten days, the committee
heard from representatives of the prosecution and defense,
Judge Thayer, jurors, and alibi witnesses. Lowell assumed
the role of prosecutor, impeaching the recollection of a
critical alibi witness. The Lowell Committee concluded that
Sacco and Vanzetti received a fair trial, paving the way for
the execution
.
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In August 1927, as the Lowell Conunittee held hearings
and courts heard final appeals, multitudes of Sacco and
Vanzetti supporters kept vigil. Boston police, dressed in
full riot gear, guarded the city. Thousands rallied daily
on Boston Common; hundreds of picketers were arrested in
front of the state house. Celebrities like Katherine Anne
Porter and Edna St. Vincent Milay joined radicals, liberals,
workers, mothers, Beacon Hill matrons, college students,
artists and writers to demand clemency. When all appeals
failed, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. Thousands of
mourners filed through a small Italian funeral home to pay
their last respects; ten thousand more followed the coffins
to Forest Hills cemetery.
The case of Sacco and Vanzetti became an epic struggle
between Yankee authority and immigrant aspirations. To
Judge Thayer and his generation of Yankee patriarchs, Sacco
and Vanzetti were ungrateful, disloyal foreigners bent on
destroying everything they and their forefathers had
sacrificed to build. To newer immigrants, Sacco and
Vanzetti were victims of imperious, prejudiced Yankees
incapable of understanding the plight of working men and
women. The case stood as an allegory of the great divide
between Yankees and immigrants in Massachusetts.
Party Politics
The one public arena where the numerical superiority of
immigrants worked to their advantage was party politics.
When voters went to the ballot box, it did not matter
whether they had been in Massachusetts for ten generations
or ten weeks. Of the foreign born, the Irish were best
situated to capitalize on this fact because they had been in
Massachusetts the longest and were the largest immigrant
group. Also, they brought with them exposure to Anglo-
American political traditions. By the late nineteenth
century, Irish immigrants were firmly situated in the
Democratic party in opposition to the Yankee controlled
Republican party. Municipal ward politics became the one
stepping stone to local power and prestige for Irish
immigrants. Hugh O'Brien, the first Irish Mayor of Boston,
was elected in 1885. With political power came access to
patronage jobs and respectability for Irish politicians.®
The first successful Irish candidate in a statewide
race was David Walsh, who was elected lieutenant governor in
1912. Walsh was the son of a skilled hornsmith who
emigrated to Massachusetts in the early 1850s. His family
valued education highly, graduating all ton children from
high school. Supported by two unmarried sisters, who worked
at the Bigelow Carpet factory, Walsh graduated from Holy
Cross College and Boston University Law School. After
practicing law in Fitchburg for several years as a
plaintiff's attorney for injured workmen, Walsh turned to
politics as his primary vocation. Not only was he the first
Irish Catholic to be elected lieutenant governor, he was
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also the first Democrat to hold that office since the
founding of the Republican party. Walsh was elected
governor the next year, 1913, when the Republicans split
over the candidate from Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive
party. In 1918, Walsh joined Henry Cabot Lodge in
Washington, D.C. as a Bay State Senator. His early
successes at winning statewide elections were due, in part,
to the fact that he was not a typical urban Irish
politician. Hailing from Clinton, a small industrial town
about 40 miles west of Boston, Walsh worked his way up
through the local Democratic party, earning the respect and
allegiance of Yankee Democrats like Joseph Ely from
Westf ield.^
Another ambitious Irish politician at this time was
James Michael Curley of Boston. For Bay State Yankees,
Curley was "that man" long before Franklin D. Roosevelt was
elected to the Presidency. The son of a widowed scrubwoman,
Curley learned the ropes of Boston's ward politics early on,
parlaying that knowledge into a lifelong career as a
Massachusetts politician. Lacking the formal education of
Walsh, Curley was a self taught, spellbinding orator with an
Irish voice of honey. He first won elective office as a
representative to the Massachusetts legislature in 1902.
During his fifty year political career, he served as
alderman, congressman, mayor of Boston for four terms and
governor for one term. Curley 's career was also marked with
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scandal, twice serving time in prison for municipal fraud.
He was known as much for his loyal followers as his powerful
enemies. Within state politics, Curley was always at odds
with David Walsh who had much more power within the state
Democratic party.
Neither Curley nor any other Irish politician in Massa-
chusetts could build a political machine on the scale of
Tammany Hall in New York. Ward politics in Boston was so
"feudal" that no politician could gain hegemony over his
rivals. Within Boston, Curley competed with other powerful
Irish politicians, such as Martin Lomasney and John "Honey
Fitz" Fitzgerald, for control of city politics. Each
political boss controlled neighborhoods, but none was able
to dominate all rivals. This meant that while politics
was a stepping stone for individual, ambitious Irishmen, it
held an insecure future at best. It also meant that no
politician would be able to wield more than temporary, local
power against the entrenched Yankee elite.
The political antics at the 1932 Democratic National
Convention illustrate well the diffusion of power among
Irish politicians in Massachusetts. The state delegation,
led by Walsh, was committed to Al Smith, the adopted
favorite son of Bay State Democrats. Curley, sensing a
shift in political fortune, was the most prominent
Massachusetts Democrat to break with Smith and endorse
Franklin Roosevelt during the 1932 primary. Curley arrived
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at the Democratic National Convention in August without
delegate credentials. While the official Massachusetts
delegation defiantly cast its votes for Al Smith, even after
the tide turned decisively toward Roosevelt on the fourth
ballot, Curley's unmistakable Irish brogue boomed from the
convention hall as "Don Jaime Miguel Curleo," chairman of
the Puerto Rican delegation, triumphantly voting for
12Roosevelt
.
Politics was a tool of power—albeit it fairly limited
power
—
primarily for Irish immigrants. Once in power, the
Irish succeeded in keeping Italians and Jews out of urban
Democratic party machines, although all ethnic groups
succeeded in electing their own to some local offices, often
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on the Republican ticket.
From 1900 to 1930, party loyalty remained strong in
Massachusetts. Both parties devised strategies to attract
new voters to their ranks. The Republican party remained
solidly Yankee after the Civil War, and recruited Jewish
voters with policies that benefited businessmen and African
American voters with its legacy of abolitionism. Republican
protectionist policies attracted immigrant voters, such as
French Canadians, looking for work in mills and factories.
The Democratic party was just as solidly urban Irish, with
some rural Yankees. The Irish controlled Boston's local
politics, leaving the Yankees to run candidates for
statewide offices. Italians supported Democratic
candidates
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but their participation in electoral politics was very low.
The two parties competed vigorously for votes of newer immi-
grants by running candidates with immigrant names for lesser
positions on party slates and by rewarding key supporters
with patronage jobs.''^*
The presidential election of 1928 turned Massachusetts
back into a two party state after eight decades of
Republican domination. Al Smith's candidacy began a
transformation of the Democratic party into the dominant
political party in the state. Although political scientists
point to this election as a critical realignment in
Massachusetts politics, it was foreshadowed by David Walsh's
1926 statewide victory and not consolidated for another
decade. Walsh ran better than any Democratic candidate
before him, in part because the Republicans had so little to
offer immigrant voters during the 1920s. The party's
association with Prohibition, one hundred percent
Americanism, and the Ku Klux Klan drove immigrants into
David Walsh's coalition. Walsh carried wards of newer
immigrants that had never voted Democratic before such as
French Canadian districts in shoe and textile cities, Jewish
neighborhoods in greater Boston, and African American
quarters in Boston. But Walsh's victory was not the turning
point in the realignment process. Even though he squeaked
by to beat William Butler, Republicans still maintained
control of the governor's office and both houses of the
state legislature. Walsh's 1926 victory demonstrated what
was possible, not what was. He won because immigrant voters
and Yankee Democrats respected him and supported the issues
he represented.
Two years later, these same voters embraced Al Smith,
the son of Irish and Italian immigrants who rose through
Democratic party ranks to the governor's mansion in New
York. The 1928 election, more than any other, reflected the
depth of class and ethnic cleavages in the commonwealth.
The two candidates—Herbert Hoover and Al Smith
—
gave voters
a crystal clear choice between old stock Protestant
Americanism, with its policies of economic conservatism,
Prohibition and immigration restriction , and new immigrant
Americanism, with its policies of religious pluralism,
reform, and ethnic pride. Both parties knew the election
would be won or lost on immigrant votes. An amazing 94
percent of all registered voters in Massachusetts went to
the polls in November 1928. Smith narrowly carried the day
with 50.5 percent of the vote."*"^
Smith's victory was just a step in the electoral
realignment process in Massachusetts. It took another
decade for immigrant voters, who switched parties to vote
for Smith, to register as Democrats and vote regularly for
Democratic candidates. Gerald Gamm's study of presidential
election voting behavior in Boston examines this twenty year
process, from 1920 to 1940, for different ethnic groups.
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Jews made the most dramatic shift from the ranks of the
Republican party to the Democratic party. In the process of
becoming heavily Democratic, class distinctions among Jewish
voters disappeared. No longer did Jewish businessmen vote
differently from Jewish workers. Italians were not so much
realigned during this period as recharged. Italians who
voted in the Progressive era and the 1920s supported
Democratic party candidates; however, not until the New Deal
coalition brought them concrete benefits did Italians begin
to vote in large numbers. In addition to mobilizing more
men, Italian women finally registered to vote in the 1930s.
Among African Americans in Boston, women abandoned the
Republican party much earlier than men, and registered to
vote in larger numbers than men. Boston-born Black men
tended to remain loyal to the Republ ican party while newer
arrival s from the South tended to register as Democrats
.
Among the Yankees and Irish, there was no realignment.
Yankees remained solidly Republican although they became
politically demobilized with fewer and fewer turning out to
vote. The Irish remained solidly Democratic. New recruits
were found among Irish women in the 1920s. Like Jews, Gamm
found no class cleavage in Irish voting patterns. Middle
class Irish voters and working class Irish voters both
supported Democratic party candidates in impressively large
numbers
.
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Gamin's conclusion that ethnicity, not class, defined
the New Deal coalition in Boston rests on a narrowly
conceived definition of class. Gamm used what was available
to him, traditional material measures of income such as "the
value of owned homes, the monthly rent of rental units, the
number of families owning mechanical refrigerators, the
number of homes centrally heated, and the level of education
attained by adults," to identify lower class, middle class
and upper class voters among Jews, Italians, Blacks, Yankees
and Irish. ^® However, class in Boston was determined by
more than mere income. Immutable characteristics, such as
family name, and cultural identifiers, such as speech
patterns, appearance, and hobbies, were what got you into
Groton or Harvard, not the ability to pay the bills.
Graduates of Harvard, not Boston College, filled corporate
board rooms. The "shabby gentility"
—
poor Yankees from once
wealthy families—had more access to power than most wealthy
Irishmen. Yankee elites discriminated against upper income
Irish and Jewish immigrants as much as they did against
their working class relatives. In 1930, ethnicity and class
were the same thing in Massachusetts.
From 1930 to 1960, immigrants coalesced in the
Democratic party and went head-to-head with Yankees in the
one public arena available to them—politics. Throughout
the process of realignment, however, crossover voting was
common. Votes for Franklin Roosevelt were not necessarily
35
votes for local Democratic party candidates. Ethnic rivalry
and anti-Irish sentiment among newer immigrant groups
continued to animate the Republican party throughout this
period. Because of their greater numbers, Irish politicians
dominated Democratic party machinery in urban areas
throughout the state where immigrants lived and voted. They
dispensed patronage jobs and municipal contracts to their
kinsmen, not other immigrant groups. Italians, Jews and
French Canadians lacked enough votes to contest Irish
domination. Republicans courted their votes, making sure
names of newer immigrants appeared on their ticket. While
newer immigrant voters supported national Democratic
candidates, like Al Smith and Franklin Roosevelt, locally
they supported the party that met their needs.
Electoral power gradually shifted from center cities,
where immigrant voting was most cohesive, to emerging
middle-class suburbs, where second and third generation
immigrants were less likely to identify as ethnic Americans
or with ethnic issues. Table 2.5 shows which party
controlled political offices in Massachusetts from 1930 to
1960. It graphically demonstrates the high degree of
crossover voting and continuing efficacy of the Republican
party.
Several factors account for the fact that the
Massachusetts legislature remained solidly Republican until
the end of the 1950s. After 1932, factionalism crippled
Table 2.5 Party control of political office in
Massachusetts, 1930-1960
Lieut
.
Att 'y State State
Gov. Gov. Gen* 1 Senate House
1931-32 Democ
.
Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1933-34 Democ Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1935-36 Democ Democ
•
Democ
.
Repub. Repub.
1937-38 Democ Democ Democ Repub. Repub.
1939-40 Repub. Repub. Democ Repub. Repub.
1941-42 Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1943-44 Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1945-46 Democ
•
Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1 Q47_4Q P^=> nilh Dp D/ jhX \C U • Pp riM h Do 7t\KZ fJLUJ . pUL) .
1949-50 Democ Democ Democ Even Democ
.
1951-52 Democ Democ Democ Repub. Democ
1953-54 Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1955-56 Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub. Repub.
1957-58 Democ Democ
.
Repub. Repub. Democ
1959-60 Democ Democ Democ
.
Democ
.
Democ
Source: Latham, Massachusetts Politics
, p. 13
the Democratic party on both the state and local level
.
When Curley endorsed Roosevelt
,
he split with the Walsh-Ely
wing of the party which still controlled the party's
organization. In 1934, Curley challenged Walsh and Ely's
control by running in the primary against their candidate.
Although Curley won the primary, and the election, he was
never able to consolidate power and rebuild an efficient
state organization. After 1934, Ely withdrew from party
politics, joining ultra conservatives to attack the New
Deal; Walsh became a national voice for isolationism, openly
challenging Roosevelt's foreign policy. Left "rudderless,"
the party ran questionable candidates and became mired in
scandal. Factionalism also crippled local Democratic
party organizations. Economic distress brought on by the
depression exacerbated interethnic hostility as different
groups competed for access to New Deal jobs and programs. ^°
Catholic Church
Along with their growing power at the ballot box,
immigrants had access to one institution beyond the reach of
Yankee control, the Catholic Church. When Massachusetts
celebrated the church's one hundredth anniversary in 1908,
Boston Archbishop William Henry O'Connell (later to become
Cardinal) delivered a sermon extolling the amazing growth of
the church at the centennial service attended by Bay State
Yankee leaders as well as Catholic dignitaries. O'Connell
recalled the often fractious history of descendants of
Pilgrims and Catholic immigrants and then noted all the
changes that had taken place. He concluded: "The Puritan
has passed; the Catholic remains. "^^ That is exactly what
Yankee elites feared the most.
By 1930, Cardinal O'Connell was a well known figure in
Massachusetts life. Internationally, he had close ties to
Vatican leaders; nationally, he was dean of the American
bishops; locally, he presided over a "million member arch-
diocese."^^ William O'Connell was born in Lowell to a large
Irish immigrant family. His father maintained steady work
in the mills while his older brothers found semi-skilled
and
skilled work in the industrial town. As the youngest
of six
sons, William had the opportunity to attend high
school and
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college. After graduating from Boston College, he attended
seminary in Rome at the American College and later returned
to serve as its rector for five years. O'Connell's close
association with the Vatican shaped his cosmopolitan tastes,
his authoritarian temperament, and his Old World view of the
Church's role in society. O'Connell's message to his flock
was very conservative. He opposed baseball games on Sunday,
lipstick on women, plays by George Bernard Shaw and popular
crooners on the radio. As a militant Catholic, he believed
that the Church was the only institution capable of leading
the masses away from the immorality of modern life which he
blamed on Bolshevism, socialism, and popular culture.
After becoming archbishop of Boston in 1907, O'Connell
quickly moved to consolidate his power among priests in the
archdiocese. He personally purchased the failing weekly
newspaper of the archdiocese, The Pilot, and became its
publisher, controlling content and editorial policy. /
O'Connell used the pages of The Pilot to preach his fervent
anticommunist views directly to his flock. In 1929,
O'Connell inaugurated the Catholic Truth Hour, a Sunday
afternoon radio series featuring lectures—cleared in
advance by the Cardinal—from prominent Catholic educators.
O'Connell promoted talks on the evils of communism through
this medium as well.
O'Connell rarely intervened directly in political
matters, preferring to cultivate an image of neutrality in
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temporal matters. He maintained a safe distance from
controversial Irish Catholic politicians like James Michael
Curley and John F. Fitzgerald. By temperament, he was more
comfortable with Yankee patrician politicians and voted
Republican. O'Connell did not bother his good friend Gover-
nor Alvan Fuller with a clemency appeal for Italian
anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, until
directed to do so by the papal secretary of state two weeks
before the execution. The one exception to O'Connell's
noninvolvement in politics was when he thought the state was
legislating morality; an area, he believed, that was the
sole province of the church. In 1924, for instance,
O'Connell campaigned aggressively against a proposed
constitutional amendment to prohibit child labor. For him,
the amendment was immoral because it usurped family and
spiritual authority by substituting the will of "a
centralized bureaucracy more in keeping with communism than
the base-rock principles of American government." In 1935,
when the amendment resurfaced, O'Connell's spokesman
admonished Catholics that "nothing Redder ever came out of
Red Russia.
"
Following O'Connell's leadership, the Catholic Church
in Massachusetts fervently opposed anything that smacked of
even liberalism. O'Connell kept the church's own liberal
organization, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, from
gaining a foothold in Massachusetts. When O'Connell died in
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1944, he was succeeded by Richard Gushing, a man born and
raised in a middle class Irish family in South Boston, who
was as likeable and out-going as O'Connell was solemn and
aloof. Gushing was photographed kissing babies, throwing
footballs, and riding with nuns on the roller coaster at
Revere Beach. He was well suited to the church's more
secular image and role in mid-twentieth century America.
Although cut from different cloth, Gardinal Gushing was just
as anticommunist as Gardinal O'Gonnell. While O'Gonnell's
V
anticommunism was rooted m papal encyclicals, Gushing »s
anticommunism was rooted in the politics of the cold war.
O'Connell and Gushing 's leadership ensured that the
immigrant majority in Massachusetts would hear plenty about
the evils of communism from their church. What Catholics
heard from the pulpit was that there could be no compromise
with communism. From the Pope down to the parish priest, ^
the church taught that communism was a rival religion that
must be destroyed before it destroyed the church . What this
study will show is that the Catholic Church was the most
ubiquitous source of anticommunism on the state and local
level in Massachusetts.
Conclusion
In 1930, as this study opens, Catholic immigrants and
their children were a clear majority of residents in Yankee
Massachusetts. Lacking access to social or economic power,
immigrants used their voting power to transform Bay State
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politics from a one party state to a two party state. No
longer would the Yankee controlled Republican party be
assured of dominating public policy in Massachusetts. As
party politics became more competitive, it became clearer
that the cleavage between Republicans and Democrats was
based on ethnicity and class. In the 1930s, Irish Catholic
Democrats thought communism was a much greater problem than
erosion of civil liberties, while moderate Yankee Protestant
Republicans thought just the opposite. The next chapter
focuses on the depression era conflict between immigrant
sensibilities and Brahmin prerogatives over the question of
communism.
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CHAPTER 3
REDS, PINKS AND CRACKPOT PROFESSORS
IN THE DEPRESSION
The economic downturn began in Massachusetts right
after World War I. Throughout the 1920s, shoe factories and
textile mills moved South at an alarming rate, leaving one-
industry cities like New Bedford and Lowell badly
distressed. Manufacturing declined twice as fast in the
state as in Boston. At first Boston fared better than the
rest of the commonwealth because it was predominantly a
commercial and financial center; however, the economic
downturn in the periphery soon affected the Hub as well.
When the stock market crashed in 1929, Massachusetts was
already struggling.
An early indication of overriding economic worries
among voters came in May 1930 when the Second Congressional
District, encompassing Springfield and surrounding
industrial and manufacturing cities in western
Massachusetts, elected a Democrat to Congress for the first
time in forty years. The Democrat ran on a platform that
called for the federal government to step in and help with
economic hard times the region experienced.''" By October
1930, only 60 percent of the state's work force had full-
time jobs.
Throughout 1931 and 1932, Massachusetts communities
struggled to meet basic needs of the unemployed, while the
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Hoover Administration promised recovery was just around the
corner. in December 1932, the American Federation of Labor
reported that 30 percent of Boston's work force was out of
work. The average, however, masked the unevenness of
unemployment in Boston. Unskilled African Americans,
Italians and Irish were much more likely to be unemployed
than Back Bay Yankees. Although public relief skyrocketed,
75 percent of the jobless had no relief at all.^ Boston's
mayor, James Michael Curley, advocated public works to meet
the crisis, but was stymied by a hostile Republican
legislature unwilling to allocate necessary funds. In 1933,
Curley headed a nationwide mayors' committee to petition
Hoover and Congress for a $5 billion federal public works
program.
Federal spending programs of the New Deal did not bring
relief to Massachusetts until late in the 1930s. In 1933,
Washington gave Boston only $1.9 million in relief funds,
the equivalent of one week's worth of public welfare
expenditures, and the Public Works Administration did not
begin any projects in Boston until 1935. By the late 1930s,
the state finally began PWA building projects such as public
housing, the Huntington Avenue subway line, roads and
bridges. Massachusetts received little direct relief from
the federal government because Governor Ely, a Democrat from
western Massachusetts and a rival of Mayor Curley, did not
lobby the Republican controlled legislature to authorize
matching funds necessary to qualify for federal relief.
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When funds came in, however, Curley ignored federal
guidelines angering New Deal bureaucrats in Washington.*
In Boston and other urban areas, unemployed workers
competed with each other for jobs created by New Deal
programs. The AFL used its influence to make sure federal
projects created skilled jobs for unemployed union members
in the building trades, its biggest constituency.
Irish project directors discriminated against Italian
workers; Italians discriminated against African-Americans.
In this context of dire economic need for many, and fierce
competition among unskilled workers for a dwindling supply
of jobs, initiatives to rid the state of reds, pinks and
crackpot professors were an easy diversion from other
seemingly insolvable problems.
Four important local factors shaped anticommunist
initiatives in Massachusetts during the depression: the
powerful conservatizing influence of the Catholic Church,
century old rivalry between Yankee elites and Irish
immigrants, militant struggles between capitalists and
workers over diminished profits, and anti-Semitism.
Patriotic societies such as the American Legion, Daughters
of the American Revolution, and, on the far right, the
Sentinels of the Republic stepped up local agitation as
well. Anticommunist activity turned up in three venues:
among police and other law enforcement agencies, in local
and municipal government, and in the state legislature. The
most prominent statewide initiatives were enactment of a
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teachers' oath law in 1935 and the convening of a special
commission in 1937 to investigate the activities of
subversive organizations within the commonwealth.
The Police
The first overt anticommunist initiatives during the
depression came from police and municipal authorities in
response to militant strikes and demonstrations protesting
unemployment. While the Communist party had a hand in these
radical activities, its members were certainly not the sole
actors. Nevertheless, the presence of even a few communists
gave police and municipal authorities a freer hand to
suppress all radical organizing in the name of combatting
subversive influences.
Industry in the state had been fleeing to the low-wage
South since the end of World War I. Conditions of the early
depression led thousands of working people in Massachusetts
to protest their deteriorating economic situation. When
they did, local authorities moved in quickly to break
strikes. By raising the Red flag, police drove a wedge
between striking workers and their leadership, winning
community support for their actions. In 1928, 27,000
textile workers in New Bedford went on strike under the
leadership of the left-led National Textile Workers Union.
At the time, only one-third of the striking workers were
union members. Police arrested hundreds of workers. Strike
leaders were forced to hold meetings outdoors because police
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closed down every suitable hall for building code
violations. When the strike spread to neighboring Fall
River, its chief of police arrested 200 picketers when they
tried to hold a parade and outdoor demonstration.^
In February 1931, 10,000 textile workers in Lawrence
struck to protest management ' s ten percent cut in wages
while speeding up machinery. The National Textile Worker's
Union, and its fiery communist organizer Edith Berkman, led
this strike. Local and state law enforcement agencies
quickly joined forces to stop the strike. The Lawrence
police arrested the strike committee for conspiring to
destroy property and intimidate employees. After their
trial, federal prosecutors from Boston rearrested strike
leaders and detained them on immigration charges. While
strike leaders were in jail, Lawrence police officers raided
the union's headquarters seizing all their records,
typewriters, mimeograph machines and papers. The owner of
the building gave the union notice that their lease was
terminated, while the owner of a local hall hired for the
union's mass meetings cancelled the contract.^ These
actions demonstrate how police pressured private citizens to
help them destroy what they considered to be a subversive
union. It also suggests that local business leaders backed
the police crackdown as well.
By 1937, repression of communists in Lawrence was
official policy. The Lawrence City Marshal told
investigators for the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
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that city officials denied use of municipal facilities to
speakers who were "too radical." According to the marshal,
police prohibited leafleting for radical causes and
picketing for political purposes, and denied parade permits
to groups that advocated unpopular doctrines. Police also
prevented labor organizers from entering the city freely.
School authorities banned "liberal" student clubs.''
In 1933, Lowell shoe workers struck over wages, union
protection and the closed shop. As the strike wore on, shop
owners decided to reopen their businesses with
strikebreakers. Local police escorted strikebreakers into
shops past angry picketers. When physical confrontations
broke out between strikers and strikebreakers , local
newspapers blamed the violence solely on "Red" influence in
8the union. The charge was preposterous since these shoe
workers belonged to a conservative craft union affiliated
with the AFL. Communism was a red herring that diverted
attention away from deeper economic causes of the strike
brought on by the depression
.
The police in Boston repeatedly tangled with
Communist-led protests on the Boston Common. They had no
trouble enlisting support from James Michael Curley,
Boston's Irish Catholic mayor. Curley hated communists and
wanted to keep them out of Boston. He never hesitated to
use the powers of his office to suppress advocates of
doctrines that offended the sensibilities of his Catholic
constituency. During his stints as mayor of Boston, Curley
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tangled with the Ku Klux Klan, Margaret Sanger and the
Cominunist party. ^ He was adamant in refusing to issue
permits for Communist-sponsored rallies on the Boston
Common. In May 1929, police arrested speakers representing
the Cominunist party and Socialist party at a rally on Boston
Common when they began to discuss Sacco and Vanzetti.'^^ In
1931, Curley refused to issue a permit for a rally featuring
Edith Berkman, the cominunist organizer of striking textile
workers in Lawrence. Police turned off the lights in the
middle of evening rallies if they disapproved of the content
of speeches. Plain-clothed police officers patrolled
Boston's parks looking for communists violating park
regulations that prohibited the distribution of handbills . '^"^
Mayor Curley and Police Commissioner Michael Crowley
saw only communist agitators behind unemployment rallies and
other mass demonstrations during the early depression.
Their policy was to respond to these events with a great
show of force. In March 1930, when 4,000 people gathered in
Boston to protest unemployment, Curley ordered mounted
policemen to ring the Common. When protestors headed up
Beacon Hill to picket the heavily guarded state house,
police charged the marchers, beating them back with
nightsticks. Similar clashes took place at a May Day
demonstration in 1930, and in August 1930 at a demonstration
commemorating the third anniversary of the execution of
Sacco and Vanzetti.^^ In October 1930, a specially
organized "Flying Squadron" of crack shooters equipped with
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tear gas bombs joined 200 police officers to stop unemployed
workers from marching on the national convention of the
American Federation of Labor held in Boston. On May Day,
1931, 300 police officers armed with tear gas, submachine
guns and "old hickory nightsticks"—not used since the 1919
police strike—surrounded 5,000 people gathered to hear
speakers on the Boston Common. Mayor Curley read Boston
well; he heard almost no opposition to his policy of massive
state repression in response to communist organizing.
In 1933, Curley's Police Commissioner ordered officers
to bring all arrested communists to headquarters for
photographing and fingerprinting to build a "red file."^^
This marked the beginning of Boston's Red Squad.
Commissioner Crowley had been working on this project since
1930 when he testified in Washington, D.C. before
Representative Hamilton Fish's legislative committee
investigating subversive propaganda. Crowley was part of a
group from Massachusetts, including law enforcement
officials and a professional red hunter, who testified at
the Fish committee hearings. The lead-off witness from
Massachusetts was Edward Hunter, a shadowy figure who headed
the Industrial Defense Association established in 1926 to
keep communists out of industry. Hunter was financed by
wealthy industrialists, and once he prepared a Massachusetts
blacklist for the local D.A.R. In the interchange between
Fish and Hunter, it is very clear that both men were
motivated by anti-Semitism in their hunt for communists.
Chairman Fish repeatedly interrupted Hunter to ask him if
communists he was naming were Jewish."^'' Other witnesses
from Massachusetts who testified at the Fish committee
hearings included Michael Crowley, Superintendent of Police
in Boston, along with his Chief of Detectives. They were
both quite embarrassed when Fish asked if the Boston police
had established a Red Squad and they had to answer no. By
1933, that machinery was in place.
Repression of strikers, union leaders and radicals was
certainly not new in Massachusetts during the depression.
The only new aspect of this form of antiradicalism was
targeting the Communist party. In 1912 it was the IWW;
twenty years later it was the Communist party and left-led
unions. Throughout the depression, officials in industrial
areas like Lawrence, New Bedford and Boston quietly went
about doing what they had always done—kicking labor
agitators out of town. The source of these initiatives were
local manufacturers and business elite backed by local
newspaper editors and middle-class immigrant leaders. David
Goldberg, in his work on Lawrence, describes conservative
Italians who launched an Americanism campaign in 1919 to
discredit the left-led textile union, and to distance
"loyal" Italian workers from labor leaders who "do not
18belong to our people."
The events are catalogued here to show the continuity
of anticommunism from the 1920s through the 1930s and to
illustrate how the Communist party was blamed for sowing
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discontent among working people. In 1930, Mayor Curley
called for "the application of the same character of courage
that made possible the firing of the shot heard around the
world at Lexington to solve the problem of Communism we face
19today." The problem, however, was capitalism, not
communism. The stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing
depression called into guestion capitalism's promise of
future prosperity for anyone willing to compete. Some
ordinary Americans, though few in number, began to consider
communism as an alternative to capitalism. This is what
frightened so many political and community leaders in
Massachusetts
.
National Anticommunism
The principal anticommunist initiative in the early
1930s at the national level was Representative Hamilton
Fish's investigation of communist propaganda. Although the
Fish committee hearings and report did not produce any
federal legislation to combat communism, the publicity
thrust Fish into the limelight as he toured the country
denouncing subversion. This caught the attention of
political leaders in Massachusetts. In 1931, Mayor Curley
invited Fish, who he described as a "prominent
anticommunist," to be the principal speaker at Boston's
"patriotic exercises" on May Day.^^ Fish told the crowd
that communism was "alien" to America and was being brought
in from the Soviet Union. He estimated that two-thirds
of
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all communists in the U.S. could not speak English, and
warned the 5,000 spectators to be on guard against
"invidious attacks against our economic system and even our
form of government by Communists, Socialists, pink
intellectuals, college professors and a smattering of
ministers. "^^
Not since the end of World War I had there been such
alarm over suspected communist subversion in education. In
1921, Vice-President Calvin Coolidge wrote a three-part
article for a national women's magazine subtitled "Are the
'Reds' Stalking Our College Women?" Coolidge focused his
outcry on the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, organized
in 1905, and the radicalism it created among the women
students. The furor died down rather quickly, perhaps
because it was "only women" who were at risk of becoming
Bolsheviks. Higher education for women was still seen as a
novelty in the early 1920s and was not taken very seriously
by men with power. A decade later, Hamilton Fish charged
that communists were boring from within institutions that
trained the next generation of elite men, such as Harvard
and the University of Chicago. This charge was taken very
seriously by anticommunists in Massachusetts.
Fish's report did more than just grab headlines. It
broadened the scope of the Red Menace in America. In the
past, radicals were seen as violence prone, dangerous,
foreign labor agitators. The solution was arrest and
deportation. What Fish did was to Americanize the Red
57
Menace. An alert citizenry had to watch out for American
born teachers as well as immigrant labor leaders. Fish also
added a strong dose of anti-Semitism to national
anticommunist rhetoric. By targeting the New York City
public school system, he painted an alarming picture of
Bolshevik Jews tainting gullible American youth
.
Other national forces also focused attention on the
threat of communist subversion in schools. In 1934, the
Hearst newspaper chain launched a crusade against "Red"
col lege professors based on the Fish committee report . In
Massachusetts , the Boston American printed these sensational
articles. At the same time, national patriotic groups such
as the American Legion and Daughters of the American
Revolution increased their lobbying for anti-subversive
legislation. These groups were more active and more united
in their national anticommunist propaganda programs in 1934-
2 3
35 than they had been for many years. In 1934, the
American Legion launched a national campaign to win passage
of state legislation requiring loyalty oaths for teachers.
John Walsh, chairman of the Legion's national legislative
committee, was also vice commander of the Massachusetts
department and chairman of its legislative committee. He
organized the fight for passage of a teachers' oath in the
state legislature, a topic discussed in more detail below
Professional red hunters, such as James True Associates
headquartered in Washington, D.C., also stepped up their
campaign against "Red corruption of schools and colleges."
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Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee sent Harvard
President James Conant an excerpt from True ' s weekly
Industrial Control Reports with a note saying "it throws
helpful light upon some of the forces behind the various
states requiring teachers' oaths." Anti-Semitism was the
dominant theme of this arch conservative publication that
railed against the "Roosevelt-Frankfurter new deal,"
Washington Post publisher Eugene Mayer, international Jewish
bankers, and Eleanor Roosevelt. True reported that "results
now establish the fact that a campaign, started about 18
years ago, has been waged to indoctrinate with socialism and
communism the teaching of all American schools and
colleges... As a result, Harvard, once a leading university,
has graduated more communists than any college in the
world. "^^
With national organizations focused on the threat of
communist subversion in education, it is no coincidence that
nearly half the nation's state legislatures—including
Massachusetts—considered teachers' oath bills in their 1934
and 1935 legislative sessions amidst these national
anticommunist campaigns. Once the issue was brought to
the state level, however, it was debated in purely local
terms
.
Catholic Anticommunism
Among Irish Democrats in the Massachusetts legislature,
the most vocal supporters of a teachers* oath, these
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national anticonununist initiatives echoed the warnings of
their church. There were two threads to the anticonununist
argument articulated by the Church hierarchy and by Catholic
intellectuals in Massachusetts during the depression.
According to one thread, cominunisin threatened the very
existence of the Church. Within civil society, the Church's
domain was morality. However, since scientific materialism
had no moral component, there was no need for a God or a
church within a communist state. Cardinal O'Connell, the
conservative Prelate of the Boston Archdiocese, defined
communism as a "new Paganism" that "insofar as it denies the
existence of God and proposes the abolition of all religion,
is a heresy with which no Catholic can compromise while
remaining a member of the Church. "^^ From this perspective,
communism was a rival religion that must be destroyed before
it destroyed Christianity . John St . John , a Jesuit
professor at Weston College, told listeners of the Catholic
Truth Hour that "most religions have cherished the
conviction of a world invasion; and Communism is no
exception. . .We Catholics are the main object of the attack;
it is our Faith and our Church which it is desired at all
2 8
costs to destroy."
Such prophecies did not seem exaggerated in the context
of Catholic persecution in Mexico by the Cardinas regime,
events that were well known to Catholics in Massachusetts.
The newspaper and voice of the Boston Archdiocese, The
Pilot, carried weekly horror stories of Mexican priests
60
being arrested or murdered and Catholic schools and churches
being closed down. Later, in 1936 and 1937, the stories of
Catholic persecution in Spain filled the pages of The Pilot.
The other thread of the anticommunist argument
articulated by the Church hierarchy and Catholic
intellectuals was that communism threatened to destroy
democracy from within. Father Corrigan, a Jesuit professor
at Boston College, warned the freshman class that "the
nuclei of Communism have been planted in the ranks of labor,
in the schools and colleges. "^^ In early 1935, a listener
of the Catholic Truth Hour asked why so many of their
programs focused on communism when there seemed to be so
little danger of it in New England. Rev. Ahern, a Jesuit
professor speaking for the Diocese, responded that few
people were aware of the enormous communist propaganda
machinery that "attacks the very foundation of American
Democracy." "How," he asked, "can any red-blooded American
remain silent, especially if he has the opportunity to
arouse his fellow citizens to a sense of an impending
danger? "^° According to this argument, communism threatened
the existence of the Church since it was democratic
institutions and values that sustained the Church in the
United States. Cardinal O'Connell explained to his flock
that "Communism is an enemy of the Democracy in which the
Catholic Church has lived, prospered and developed .
"^^
When the two threads of the anticommunist argument were
intertwined. Catholics became the new American patriots,
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protecting the Republic from evil outside forces. In
Massachusetts, descendants of Irish immigrants championed
the values of Yankee forefathers while descendants of
Revolutionary patriots peddled foreign, disloyal doctrines.
This was repeated at all levels of the Church as well as by
Catholic laymen. Cardinal O'Connell urged Catholics to "let
your sense of fundamental justice and your sound Americanism
be an impregnable bulwark" against the spread of communist
3 2ideas. P.J. Moynihan, the State Secretary of the Knights
of Columbus, warned a western Massachusetts audience that
"too many native born Americans take their privileges for
granted." "The United States," he explained, "was founded
on Catholic principles. Thomas Jefferson received his
inspiration for the Declaration of Independence from
Catholic writings . "'^ Governor Hurley told the Holy Name
Society: "It may yet be our destiny to save the America we
love... [from] modern liberalism that embraces red Russia,
red Spain and red Mexico."^* The Massachusetts delegation
to the Knights of Columbus annual convention in 1936 praised
the work of the organization in spreading "Catholicism and
Americanism" throughout the nation."'^
Another source of Catholic anticommunism during the
depression was Father Coughlin, the populist radio priest
from Detroit. Boston was one of the strongest Coughlinite
cities in the United States much to the dismay of Cardinal
O'Connell considered Coughlin a demagogue and forbade his
priests from listening to Coughlin -s radio show. Coughlin
-s
first sermons were broadcast from Detroit in 1926. By the
time the stock market crashed, he already enjoyed a national
audience. Coughlin focused on the peril of domestic
communism as the major theme of his 1929-30 broadcast
season. From his radio pulpit, he preached that Catholics
must choose between Christ and the "Red Fog." By the mid-
1930s, Coughlin was railing against bank reform and currency
reform. His analysis of these issues was quite muddled and
quickly degenerated into overt anti-Semitism. Coughlin's
villains were bankers and wealthy industrialists who he
portrayed as haughty, cold-blooded schemers. This
characterization fit Irish Boston's view of their own
tormentors
—
puritanical Protestants
.
Coughlin visited Massachusetts several times. During a
vacation to the Berkshires in the summer of 1935, he drove
to Boston to visit his "old friend," Governor Curley. Word
flew threw both chambers of the legislature that Cough 1 in
was in the building- He entered the floor of the House to
"thunderous applause . " Leveret t Sal tonstal 1 , an inf luential
Yankee politician and Speaker of the House, introduced
Coughlin. Allowing as how he did not agree with all of
Coughlin's views, he nevertheless greeted Coughlin warmly
saying that "the House is greatly honored in having you
address them." Coughlin talked very briefly about "dangers
threatening the world today, Nazism, Communism and that
other form of dictatorship which is now insinuating itself
into State and Federal government "--the last being New Deal
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"pinks" in government. He urged the legislature "to do your
utmost to keep intact the democratic form of government and
to see that nothing subversive undermines it." With that he
left the chamber to a standing ovation and went to the
Senate which gave him a similar reception. During this trip
to Massachusetts, Coughlin reported that Boston had the
second highest per capita membership in his organization,
the National Union for Social Justice. "^"^
In 1936, Father Coughlin joined forces with Dr.
Townsend of California and formed the Union Party which ran
a slate of candidates in national and state elections. The
vice-presidential nominee on the Union Party ticket was
Thomas C. O'Brien, a middle class Irish Catholic lawyer from
Boston. Some Massachusetts politicians running for re-
election to the House of Representatives in 1936 abandoned
Roosevelt and the Democratic party at the top of the ticket
3 8
in order to win Father Coughlin 's endorsement. Although
Roosevelt swept the state in 1936, the Union Party
presidential candidate did better than any other third party
candidate since the Civil War. Curley blamed his defeat to
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in the senatorial race on the
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presence of a Union Party candidate on the ballot.
Whatever else it may have been, Catholic anticommunism
was never monolithic. The hierarchy of the Church and
supporters of Father Coughlin had very different agendas
when attacking communism. Coughlin based his appeal based
primarily on class, and workers were particularly receptive
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to his message. Among Church officials, by contrast, there
was great disagreement over what was communistic. Cardinal
O'Connell never supported programs initiated by the moderate
wing of the church, led by Monsignor Ryan in Washington,
D.C. For O'Connell, even these programs were too radical.
When we listen to Catholic laymen articulate their reasons
for combatting communism, what comes across is fear for the
survival of their church, the most important institution in
their daily lives.
Teachers' Oath
For several reasons, then. Catholic legislators took
up the banner of anticommunism by advocating passage of a
teachers' oath law in 1935. The bill required all teachers
in public and private schools and universities to take the
following oath:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and that I will faithfully
discharge the duties of the position of
according to the best of my
abilities
.
Technically, this is not a "loyalty" oath because the
affiant does not swear loyalty to the government. However,
proponents of the bill clearly saw it as a loyalty oath and
as a means to root out subversive teachers. The legislature
debated the bill as if it were a loyalty oath. What made
the bill so extreme was that it covered teachers in private
schools, colleges and universities as well as public
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institutions. Other states had not gone this far, prompting
the American Civil Liberties Union to denounce the
Massachusetts law as "more sweeping than any law yet passed
in 18 states with such legislation
.
In early June, 1935, when the teachers' oath bill
reached the floor of the House, Tommy Dorgan, an Irish
Democrat from Dorchester, called on every "loyal American"
to support the bill. "The time to stop Soviet propaganda is
now," he urged, "not when the horse gets out of the stable.
Keep America for Americans." As he was speaking.
Representative Casey, a fellow Irish Democrat from Boston,
scuffled with guards at the door as he tried to enter the
chamber carrying a large American flag to present to Dorgan.
Liberal Yankee Republicans opposed the teachers' oath.
During debate, Christian Herter, the representative for
Yankee wards in Boston's Back Bay, spoke against the bill,
calling it "class legislation." Republican Walton Tuttle
from suburban Framingham told his colleagues that "Public
Enemy Number One is ignorance parading in the guise of
legislation such as this."*^
Opponents of the teachers' oath were caught by surprise
when the bill was introduced in the legislature at the
request of the American Legion. Senator Henry Parkman, Jr.,
the blue-blooded Republican chairman of the Education
Committee, warned Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee in
February, 1935 that "in the present temper of the
Legislature it is likely to be passed."*^ The American
Legion came to the hearing on the bill well prepared, and
presented a strong case. This prompted fifteen college
presidents to petition the Education Committee for an
opportunity to respond. President Daniel Marsh of Boston
University acted as spokesman for the college presidents at
the rehearing. Opponents of the bill were guick to display
their anticommunist credentials. They argued that while
they opposed communism, the bill was unacceptable because it
singled out teachers and cast dispersion on their loyalty.
When Robert J. Watt, legislative agent for the Massachusetts
Federation of Labor, testified, he told the committee that
"while those who wave the flag do the talking, the American
Federation of Labor has done more to keep down Communism in
this country than any other force. "^"^
The American Legion and its allies set the terms of
debate which oath opponents were never able to overcome.
Legionnaires succeeded in establishing the principle that
opposition to the oath was an act of disloyalty. Different
strategies to get around this labelling were unsuccessful.
When the bill reached the Senate floor for its third and
final reading. Republican Senator Henry Parkman, Jr.
demanded a roll call, urging his colleagues to "recover your
sanity. We are going back to the Dark Ages in this sort of
legislation trying by this method to inspire loyalty."
Democratic Senator Charles Miles, chairman of the Education
Committee, told Parkman his remarks were an insult to the
Senate. The bill passed 27 to 3.^^ Parkman ' s roll call
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strategy backfired; when forced to take a public position,
few senators opposed the oath.
In the House, oath opponents took a different tack and
tried to defeat the bill without requiring legislators to
take a public stand. The bill was defeated on a standing
vote, 68 to 61 with many legislators not voting.
Representative Dorgan, however, demanded a roll call. Oath
opponents then tried to kill the bill by proposing an
amendment postponing implementation of the law for forty
years. When Dorgan "protested violently," the roll was
called and the amendment was defeated.*^
The bill passed the House, 130 to 94, and it was signed
into law by a jubilant Democratic Governor, James Michael
Curley. While the teachers' oath bill was being debated in
the legislature, Curley had used all the powers of his
office to win passage of the bill. The American Legion
praised his contribution claiming his "whole-hearted,
enthusiastic" support of the bill was "so energetic as to
46 r.
even discourage many sources of opposition." One of
Curley 's powerful opponents was his Commissioner of
Education, Dr. Payson Smith. Smith had been Commissioner
since 1917 and was widely respected throughout the state by
public school teachers and principals as well as by the
notables at Harvard's School of Education. Smith did not
support the teachers' oath bill or Curley 's efforts to beef
up the Education Department's Division of Americanization.
The Division's main work was to give advice and clerical
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assistance to immigrants filling out forms for
naturalization. Governor Curley wanted to use the Division
to "combat the spread of communism" by questioning
applicants about their political beliefs.*^
When Smith's term expired in December, 1935, six months
after the teachers' oath was enacted, Curley retaliated
against Smith and his liberal Yankee supporters by
appointing James Reardon as Commissioner. At the time,
Reardon was a little known school superintendent from Adams,
a small town in western Massachusetts. His main
qualifications seemed to be that he was Irish and that he
supported the teachers' oath. The night before he was sworn
in as Commissioner, Reardon told the press "I am 100 percent
in favor of the Oath bill. I do not believe that Communism
and Socialism should be spread among our school children,
and the teachers who spread this type of propaganda should
4 8be driven from our schools."
The following year, 1936, those opposed to the
teachers' oath law formed the Massachusetts Society for
Freedom in Teaching to organize a stronger effort to win
repeal of the law. Samuel Eliot Morison, a prominent Yankee
historian at Harvard, served as chairman of the committee.
The Society recruited a formidable army of educators, labor
leaders, and Protestant ministers to square off against the
American Legion. Twelve hundred spectators crowded into
Gardner Auditorium to root for their side when the
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legislature's education committee held hearings on repeal of
the law.
The entire Yankee educational establishment in
Massachusetts that had for so many years excluded Irish
students turned out to support the repeal bill. For these
educators, the issue was academic freedom, not communist
subversion. President Conant of Harvard led a delegation
that included the presidents of Radcliffe, Williams,
Amherst, Smith, Mount Holyoke, Tufts, MIT, Wheaton, and
Simmons as well as the headmasters of Milton Academy,
Phillips Academy, Winsor Academy, Williston Academy, Browne
and Nichols School, and the Fenn School.
Public school teachers were represented by Hugh Nixon,
president of the Massachusetts Teachers Federation, an
organization affiliated with the National Educational
Association. Nixon's organization represented 21,000
elementary and secondary school teachers, approximately 80
percent of all teachers in the state. He told the committee
that "teachers resent this nation-wide drive to make them
jump through a hoop at the behest of an organized minority
who are using the whip of suspicion and
misrepresentation."*^ Other organizations of educators
opposed to the oath included the Massachusetts Elementary
Principals Association, Massachusetts Junior High School
Principals Association, Massachusetts High School Principals
Association and Massachusetts School Superintendents
...
• 50Association
.
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The only Massachusetts educators absent from the
hearings were those affiliated with Catholic schools. In
1935, Boston college president Gallagher joined his
colleagues to testify against the teachers' oath. A year
later, however, the presidents of Boston College and Holy
Cross declined to join the delegation of college presidents.
The president of Holy Cross explained that it was not "an
appropriate time to raise the issue again. "^^ One detects
the hand of Cardinal O'Connell in this abrupt reversal of
position.
Labor presented a united front in opposition to the
teachers' oath. The AFL, the Central Labor Union of Boston
and every other industrial center in the state, all American
Federation of Teachers locals in the state, as well as
locals of many other unions sent representatives or messages
to the hearings. Michael Flaherty, president of the
Massachusetts Federation of Labor, an AFL affiliate, told
the committee that "such a bill is not good Americanism."^^
John Walsh, state commander of the American Legion and
Waltham school committee member, led the fight to keep the
oath. Witnesses on this side of the issue included American
Legion officials and representatives from other patriotic
organizations. Legionnaire Royal Hayes, formerly a special
investigator of communism in New York's public schools,
testified as an "expert" on subversion. Oath supporters
also called Howard A. Chase, a recent convert from the "Red
Army of Massachusetts," to testify about communist
indoctrination in Massachusetts classrooms. In the course
of his testimony, Chase red-baited James Sheldon, floor
manager for opponents of the oath, accusing him being a
communist. However, Chase discredited himself when he
admitted that he had testified the year before in favor of
the oath under an assumed name.^*
The only educator called to testify for the oath was
Dr. Frederick Gillis, Assistant Superintendent of Schools in
Boston. He told the committee that teachers "are not
flattered in the least by being associated with the ideas of
absolute academic freedom and intellectualism given off by
these infallible professors and college executives . "^^
Gillis was one of several witnesses to articulate such anti-
intellectual feelings. Representative Dorgan told the
committee it was their job to "protect the children for
their parents against the dangerous minority of professors."
"What is an American?" he asked. "Certainly it's not a
professor. The man in the street is a better American than
some of the professors . "^^
Irish Democrats on the Education Committee deeply
resented being lectured to by "crackpot professors." They
bristled before the luminaries from higher education. Tommy
Dillon, an Irish Democrat from Cambridge, told his
colleagues in the House that the professors "treated the
members of the committee as if they were so much dirt; and
deep down in their hearts they really think we are that much
dirt." Representative Dorgan, who liked to be called the
father of the teachers' oath, reported that educators wanted
to change "we, the people, to we, the professors." Senator
Miles, a Democrat from Brockton, thought that Professor
James McLaughlin of Harvard Law School was "insulting and
ridiculing" the committee when he accused them of "danc[ing]
to the tunes of their masters, Mr. Hearst and the American
Legion. "^"^
The House defeated the repeal bill 88 to 133, a similar
vote to the one the year before when the law was enacted.
Later that year, in November 1936, Republicans were swept
into local office throughout the state, even though Franklin
Roosevelt easily carried the state in the presidential
contest. The following year, 1937, a more strongly
Republican legislature mustered enough votes to pass a bill
repealing the teachers' oath by a vote of 129-112. Irish
Democratic governor, Charles F. Hurley, promptly vetoed the
bill finding it a barrier "against the subversive influences
of our day." He labelled opponents of the oath as "vicious
minorities" bent on destroying "the principles upon which
this Republic was founded." In 1938, a repeal bill failed
to pass the Senate and in 1939, it was voted down in the
House 102-105. The teachers' oath remained law in
Massachusetts until 1986.
The battle over the teachers' oath in Massachusetts
demonstrates well the difficulty of trying to deconstruct
the political culture of anticommunism because anticommunist
currents of thought were carried over the airwaves, in
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newspapers, in taverns, from pulpits, and among
acquaintances. One approach is to look at the players on
both sides. Among Bay State legislators. Catholics were the
most vocal proponents of the teachers' oath. Anticommunism
hit a nerve among them, but not among Yankees, for specific
reasons. One reason was that they felt deeply threatened by
communism. They believed that a communist state would
destroy their church and the democratic institutions that
allowed their church to thrive just as Catholics currently
were being persecuted in Mexico and Spain.
Most Yankee Protestants had no reason to feel the same
threat. There were exceptions, of course. Alexander
Lincoln, a prominent Yankee lawyer who was treasurer of the
Constitutional Liberty League of Massachusetts and president
of the Sentinels of the Republic, two arch-conservative
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organizations, was one such example. Anticommunist
Protestant elite, such as Lincoln and Hamilton Fish were
isolationists and saw the communist movement as the primary
force behind internationalism. Most of the Yankee elite,
however, understood that economic, social and state power
was firmly within their control and that their institutions
could "tolerate" a few extremists, especially when they were
their own kind, such as Dr. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana,
a well-known communist sympathizer at Harvard. The only
institution Irish Catholics controlled was their church,
whose existence was threatened by communist ideology.
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Another Irish nerve that anticommunism touched was the
century long ethnic rivalry between Irish inunigrants and
Yankees. This rivalry was fueled by class conflict as much
as by different religious practices and customs. Although
Irish influence in Massachusetts politics was clearly
established by the 1930s, the Irish had made little headway
in business or social affairs of the state. This was very
clear in the parallel educational systems in Massachusetts-
-private schools for the Protestant elite, parochial schools
for the Catholic middle class, and public schools for
everyone else. The loyalty oath legislation penetrated one
exclusive Yankee domain--pr ivate educat ion--even though
individual Catholics were unable to do so. Nowhere was this
clearer than in Cambridge, home to Harvard University, the
symbol of Yankee domination and exclusion. Six Irish
Democrats and one Republican represented Cambridge in the
state legislature. All of them voted in favor of the
teachers' oath while Harvard's educational elite led the
opposition
.
The teachers' oath debate was also colored by the
cultural gulf between Catholic authoritarianism and
Protestant individualism. The act of declaring one's
loyalty to a superior was very familiar to Catholics. As
Monsignor Peter Guilday, secretary of the American Catholic
History Association, explained to Samuel Eliot Morison: "It
is so difficult to know what to say about the new Test Oath.
We are so used to them." Guilday pointed to his own
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colleagues at Catholic University who took an annual "oath
against modernity." Catholic clerics, Guilday explained,
must take an oath of loyalty at every rung up the
ecclesiastic ladder. Catholic laymen in Massachusetts
took every opportunity to reaffirm their loyalty to Cardinal
O'Connell. At the Massachusetts Knights of Columbus annual
meeting in 1930, the membership adopted a resolution
extending their "deep sense of fealty and gratitude and
constant loyalty to His Eminence, Cardinal 0
' Connell . "^°
When John Swift, a state Supreme Court judge and president
of the Massachusetts State Council of the Knights of
Columbus wrote to Cardinal O'Connell, he signed his letters
"With renewed assurance. Your Eminence, of our constant
loyalty. "^^ Cardinal O'Connell's message to the annual
Knights of Columbus Patriots' Day Banguet is 1931 concluded
that "obedience to the State is loyalty to God, and
patriotism is blessed by religion. "^^ Such professions of
loyalty were unheard of among elite Protestant religions and
were totally incompatible with Yankee individualism. Thus,
what was natural to Catholics, was anathema to Episcopalians
and Unitarians.
It is wrong to conclude, however, that Irish Catholic
Democrats were the only politicians who supported the oath.
There were blue-blooded Republicans, like Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr., and Yankee Democrats, like former Governor Joseph Ely,
who supported the oath as well. Jewish legislators, both
Democrats and Republicans, supported the oath.^"^ In
general, Democrats supported the oath and Republicans
opposed it although there were many defections on each side.
The Democrats were consistent, at least, with approximately
80 percent favoring the oath and 20 percent opposing the
oath each time it came to a roll call vote. Among Catholic
Democrats (Irish, Italian, French Canadian and Portuguese),
91 percent supported the teachers' oath.^*
Republicans were the ones who hesitated on the
teachers' oath. In 1935, when the oath was first
introduced, 37 percent of the Republican legislators were in
favor and 63 percent opposed; in 1937, only 23 percent of
the Republicans favored the oath while 77 percent opposed
it; in 1939, 30 percent favored the oath, while 70 percent
were opposed. Republicans who favored the oath came from
the two extreme wings of the party—arch conservative
Yankees and "liberal" Catholic Republicans sympathetic to
working class issues. One way to illustrate this voting
pattern is to compare the CIO and AFL ratings of legislators
supporting and opposing the oath. These ratings were based
on the number of times legislators voted for a position
endorsed by the AFL or the CIO. A rating of 100 means the
legislator voted in favor of every bill endorsed by the AFL
or the CIO; a rating of zero means that the legislator
opposed every bill endorsed by the AFL or the CIO. In 1940,
Republicans as a whole received a 34 percent rating from the
CIO and a 33 percent rating from the AFL, while Democrats as
a whole received a 70 percent rating from the CIO and 73
77
percent rating from the AFL. The arch conservative Yankees
who voted for the teachers' oath were rated well below the
Republican average: 18 percent from the CIO and 1.^ percent
from the AFL. The "liberal" Republicans who voted for the
oath looked more like Democrats than Republicans in their
ratings from organized labor: 61 percent from the CIO and
64 percent from the AFL.^^
What these numbers illustrate is that a coalition of
Catholic Democrats, Republicans with working class
sympathies, and conservative Yankee Republicans supported
the teachers' oath in Massachusetts. To these legislators
and their constituents, communism threatened their way of
life. Catholics feared for their church; Yankees feared for
their fortunes. Of all the anticommunist initiatives in the
depression, the teachers' oath was the most contested. The
battle over "crackpot professors" created strange
bedfellows, like Mayor Curley and Hamilton Fish. This is
because anticommunism , like its counterpart Americanism, was
multidimensional. Different people ascribed quite different
meanings to the same words. what all agreed on was that
communists and the Communist party were easy targets in very
troubling times. Despite all the rhetoric, however, as a
tool to combat communism in the commonwealth, the teachers'
oath accomplished very little.
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Special Commission to Investigate Communistic.
Fascist, Nazi and Other Subversive Groups. 1937
The other anticommunist initiative in the Massachusetts
legislature during the depression was the empaneling of a
special commission to investigate "Communistic, Fascist,
Nazi and Other Subversive Groups" in the commonwealth.
Representative Philip Sherman of Somerville filed the bill
creating the commission in December 1936. Sherman was a 38
year old Jewish Republican lawyer who had represented his
suburban Boston district since 1931. According to a
reporter covering the hearings for the New Republic, Sherman
promoted the commission to "prove that there are no Jews in
67the CP." If this really was true, how Sherman intended
to accomplish this goal is a mystery since there were a
number of Jews in the leadership of the Communist party in
New England. The General Secretary for District One, which
included Massachusetts, was Philip Frankfeld, a man whose
family were Jewish immigrants and who had moved to Boston
from New York City. Perhaps the reporter meant that Sherman
wanted to prove not all Jews were communists. With anti-
Semitism on the rise throughout the 1920s and 1930s, middle
class Jews were very concerned about adding the stigma of
communism to the ammunition of their antagonists. In 1924,
the Ku Klux Klan held a rally in Worcester that was attended
by 15,000 people. The principal Klan spokesman was King
Kleagle Eugene Farnsworth of Maine whose rhetoric was anti-
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Semitic rjnd anti-Catholic. Tho^ /.-or, crosses were burned
in (J'j/.(:u:. 'ji co/ri/riunities throug^l thfj cornnonv/f.-a ) t h /"^
Anti-Semitism in Massachuyfett:; ran nuchi 'J^ ^ prr than the
Ku KJux KJan. Such prominent Yank^i^j brahmin;, or, .'.tmator
Henry Cabot Lodge and Harvard president A. Lav/renc« Lowell,
were well knov/n anti-Semites. Lodqe championed federal
legirjJation in thf- trj rf:ntrict inrnjqration in ord^.-r to
Stop th(j exodu3 of J^v/r; from Fur^riia to thf- [Jnitf-d r:tatf:r;.
Lowell testified against the nomination of Loui?^ Brandeis to
the United States Supreme Court. Alexander Lincoln, a
prominent Boston attorney and president of the Sentinels of
the Republic, was branded a virulent anti-Semite in the
summer of l^'if. v/hen the Black Committee in Washington seized
a letter in v/hich Lincoln r;tatf;d that "th^.- Jf.-winh thr^.-at is
a real one." Jamerj Michael Curley, who v/ay out of offJ^•^• at
the time and running against Lodge for o ..onate seat, .'.';j/'jd
on the charge milking it for he could. Although the record
is somewhat murky on the charge of Lincoln's anti-Semitism,
the perception that Yankee elites v;ere anti-Semitic was
not.^^ It was v;ell known that elit<^ Yankee univeiL i t ler; had
a quota for the number of Jewish studentfj thoy would accept
each year.^° The few Jev/ish men v/ho v/orf.- a^;^f;ptf,-d at
Harvard Law School v/ere not hired by the Yankee law firms
even though they achieved such distinctions as editor of the
Law Review. It war; in this climate of anti-Semitism that
Philip Sherman proposed to investigate Reds in
Massachusetts
.
The bill establishing the special commission sailed
through the House and Senate and was signed by Governor
Hurley in May 1937. This was the same legislative session
when the House and Senate were embroiled in combative
hearings and debate over repeal of the teachers' oath. A
month before the special commission bill was enacted, the
repeal bill had passed the House and Senate by a very narrow
margin, only to be vetoed by Governor Hurley. When the
special commission bill came up for a vote a month later,
only half of the representatives were present to vote as had
been present on the repeal bill vote. Clearly, the forces
seeking repeal of the teachers' oath law—both in the
legislature and in the community—did not put the special
commission in the same category as the oath. While the
teachers' oath was considered to be a threat to civil
liberties, the special commission was not. The major
difference between the two bills was their target. The
teachers' oath applied to all teachers in the state,
including influential Yankee educators. The special
commission targeted Reds and "other subversives." Only a
minority of people opposing the teachers' oath believed the
First Amendment applied to communists. Everyone else
—
conservatives, moderates and liberals alike—dismissed this
argument as communist propaganda.
The chairman of the commission was Senator Sybil
Holmes, a conservative Republican lawyer from Brookline who
had been an assistant district attorney for Middlesex County
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in the 1920s. "^^ As a newly elected Senator and the first
woman to sit in that body, she appears to be an unlikely
candidate for the position. However, she was a relative of
Senate President Samuel Holmes Wragg, the person who
appointed the three Senators to the commission, and perhaps
he thought he could control Miss Holmes better than a more
experienced male colleague. The appointment of a junior
Senator does indicate that it was not a highly prized
position. Another senator was Thomas Burke, an Irish
Catholic Democrat from Boston who had been an active
proponent of the teachers' oath.
Commissioners appointed by the Republican speaker of
the house represented the spectrum of immigrant groups in
the commonwealth. He appointed three Republicans, Philip
Sherman, the original sponsor of the Resolve establishing
the commission, Edward Sirois, a French-Canadian from
Lawrence and Anthony Julian, an Italian from Watertown, and
two Democrats, Michael O'Brien, an Irishman from Easthampton
and Jackson Holtz, a Jew from Boston."'^ Governor Hurley
made three appointments including James Rose, former
commander of the Massachusetts Department of the American
Legion, and Leo Halloran, an Irishman from Quincy and also a
former commander of the Massachusetts Department of the
American Legion. The secretary to the commission was Roland
Parker, nephew of Herbert Parker, the patriarchal, arch
conservative Yankee lawyer who at the age of 87 was still
active in the Sentinels of the Republic. All in all, this
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was a very conservative commission whose members had several
axes to grind.
In the beginning, the left in Massachusetts cooperated
with the commission, on the theory that it would investigate
the right as well as the left. Exposure of fascist
tendencies in the commonwealth fit right into popular front
strategy. When hearings began in September 1937, two
leadoff witnesses were Philip Frankfeld, head of the
Communist party in Massachusetts, and Earl Browder, head of
the Communist party of the United States. Both men appeared
voluntarily. They testified that the Communist party was
not a subversive organization and outlined a fairly tame
version of party history. Following popular front strategy,
Browder told the commission the party's program was
"educational, to win the majority to our concepts of
socialism. We do not believe in the use of force against
the will of the majority."*^* The commissioners had a quite
different agenda for these hearings. Chairman Sybil Holmes
demanded lists of all Party members and contributors.
Senator Burke wanted to know if Frankfeld believed in God.
James Rose asked Frankfeld if he would bear arms for the
United States against the Soviet Union. After these initial
combative sessions, the Communist party and its liberal
allies began criticizing the scope of the investigation and
called for a more extensive investigation of fascism in
Massachusetts
.
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The commission held hearings throughout the fall 1937.
It met 59 times in public hearings and 40 times in closed,
executive session, hearing 70 witnesses and collecting over
1,000 exhibits. In May 1938, it issued a 580 page final
report Only 29 pages dealt with fascism and Nazism; the
other 551 dealt with the Communist party. The report
reveals that the commission had access to undercover
information about the internal workings of the party. It
details meetings, resolutions, and internal instructions
from the Central Committee of the CPUSA to District One; it
names hundreds of people as Communist party functionaries or
"fellow travellers" in Massachusetts; it lists aliases of
the leadership; and it exposes recruiting strategies and
7 6
organizing techniques.
There were at least two sources of this information.
One was the Bureau of Intelligence of the Massachusetts
National Guard. In June 1937, a week after their first
executive meeting, the commissioners met for several hours
with General Cole and Colonel Dalton of the National Guard.
As a result of this meeting, the National Guard agreed to
give the commission the results of their ten-year secret
investigation of communists in Massachusetts.^^ The
National Guard had long been involved in anti-radical
activities. In 1912, it was summoned to Lawrence to patrol
the streets and protect strikebreakers during the great
textile workers' strike. In 1919, the Guard was called
out
to police Boston when the city's patrolmen were
locked out
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over the issue of union recognition. In the 1920s and
1930s, the Guard's public role was limited to more
traditional emergencies like the 1936 flood disaster and the
7 81938 hurricane. it appears from the commission's report,
however, that during this time the Guard was very active
clandestinely.
The other source of undercover information was local
police. The commission asked all chiefs of police in the
state to share their files on communist activity within
their jurisdiction. Although there is no extant record of
compliance by local authorities, the findings of the report
suggest that cooperation was extensive. For instance, the
final report contains brief sketches of 77 individuals from
the Springfield area who are "known" communists and
"supporters" of the Communist party. One man, John Daja,
was reported to be "a paid agitator of the Communist party
during labor troubles in western Massachusetts." Another
was Oliver Larkin, a Smith College professor included
because he belonged to the Massachusetts Committee to Aid
Spanish Democracy and the American League Against War and
Fascism. Mrs. Frank Mauri made the list because she was
"alleged to be the distributor of Communist propaganda in
Greenfield. "®° It is very likely that this information came
from a clandestine Red Sguad within the Springfield police.
The commission's report was criticized widely for being
one-sided even as 2,000 copies were quickly snatched up. As
well as issuing a report, the commission also recommended
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passage of twelve bills to deal with the cominunist threat in
the state. These bills ranged from election reforms to make
it impossible for the Communist party to run candidates to
establishment of a Division of Citizenship that would
collect ongoing information about radical activities in the
state. This Division would have continued the investigation
made by the special commission, in essence
institutionalizing the Red hunt in Massachusetts. None of
these bills passed. Most died in committee or were referred
to the next session of the legislature. Apparently the
extreme position of the special commission was not a
majority view in the Massachusetts legislature.
An indication of the commission ' s extremism was its
inability to get adequate funding from the executive and
legislative branches of government. In the fall of 1937,
when several witnesses refused to turn over membership
lists, the commission sued them in civil court to force
compliance. The lawsuit prolonged the commission's work and
legal fees drained its funds. When Chairman Holmes sought
additional funds from Governor Hurley, he refused to
8
1
transfer money from any other appropriation. Since the
legislature was not in session to authorize additional
appropriations, the commission was forced to make do with
the funds it had. In spring 1938, when the legislature was
back in session, the House refused Chairman Holmes' request
to authorize additional funds so that the commission could
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complete its investigation.
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Another indication of the commission's unpopularity was
the fact that none of its members was able to capitalize
politically on their role in exposing " subversive"
activities. In 1938, Chairman Holmes was defeated in her
bid for reelection to the Senate making her a one-term
senator. Although Leo Halloran, former American Legion
official and fellow member of the special commission,
charged that she was defeated because of her "work against
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subversives," this was not true. In 1936, Holmes narrowly
defeated Edward Mullowney, a young, popular, Harvard
educated attorney. Two years later, the slim margin of
victory went in favor of Mullowney, not Holmes. She lost
the election in the Republican stronghold of Brookline where
Mullowney picked up his votes. A prominent political
commentator for the local Brookline newspaper blamed her
defeat on lack of support from "important politicians" and
"influential Republicans" who backed Miss Holmes in 1936 but
failed to support her reelection in 1938. What this
suggests is that some of her Republican constituency
switched sides and her political mentors sat out her
reelection. It does not make sense that liberal Republicans
would abandon an anticommunist Republican for an
anticommunist Democrat solely on the issue of communism.
What makes more sense is that her constituents were more
drawn to a bright, young male graduate of Harvard Law
School
than they were to a doughty, conservative self-taught
female
lawyer
.
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Of all the anticommunist initiatives during the
depression, the special commission had the potential to do
the most damage to communist organizing in the commonwealth.
Yet, surprisingly, this initiative had the least popular
support. The resolve establishing the commission slipped
through the legislature virtually unnoticed while attention
focused on the battle to repeal the teachers' oath law. In
contrast to the teachers' oath, the commission had few
boosters and few opponents. Its hearings were noisy and
well publicized but its report, detailing virtually all
communist activity in the commonwealth, went unheeded. The
legislature as a whole seemed uninterested in the findings.
Both the Governor and the legislature refused to allocate
any additional funds to the committee. None of the
legislation recommended by the commission ever made it out
of committee, suggesting that the Republican leadership did
not back the commission's report.
The special commission was not a grassroots initiative
led by local citizens groups, but rather a project launched
by disgruntled conservatives. The principal source of
information for the special commission was the Bureau of
Intelligence of the National Guard and local red squads.
Law enforcement's agenda was to publicize information about
the Communist party in Massachusetts, naming as many names
as possible. Their targets were communists and communist
sympathizers who had broken no laws and were outside the
reach of traditional police repression. The legislature as
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a whole, however, did not share this agenda during the
depression nor were they being pressured by their
constituents to investigate communism in the commonwealth.
Catholic Lay Groups
Although the commission failed to get any of its
proposed legislation passed, it did generate a lot of
publicity about the potential threat of communism in the
state, and it did publish hundred of names of people it
labeled as communists and communist sympathizers. This
exposure made it extremely difficult for popular front
activities in Massachusetts to continue in 1937 and 1938.
Catholic lay groups led the battle against communism at
the local level. The source of these anticommunist
initiatives lay at the highest levels of the Catholic
hierarchy. In 1934, the Pope's Secretary of State
designated the Knights of Columbus as "the standard bearers
of Catholic action."®^ Seeking to fulfill this mandate, the
national office of the Order launched a campaign to pressure
President Roosevelt to intercede in Mexico on behalf of
persecuted Catholics. Although the campaign was
unsuccessful, it served to heighten the issue of
anticommunism among Catholic men in the United States. In
May 1937, the Pope issued an Encyclical "On Atheistic
Communism" spurring the Knights on to find new targets.
That fall, the Knights of Columbus in Massachusetts
announced a campaign to combat communism uncovered during
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the special commission's hearings. The thrust of the
campaign was to alert people to the fact that communists
were "boring from within." Cardinal O'Connell gave his
blessing to the campaign and agreed to "cooperate in the
work which the Knights of Columbus are doing to combat
Q "7
Atheistic Communism in this country." The campaign opened
with a mass meeting in Boston in November 1937 attended by
500 knights. The principal speaker was Dr. George Derry,
Director of the Knights' Department of Social Education.
Derry warned his fellow knights not to be complacent because
"It can happen here." The strategy of the Communist party,
he told the crowd, was to capture labor unions, "seduce" the
CIO into a farmer-labor coalition, and play on the hard
times wrought by the depression to bring about a social
revolution. Another speaker was Reverend Michael Ahern, a
Jesuit teacher at Weston College and director of the
Archdiocese's Sunday radio program, the Catholic Truth Hour.
Ahern reminded the Knights of the Catholic tradition of
using Church endowments from wealthy parishioners to take
care of the poor. Communist revolution comes about, he
said, "in direct proportion to the denial of Catholic
practices and principles . "^^ The message that comes across
loud and clear is that to be a good Catholic, one had to be
anticommunist
.
Massachusetts knights brought the campaign to combat
communism to the local level by pressuring municipal
authorities to censor films favorable to the Loyalist
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government in Spain. The issue of the Spanish Civil War
deeply divided Catholics and Protestants in Massachusetts.^^
Cardinal O'Connell was particularly outspoken in his
denunciation of what he believed was a communist government
in Spain. The Boston Archdiocese newspaper, The Pilot, ran
lurid stories of Catholic atrocities in Spain long after
these practices declined in the summer of 1936.^°
Supporters of the Loyalist government saw the Spanish Civil
War as an epic struggle between Democracy and Fascism. The
most visible support organization in Massachusetts was a
medical committee, headquartered at Harvard, that raised
funds to send an ambulance to the Loyalist government. Once
again, the antagonists were Irish Catholics and Yankee
intellectuals. When support committees organized film
showings sympathetic to the Loyalist cause, local Knights
finally had a concrete issue.
In February 1938, local Catholics called on Fall River
Mayor Alexander Murray to ban a meeting sponsored by the
Friends of the Lincoln Brigade at which the Spanish War film
"Heart of Spain" was to be screened. Mayor Murray banned
the meeting because the film was "communistic and not in the
best interests of the community." Fall River's police chief
told reporters: "I will have my men arrest any speaker
whose remarks are subversive to the government." Two days
after the banned film showing, Fall River authorities
allowed a pro-Franco meeting to take place that was attended
by Governor Hurley. In April 1938, the Mayor of Brockton
banned a showing of "Heart of Spain" in a municipal
auditorium. When organizers found a private auditorium, the
building inspector condemned the hall because the seats were
not nailed down.^^ In May 1938, the Norwood School
Committee revoked a permit for the Friends of Spanish
Democracy to hold a lecture in the school auditorium when
Knights and other Catholic groups protested. Two weeks
earlier, the school committee had granted a permit for a
pro-Franco meeting. In July 1938, Provincetown selectmen
banned a showing of "Spain in Flames" when the local
American Legion post protested.
In the summer of 1938, the Friends of Spanish Democracy
found obstacles at every turn when they announced a
screening of "Blockade" in Boston. The State Deputy of the
Knights of Columbus asked the League of Catholic Women to
organize the protest in Boston. The League, organized in
1910 by Cardinal O'Connell in response to the Protestant
clubwomen's movement that excluded Catholic women, initially
focused on educational programs for wealthy Catholic
matrons. In the 1930s, Cardinal O'Connell asked the League
to "speak for Catholic interests at legislative hearings on
subjects concerning the home and family life."^^ The League
became very active in legislative battles over the Child
Labor Amendment and birth control. In 1934, its
president, Lillian Slattery, began speaking out against
communism. Although some fellow League members thought
Slattery 's foray into "political matters" inappropriate.
their complaint to Cardinal O'Connell fell on deaf ears.^^
Slattery lectured on communism at local women's
organizations, like the Scituate Women's Betterment Club.
From 1935 until her death in 1938, Slattery vigorously
organized countless formal and informal lectures on the
menace of communism.^'' By 1938, the League was primed to
take on the task of closing down "Blockade" in Boston.
The Catholic women first appealed to the Boston City
Council, claiming that the movie was "communistic" and that
it appealed for help for the Spanish Loyalist cause. The
City Council agreed and voted unanimously to ask Mayor
Maurice Tobin to ban the film. Tobin did not fall in line,
however, and insisted on seeing the film. When Tobin
announced that he would allow it to be screened, the
Catholic women took their protest to Governor Hurley.
Senator Burke, a former member of the special commission,
endorsed the demand that the Governor revoke the license of
any theatre showing the film.^® The Catholic women lost
their battle, however, and the film was shown.
A similar battle took place in Worcester. When a
Loyalist support organization announced a screening of
"Blockade," students from Holy Cross College protested.
Initially, the mayor agreed to ban the film on the grounds
that it would incite riot. But, when the Civil Liberties
Union interceded, the Mayor agreed to submit the film to the
Worcester Board of Motion Pictures. The Board consisted of
62 residents from all walks of life, who watched the film
and voted 39 to 23 to permit it to be shown. No riots
ensued.
Like the teachers' oath fight, the campaign of lay
Catholics to stop leftists from organizing support for the
Loyalist government in Spain was very noisy with impassioned
spokesmen on both sides. The campaign drew great publicity
particularly when public officials balked at censorship.
Like the special commission, the grass roots campaign among
lay Catholics achieved limited success. The source of this
anticommunist initiative was the Catholic Church; the
Vatican identified the issue while local groups identified
the target.
Conclusion
Returning to historiographical questions raised in
chapter one, what happened in Massachusetts during the
depression does not fit any of the competing paradigms.
However, it may be unfair to expect models developed to
explain postwar anticommunism—what most writers refer to as
McCarthyism—to explain prewar anticommunism as well.
However, if these models do not work, what does? The
evidence of anticommunism in Massachusetts during the
depression suggests that no one source was at work. Police
harassment, the teachers' oath, the special commission, and
lay Catholic opposition to the Loyalist cause in Spain are
all distinct anticommunist initiatives springing from
different needs and circumstances.
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The least surprising of depression era anticommunist
initiatives is harassment of radicals and communist-led
unions by local authorities. This was nothing new in the
commonwealth. On the other hand, the teachers' oath law was
a depression era anticommunist initiative new in the
commonwealth, if not in the country. The Fish committee
report, the American Legion, and Hearst press created a
national stir about Red teachers in the United States that,
in Massachusetts, played right into long standing Yankee-
Irish antagonism. Of all the anticommunist initiatives in
the depression, the teachers' oath was the most contested.
Supporters of the oath were Catholic Democrats, liberal
Republicans with working class sympathies and arch-
conservative Republicans. The special commission was a home
grown anticommunist initiative championed largely by the
right wing. It was not derivative of federal initiatives to
establish the House Un-American Activities Committee because
its final report was issued before Chairman Martin Dies even
began holding hearings. Although it named many names, it
did not create a statewide clamor to stop communist
organizing in the state. When lay Catholics organized to
stop pro-Loyalist support groups, they were following the
lead of their church.
The old paradigms, top down or bottom up explanations,
do not help us understand depression era anticommunism in
Massachusetts because issues of ethnicity and class muddy
the waters considerably. There was no one source driving
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ant icommunist initiatives in the 1930s. Instead, there W(
several sources, each with different prejudices and
different goals. Catholics feared for their church, Red
Squads wanted a docile labor force, and conservative
isolationist Yankees hated Jews and Bolsheviks. These
forces never consciously united to fight communism in the
commonwealth but rather bumped into each other doing the
same thing at critical moments.
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CHAPTER 4
WARTIME ANTICOMMUNISM
Ant icommunist sentiment continued throughout the war
years in Massachusetts. During the period of the Soviet-
Nazi pact, from August 1939 to June 1941, police and
municipal harassment of Communist party antiwar activities
increased. At the same time, the legislature debated a bill
aimed at communists to keep "subversive" parties off the
ballot. With the Soviet Union allied to Hitler,
anticommunist liberals in Massachusetts resigned from
organizations too closely connected to popular front
politics. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the
Communist party joined the war effort at home and the
government temporarily halted anticommunist initiatives.
However, radicals who continued to oppose the war, such as
conscientious objectors, faced stiff opprobrium in their
communities
.
During the war, isolationist ideology emphasized
anticommunism and anti-Semitism. Father Coughlin's
followers found support among some Irish Catholics in
Massachusetts. In 1939, Coughlin-backed Christian Front
activities surfaced in Boston. As the nation plunged into
war alongside the Red Army, the Christian Front flourished
among men left behind on Boston's home front. ^ Coughlinites
were not the only isolationists to continue anticommunist
activities during the war. National leaders of the America
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First movement joined local isolationists on public plat-
forms in Boston to argue that subversives at home posed an
even greater threat to national security than the Axis
powers
.
By following the thread of anticommunism on the local
level, we see that the wartime alliance between the Soviet
Union and the United States did not halt anticommunist
activity. Scholars studying anticommunism on the national
level, where the Roosevelt Administration accepted Communist
party assistance after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet
Union, missed the important link between the prewar "little
Red Scare" and postwar "McCarthyism" expressed at the local
level. ^ This chapter sheds light on that link in
Massachusetts
.
Nazi-Soviet Pact
When the Soviet Union announced its alliance with the
Third Reich in August 1939, the Communist party in the
United States abruptly reversed its call for war against
fascism. In Massachusetts, the party's "Yanks Are Not
Coming" committee organized antiwar activities as vigorously
as it previously organized for United States involvement in
fighting fascism in Europe. The sudden shift in position,
prompted only by foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union,
fueled the fires of anticommunism. Detractors used the
shift to bolster their claim that communists in the United
States were puppets of the Soviet Union; liberals, who
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joined the party or front organizations to fight fascism,
resigned in disgust; pro-British Yankees denounced antiwar
communists as a fifth column. Overnight, the Soviet-Nazi
pact eliminated whatever legitimacy the Communist party
gained through its popular front activities. This opened
the door to a new wave of harassment against communist
activities in Massachusetts.
In 1939, the Boston Red Squad surreptitiously searched
CP headquarters without a warrant. No action followed
against the police.'' Across the river in Cambridge, police
confiscated 5,000 antiwar flyers from Young Communist League
leaf letters in Harvard Square.^ In November 1939, the
Harvard Corporation banned Earl Browder, chairman of the
Communist party in the United States, from lecturing to the
John Reed Society of Harvard, a "non-political organization
composed of students interested in the study of scientific
socialism," because it would be "in bad taste. The next
month, the Cambridge City Council passed a law prohibiting
quotations from Stalin, or photographs of Stalin, in any
magazine, book or paper distributed by the City.^
Presumably, this law covered public school textbooks,
although there is no evidence of its enforcement in
Cambridge
.
In spring 1940, Boston plainclothes officers broke up
an antiwar meeting of "The Yanks Are Not Coming" committee
to prevent the head of the Massachusetts branch of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars from speaking at the meeting.^ Ir
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May 1940, B ' nai Brith invited J. Edgar Hoover, director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to address their annual
banquet. Hoover told 2,000 B'nai Brith members and
supporters that the greatest problem facing the nation was
"fellow travellers who do the bidding of Communists."®
In spring 1941, the Worcester chief of police denied a
permit to the Communist party for an outdoor antiwar meeting
because it would be "unpatriotic." In Boston, the
Charlestown naval ship yard dismissed two men who were
suspected of belonging to the party because they were "ill
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States. "^° At the same time, the FBI trained three
battalions of Boston police in espionage and sabotage.
Police commissioner Joseph Timility told a Harvard Business
School audience there was "close collaboration on matters of
national defense and fifth column activity" in the
commonwealth. '^ Given J. Edgar Hoover's views on the
Communist party, that surely meant communist activity as
much as it meant fascist activity. Evidence of this
federal-local law enforcement collaboration surfaced at the
1941 May Day rally on Boston Common when plainclothed Boston
police, FBI agents, and Army intelligence officers openly
monitored 500 people gathered to hear local Communist party
leaders Otis Hood and Ann Burlak, and Ben Davis, associate
12
editor of the Communist party newspaper.
In 1941, the Massachusetts legislature debated a bill,
sponsored by the American Legion, to keep candidates from
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"un-American" parties off the ballot. While proponents of
the bill paid lip service to opposing fascists as well as
communists, the real target of the bill was the Communist
party. Legislators knew that Communist party candidates had
never come anywhere near an electoral victory. The purpose
of the bill was to prevent communists from having a platform
during campaigns and raising difficult questions. Mrs.
LaRue Brown, spokeswoman for the Massachusetts League of
Women Voters, told the House Elections Committee that the
"real desire of the proponents was to ... stop the
Communists from talking. "^"^ When the bill reached the floor
of the House, legislators changed the proscribed group from
"party ... engag[ing] in or promot[ing] subversive activity"
to "any party which is identified or affiliated with a
foreign government or foreign political party and which
exists mainly to act for, with, or on behalf of such foreign
government or foreign political party. "^^ This language
made it crystal clear that the target of the bill was the
Communist party. However, the bill's proponents did not
have enough votes for passage, and the House referred it to
the next session of the General Court by a vote of 80 to 57.
By the following year, the nation was at war with Germany,
allied with the Soviet Union. No one reintroduced the bill
When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941,
ending the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Communist party suddenly
reversed policy, as it had in 1939, and now promoted U.S.
involvement in the European war. The alliance of the Soviet
Union with England and France in the summer of 1941, and
with the United States after Pearl Harbor in December 1941,
temporarily halted government harassment of the Communist
party on the state and local level in Massachusetts. The
popular front, hov/ever, had already lost its liberal allies
and when government-sponsored anticommunism resurfaced after
the war, there were fewer voices to protest the new
initiatives
.
The Communist party's second abrupt reversal on the
need to fight fascism in Europe fostered anticommunist
sentiment within liberal organizations. In 1940, the
American Civil Liberties Union's national governing body
passed a provision prohibiting supporters of "totalitarian
dictatorships" from serving on its board of directors or
staff. Based on this new policy, the ACLU's national board
of directors purged Communist party member Elizabeth Gurley
Flynn from its ranks. The Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts (CLUM), an affiliate of the ACLU but not a
subsidiary chapter, disagreed with the ACLU and never
adopted an anticommunist policy. Mary Elizabeth Sanger,
executive secretary of CLUH, told Roger Baldwin, national
director of ACLU, in no uncertain terms that: "We do not
require oaths of allegiance nor -opinions tests' of our
members or officers and we have loyalty and allegiance. We
allow our officers and members of our Executive Committee
full civil rights and freedom to sponsor such meetings
as
they choose. "^^
In the short run, CLUM's refusal to purge suspected
Communist party members from its ranks meant that
influential, liberal supporters resigned. Henry Hamm, for
instance, resigned as associate counsel and member of CLUM
in 1942 because executive committee members worked on the
"Free Browder convention." He would not belong to an
organization with a "strong minority block" on its executive
committee that influenced policy and made CLUM a "subsidiary
of which the Communist party is the holding company. "^^ In
the long run, however, CLUM ' s refusal to toe the line meant
one clear voice would continue to be heard opposing
anticommunist initiatives afrer the war.
Conscientious Objectors
Radicals outside the Communist party who continued to
oppose the war after Pearl Harbor faced stiff censure from
their communities. Although World War II produced less than
half as many conscientious objectors as World War I, COs
were treated as pariahs during the "Good War." Most spent
the war in CO camps, virtual prisons where they performed
manual labor for the state. More than 95 percent of the
men who refused to fight in World War II did so on religious
grounds. Radicals who refused to fight belonged to the
Socialist party and were a hated minority within a hated
minority
.
Carl Walz, a graduate of Amherst College and member of
the Socialist party was one such CO. Walz taught German and
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history at Turners Falls high school in a small factory town
on the Connecticut River in western Massachusetts. He
helped charter the Northfield branch of the American
Federation of Teachers, a left-leaning union alternative to
the National Educational Association. Walz's principal and
school committee knew about his politics and told him he
could teach so long as he did not bring "socialist
propaganda" into the classroom. From 1934 until 1942,
school authorities renewed his contract with annual $100
raises. On weekends and when school was in recess, Walz
lived in Easthampton, closer to the radical community in
Springfield. During the week he lodged at the Turners Falls
hotel
.
In October 1940, Arthur E. Burke, Superintendent of
Schools, called Walz into his office to verify a
"scandalous" rumor making the rounds of local barrooms.
According to the gossip, Walz had persuaded a local boy not
to register for the draft. Walz denied advising anyone
about a matter he considered so "personal and important."
When asked his own draft status, Walz replied that he
intended to register as a conscientious objector. Burke
told Walz that no true patriot could be a CO and asked him
20
to reconsider his position.
In May 1941, the school committee held up renewal of
Walz's contract ostensibly because of declining enrollment
in the courses he taught. Walz thought it was because of
his pacifism and sought the advice of Bernard Dirks, a
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school committeeman who had been a CO during World War I.
Walz also contacted the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union
to line up legal support in case he was fired. After
stalling for six weeks, the school committee finally renewed
Walz's contract for the 1941-42 academic year.^^
The following year, however, the school committee voted
not to renew Walz's contract. By this time Walz had
officially registered as a CO. Superintendent Burke
admitted calling his draft board in May 1942 to find out his
draft status. Walz learned about the school committee's
action from the local newspaper. When he confronted the
Superintendent, Burke told Walz no reason had been stated
for not renewing the contract. Since Massachusetts tenure
law required school boards to give a reason for contract
non-renewal, Walz wrote the committee suggesting they seek
legal advice. He also requested a leave of absence having
22
been ordered to report to a CO camp in New Hampshire.
On July 7, 1942, the school committee held an emergency
session to consider the Walz case. All eight members of the
committee were upper-middle-class residents. The town's
factory workers were not represented at all. Five of the
men ran local businesses—a drug store, a trucking company,
a furniture store, a building contractor, and a coal
company. Two men were professionals—an architect and an
insurance salesman/newspaper reporter. One man ran a large
commercial farm. The two women on the school committee were
married to leading men in the community, one being a
doctor's wife and the other a retired businessman's wife.^-^
Superintendent Burke attended all school committee meetings,
including the emergency meeting to discuss Walz. According
to the chairman of the school board, Burke "guided and
directed" them "without attempting to usurp the legal powers
of the board itself."^*
At the emergency meeting, one school board member
suggested they simply drop German from the curriculum
thereby eliminating Walz's job without having to fire him.
Bernard Dirks, the World War I CO, urged board members to be
honest about their reasons. When Dirks later testified in
court about the meeting, he remembered saying "if the real
objection is to Walz himself, let us come out in the open as
to that reason." One member said he did not like Walz's
pacifist beliefs; another said "a conscientious objector is
not a proper person to be in the public schools"; another
was very angry that Walz did not have to serve when his son
was in the Pacific aboard an air craft carrier.
Superintendent Burke told the committee "I do not want Walz
or any other conscientious objector working in my school
system. "^^ At the end of the meeting, the committee voted
to discontinue offering German classes and dismissed Walz
"with reason. "^^
Walz sued the school board, seeking reinstatement of
his job and money damages for lost wages. His case was
heard by Superior Court Judge Thomas J. Hammond, an old line
Yankee. A Republican, Congregationalist , Amherst College
and Harvard Law School graduate, veteran of World War I, and
former district attorney for western Massachusetts, Hammond
was totally antagonistic to Walz's socialist beliefs.
During the hearing, he dismissed outright Walz's claim for
back wages on the grounds that Walz had been in a CO camp
and unable to work. When Walz's lawyer explained to the
judge that conscientious objectors were allowed to leave
camp in order to perform community service. Judge Hammond
exploded. He could not believe that the government would
allow COS to stay home and earn a living while other men had
to go overseas. In September 1942, Hammond denied Walz's
petition in its entirety finding that the school board acted
properly when it dismissed Walz "with reason. "^^ No higher
court ever reviewed the case.
The Walz case gives us a window on small town attitudes
in Massachusetts towards socialists who opposed military
service during World War II. There was little sympathy for
these young men with pacifist political principles. In
Turners Falls, school officials would not tolerate such
political deviance. Walz taught at the high school at
sufferance. He could engage in radical political work so
long it was far away and could not influence the town's high
school students. When Walz's pacifist position became
publicly known in town, he was fired.
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Isolationism
Some people who believed the United States should stay
out of the war in Europe became avid McCarthyites a decade
later. This should come as no surprise, since isolationist
ideology rested on twin pillars of anticommunism and anti-
Semitism. After the war, revelations about the Holocaust
made anti-Semitism unpalatable—at least publicly.
Anticommunism, however, resurged with a vengeance. By
looking at isolationists, we find another unbroken thread of
anticommunism in Massachusetts from the "little Red Scare"
to "McCarthyism. "^^
There were three sources of isolationism on the state
and local level: the America First movement and the
Protestant far right, Catholic Church leaders and
politicians, and followers of Father Coughlin. The
Christian Front, a direct action offshoot of Coughlin 's
Social Justice movement, flourished among some Catholics in
Boston. The Front, which embraced the most vitriolic
expressions of anti-Semitism and anticommunism, began in
1939 and continued after Pearl Harbor, peaking in the winter
of 1943-1944.
In Massachusetts, the America First Committee and the
Protestant far right were the least important of these three
sources of isolationism. The America First Committee
originated in the mid-West, among powerful industrialists
and Senators from Populist states. Robert McCormick's
Chicago Tribune led the ideological battle against
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intervention. A group of Chicago industrialists, headed by
Robert E. Wood of Sears, Roebuck and Thomas S. Hammond of
the Whiting Corporation, organized the committee in 1940 to
keep the United States out of war. They believed Germany
was going to win and that German economic hegemony in Europe
would lead to the fall of the Soviet Union. They hoped
these events would create significant investment
opportunities for American industrialists. The Committee
was initially well received in the business community and
among conservative newspaper publishers
. Its leading
spokesman, Charles Lindberg, Senators Burton Wheeler from
Montana, Gerald Nye from North Dakota, and Bennett Champ
Clark from Missouri pushed the American First position to
Congress
.
Conservative Massachusetts Yankees, however, were not
associated with the America First Committee as they had been
during the depression with the conservative Liberty League
and the Sentinels of the Republic. Theirs was a different
brand of conservatism. In addition, the Yankee elite had
deep, personal ties to England. The most prominent
Massachusetts politicians associated with the America First
position were not conservative Yankees but rather Irish
Catholics—Senator David I. Walsh and Ambassador Joseph
Kennedy.
Although leadership of the America First Committee did
not include elite Yankees, other Bay Staters sympathized
with the organization's isolationist principles. In May
1941, 3,000 people packed Boston's Symphony Hall to hear
Senator Burton address an America First rally. The audience
booed loudly at the mention of President Roosevelt's Lend-
Lease program and cheered even louder at the mention of
Charles Lindberg."'^ A year earlier, in May 1940, the
American Mother's Neutrality League sponsored an outdoor
rally on the Boston Common. Five thousand people came to
hear Representative Martin Dies denounce the newest "Trojan
horse"—internationalists leading the United Sates into war.
Boston's former district attorney, John Joseph Murphy acted
as moderator of the rally and later became a principal
organizer for the Christian Front. Another speaker at the
rally was former Representative Tommy Dorgan, "father of the
teacher • s oath. "^^
These rallies, however, did not draw on agrarian
populist support, as they did in the mid-West, but rather on
longstanding ethnic and class antagonism. In Massachusetts,
support for isolationism was organized by the Catholic
Church, not by the America First Committee. Political
scientist John Stack, in his study of Boston's Irish,
Italians and Jews during the war years, sees Irish and
Italian isolationism as ethnic conflict, most clearly
expressed as Anglophobia or pride for the mother country
To be sure, it was that. Stack quotes the Italian News
denouncing justification for intervention as a "tide of
British falsehoods" brought by people "blinded by the
shining glitter of British gold."" Irish hatred of the
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British Empire goes centuries deep. However, what Stack
misses is the political dimension of isolationism. its
meaning was richer than just Anglophobia.
Isolationism embraced a conservative world view that
prized America and saw communists and Jews as enemies of
Americanism. Indeed, for isolationists, communists and Jews
were synonymous. The problems facing the United Sates, they
argued, were not in Europe but at home. Domestic communist
subversion threatened national security far more than
European imperialism. Even after Pearl Harbor, with the
United States allied to the Soviet Union and Hitler's
atrocities against the Jewish people exposed, anti-Semitism
and anticommunism continued unabated among isolationists in
Massachusetts
.
Catholic Neutrality
The Catholic hierarchy in Massachusetts followed the
lead of Pope Pius who remained neutral throughout World War
II. While the Pope denounced anti-Semitism, he denounced
communism even more strongly. His 1937 encyclical, Divini
Redemptoris , warned that communism was the greatest menace
to the world, a position he repeated ad nauseam. Just as
the Pope called for prayer to end the war, so did Boston's
Cardinal O'Connell.
In April 1940, the Cardinal urged Catholic women to pay
no attention to "war propaganda" that was "exciting emotions
and delusions and fears" and "trying to make us think that
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one side or the other are fighting for sublime ideals." The
Cardinal argued that "just because we are sorry [for people
being oppressed], we do not intend to make the same mistake
[and enter the war]." "The one thing we can do," he told
Catholic women, "is pray for peace. ""^'^ In June 1940, as
Germany was closing in on Paris, O'Connell told Boston
College graduates at their commencement that "God still
rules the universe and God will protect France. "^^
In contrast to Catholic neutrality. Harvard graduates
and faculty in 1940 were endorsing President Conant ' s call
for "immediate and substantial assistance" for England and
her allies. In a well publicized radio address, Conant
called for a "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies." Once again, Irish Catholic leaders and Yankee
elite squared off on opposing sides of international issues.
On Mothers Day in 1941, Senator Walsh, speaking at a
communion breakfast in his hometown of Clinton, denounced
"moneyed interests, the college professors and the
idealists" who were leading the United States to war. He
told the assembled Catholic mothers that if the U.S. went to
war, they could expect their fifteen, sixteen and seventeen
year old sons to be drafted. On the same day in Boston,
Harvard Professor William Elliott addressed the annual
meeting of the Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs.
He told these Protestant mothers that America had a duty to
intervene because it was the only power left that could stop
37
Hitler and the rise of Fascism.
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The editors of the Boston Pilot, the influential
newspaper of the Boston Archdiocese, covered the war by
reporting on persecution of Catholics. In March 1940, the
paper reported on "Hitler's Aims to Destroy Christianity";
in August 1940, it was "Seizure of Baltic States Heavy Blow
to Church."^® The issue for the Church was never the
dangers of authoritarianism; it was how the Church fared
under these regimes. "Probably the most barren spot on
earth, from a spiritual point of view is Russia. Here war
against God never relents... Almost as bad is Germany...
Most irritating is the case of Mexico. Here we have
religious peace endangered where an enlightened attitude by
39
our government would compel respect for all rights."
When compared to Nazis, according to the Pilot, Communists
came out worse. Communists were sneaky and tricky like the
Japanese. "While sometimes classified as Europeans," opined
the Pilot, "it is a fact that Russians possess Asiatic
mentality .
"
While public attention focused on Europe, the Pilot
continued to alert its readers to the danger of communist
subversion at home. "Communism is the enemy of democracy.
How much more evidence shall we require before we accept
this fact that the authentic Communist can never be a
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trustworthy ally of any democratic nation?" In an
editorial titled "Fifth Column," the Pilot proclaimed that
Communist subversion was far more worrisome than Nazi
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subversion.
There is no considerable number of Americans in
this country who have any sympathy with Nazism.,.
Let us not forget that we have a very flourishing
Fifth Column already established... Our unity is
watered by the presence of a vast column made up
of Communists, fellow travelers and friends of
Soviet Russia... Brown Bolshevism undermined
Norway, Red Bolshevism seeks to undermine us.
Even after Pearl Harbor, when the United States was allied
with the Soviet Union, the Pilot continued to toll the
tocsin. "We have declared war on Brown Bolshevism. But
victory will mean little if we allow Red Bolshevists to
undermine us at home.
The Christian Front
Father Coughlin, the radio priest from Detroit,
continued to draw support in poor Irish Catholic
neighborhoods in Boston even as his star waned nationally
due to increasingly strident anti-Semitism. When a Boston
radio station announced in 1939 that it would no longer air
Coughlin' s "sermons," one thousand people met at Mechanics
Hall to organize the Committee for Defense of American
Constitutional Rights. The committee's three goals were to
defend free speech, to protest "radio monopoly," and to
demand government action against communism and "other un-
American activities. "^^ These Coughlinites saw the hand of
communists behind the radio ban.
Three months later, in April 1939, seven thousand
people returned to Mechanics Hall to hear Father Edward
Lodge Curran, Coughlin' s principle disciple, debate
Granville Hicks, a Communist sympathizer and temporary
lecturer at Harvard University.** Curran was pastor and
president of the International Catholic Truth society and
editor of the largest Catholic weekly in the United States,
the Brooklyn Tablet. The topic they debated was "Resolved,
that Communism is the enemy of American democracy." Boston
police sent 100 officers to keep order. Hicks tried to
attack the Church by linking it to authoritarianism and
Nazism. Curran fought back, taking his theme from William
Z. Foster's quote "Religion is the opium of the people."
Judging on the basis of crowd reaction, Curran won the
debate handily. Throughout the evening, the crowd cheered
Curran as loudly as it booed and hissed Hicks.
Father Curran 's visit laid the groundwork for Christian
Front organizing. Indeed, Boston was one of only three
cities where the Christian Front took root, the others being
New York and Philadelphia. In the fall 1939, Boston's Front
organizers held a series of meetings that ended with
participants postering anti-Semitic stickers in Jewish
neighborhoods.*^ In January 1940, the FBI's arrest of 18
men in Brooklyn, including several Christian Front members,
temporarily halted organizing. Hoover was under pressure
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from President Roosevelt to investigate Nazi sympathizers.
Six months later, when a Brooklyn jury acquitted 14 and hung
on the remaining defendants, Front organizing in Boston
resumed
.
A month after the Brooklyn trial ended. Rev. Ahern
chose the topic "What is the Christian Front?" for his
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weekly Sunday afternoon radio address on the Catholic Truth
Hour. Cardinal O'Connell preapproved Ahern's remarks and
published them in the Pilot. Ahern explained that groups of
Catholics and Protestants organized the Christian Front to
oppose "encroachments of Communism and other anti-Christian
activities." While Catholics belonged to the Front, it was
not affiliated with the Church, like the Holy Name Society
or Knights of Columbus. "It is unfair," complained Ahern,
"to blame the Catholic church for any mistakes the Christian
Front may have made." After distancing the Church from the
Front, Ahern concluded his address by attacking the
government and press for singling out the group. "The real
culprits were not the 17 men arrested but the instigators of
the arrest."^® On balance, Ahern treated the Front as a
legitimate organization fighting communism. Since O'Connell
approved all radio programming, he must have agreed with
Ahern's assessment.
In June 1941, the Christian Front organized showings of
the Nazi film, "Victory in the West," at the Hibernian Hall
in Roxbury. The events were "jammed with frenzied pro-
Fascism, hate-the-Jew sermons, and inflammatory speech
making." The principal leader of the Front, Francis P.
Moran, had helped organize the Committee For Defense of
American Constitutional Rights in 1939 to protest the
banning of Father Coughlin on the radio. In his speeches at
Front meetings, Moran attacked both Roosevelt and Churchill.
Roosevelt, he charged, plotted to establish a personal
dictatorship in Washington and put 1,500 "non-Christians" in
the federal government.*^ Other Coughlinite offshoots, like
the Social Justice Guild of Boston and Mothers Neutrality
League, cosponsored Front events.
In early 1942, Coughlinites brought Father Curran back
to Boston for several appearances. The most contentious
occasion was Evacuation Day, a Boston holiday that
commemorates the departure of the hated British troops in
1776. Nearly two centuries after the event occurred,
Boston's Irish had appropriated this holiday as their own.
It marked a defeat for the British Army, always a cause for
celebration in the Irish community, and fell on the eve of
Saint Patrick's day. By merging the symbolism of these two
events, the Irish at once asserted their American patriotism
and ethnic identity. By 1942, South Boston hosted the
city's Evacuation Day ceremonies.
When the South Boston Citizens Committee invited Father
Curran to be its principal speaker at the 166th anniversary
of Evacuation Day, swift opposition developed. The
controversy tapped into long-standing ethnic and class
divisions. Liberals, Yankees and Jews saw Father Curran as
a vicious anti-Semite who revelled in the defeat of the
British army. They felt his vitriol particularly
inappropriate when the United States was at war with Hitler
and allied with England. Irish organizers of the event saw
Father Curran as a spokesman for the Irish perspective.
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A self-appointed committee tried to keep Curran out of
South Boston. The Massachusetts CIO, a body dominated by
Jewish labor leaders, and its member locals called on state
politicians to boycott the ceremony; Donald Lothrup, pastor
of the liberal Community Church, sent an urgent telegram to
Mayor Maurice Tobin, conveniently vacationing in Florida
during the controversy. On Saturday, the day before the
event, opponents staged a vigil at City Hall while their
representatives tried to contact city officials.
Organizers from South Boston dismissed these protests as the
work of communists. William Gallagher, president of the
Evacuation Day committee, told reporters objection to Father
Curran was "tinged with pink, gradually deepening into
red. "^^
When Father Curran arrived at South Boston High School,
5,000 people greeted him with thunderous applause. His
first words, "I am here," said it all. At the beginning of
his speech, he thanked Cardinal O'Connell for granting him
"ecclesiastical permission" to come to Boston. Playing to
long standing animosity between Boston's Irish and Yankees,
he said "I don't care whether [my opponents] are common or
episcopal bigots. I don't care whether anyone else in
Boston likes me. You do and I'll come back again any time
you want me to."" Curran spoke for 45 minutes, reviewing
the history of Boston during the Revolutionary War in detail
while never once addressing the war in Europe. In a very
stirring end to his speech, Curran warned:
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There are internal enemies in the United States ofAmerica today... The internal enemies are those
who would repeal the Constitution, scrap the bill
of rights, destroy freedom of speech and surrender
America to worldwide atheistic revolution of
Communism... [l]n the name of those who fought on
Dorchester Hill, we want no totalitarian form of
government in America. We want no Nazism and no
Fascism and no Communism.
Although most politicians ducked the controversy
because of "other commitments," South Boston's politicians
appeared in force. Other speakers at the Evacuation Day
ceremony included Boston School Committeeman Patrick Foley,
Boston Public Welfare Commissioner William O'Hare, Acting
Mayor and Ward 7 Councilor Thomas Linehan, Chief Marshal
Patrick Gammon and Representative John E. Powers.
Some Irish Catholic leaders were appalled by Curran's
politics and protested his appearance at the Evacuation Day
ceremony. Frances Sweeney, president of the American-Irish
Defense Association and outspoken Curran critic, joined the
vigil outside City Hall the day before Curran's visit. She
attend the Evacuation Day event, sitting at the press table.
However, while the crowd waited for Curran to arrive,
William Gallagher, president of the Evacuation Day
committee, spotted Sweeney. Two men, one of whom wore a
Legionnaire's uniform, confronted her and asked her to
leave. When she refused, people in the front of the
auditorium rose to their feet shouting "put her out." The
two men picked her up off the floor and "escorted" her out
of the hall. One reporter said "scores of women hissed and
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booed" as she was dragged down the center isle.
As if to underscore the independence of the Irish
community, the South Boston Citizens Committee invited
Father Curran back again the following year. However, no
public outcry developed in 1943, and local newspapers did
not cover the event. At the beginning of his speech, Curran
greeted "Christian Fronters" in the crowd thanking them for
their faithful support. They included William Gallagher,
president of the Evacuation Day committee, and Captain John
Joseph Murphy. Originally from South Boston, Murphy had
worked for Father Coughlin at his headquarters in Detroit.
He led Christian Front and American First organizing in
Boston, and published a newspaper titled "Save America Now:
A Bulletin of Massachusetts."^^
In his speech. Father Curran discussed the newest
domestic peril—civilian defense. He warned the audience
that it was "communistic" and must be stopped. Another
speaker at the 1943 Evacuation Day commemoration was Rep.
Hamilton Fish, a prominent Yankee who represented New York
in Washington. Fish told the audience that it was an honor
to speak from the "theatre of the great British defeat." He
urged the audience to work with his organization, America
First, to confront domestic dangers. With "the Japs and
Nazis surrounded," the war in Europe was over. Americans
needed to get back to the war at home, he warned, because
"there is more to fear from our enemies within.
"^^
Christian Front activities took place in the streets as
well as on public platforms. In the fall of 1943, the Civil
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Liberties Union of Massachusetts reported that, a "wave of
anti-Semitism forced Boston into an unsavory position of
leadership in national intolerance."^'' Until an October
1943 anti-Semitic incident brought national attention to
Boston, local politicians, police and press ignored
complaints from Jewish leaders about the rising tide of
anti-Semitic violence. A gang of Irish street toughs jumped
two Jewish boys, Jacob Hodas and Harvey Blaustein, and beat
them badly. Police who arrived on the scene followed their
standard procedures and sent the attackers away without
taking names or making any arrests. When Jacob and Harvey
protested, the police arrested them.. At the Dorchester
precinct, a police officer beat Harvey with a rubber hose
while calling him "yellow Jew." A trial judge found Jacob
and Harvey guilty of participating in an "affray" and fined
5 8
each of them ten dollars.
The Christian Science Monitor, the first Boston
newspaper to cover the "anti-Semitic hooliganism," pointed
the finger at the Christian Front and other Coughlinite
groups. When other newspapers publicized allegations of
complicity by the Boston police. Governor Saltonstall asked
the state police to conduct an independent investigation of
Boston police practices. The state police concluded that
some Boston police officers beat Jewish suspects they
stopped in the streets or brought to the precinct. Governor
Saltonstall responded to the probe by firing Boston police
commissioner Joseph Timility. The governor also appointed a
special task force to devise ways to confront neighborhood
anti-Semitic violence. The event symbolized Yankee-Irish
relations. Irish Boston added Saltonstall
' s imperious act
to the litany of abuses suffered at the hands of smug Yankee
overlords. Yankee Boston renewed its vigilance over Irish
excesses
.
Street gangs and Boston police were not the only
perpetrators of anti-Semitic acts during the war. Anti-
Semites distributed vicious, anti-Jewish propaganda at war
plants. In fall 1943, three workers at the Bethlehem Steel
plant in Hingham passed out anti-Semitic leaflets on the
shop floor. When another worker reported the incident to
management and the FBI, he was laid off. A month later,
anti-Semites posted flyers at their union's shop
headquarters that said "Pay your dues and pay the Jews."^°
Similar anti-Semitic leafletting took place at the Fore
River shipyard in Quincy.
Conclusion
By looking at anticommunism on the local and state
level in Massachusetts, we find a continuous thread of
anticommunist activity during the war years. There were two
strands to this thread. One came from people who found
opposition to the war unpatriotic. Police and municipal
authorities did what they could to shut down Communist party
antiwar organizing. When the party switched sides and
joined the war effort, attention shifted to conscientious
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objectors. Small towns were unwilling to tolerate radicals
who opposed the war on political principles.
The other strand of anticoininunist activity originated
in Catholic isolationism. The Church's position was a
principled one that followed the neutrality of the Pope.
The Church never argued with authoritarianism, but rather
with persecution of Catholics. The Coughlinite position,
however, quickly degenerated into bigoted anti-Semitism.
Like many other gentiles in the United States, the Christian
Front equated Jews with communists. An attack on a Jew was
an attack on an internationalist world view that
conservatives equated with communism.
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CHAPTER 5
UNION FRATRICIDE
In the midst of economic collapse and depression, the
labor left challenged Roosevelt's Keynesian solution to the
crisis. The Congress of Industrial Organizations led the
critique. Its leadership and base was much broader than
that of the American Federation of Labor which continued to
organize only skilled craft workers. For a brief period, in
the late 1930s and early 1940s, the CIO accommodated
Marxists within its ranks. Labor moderates who advocated
mediation from an enlarged federal state temporally
coexisted with Marxists who organized on the basis of class
conflict. Thus, the two great labor federations purged
communists a decade apart: the AFL in the late 1930s during
the little Red Scare and the CIO in the late 1940s when it
fully embraced Roosevelt's statist solution to labor's
problems. By purging its left wing, the house of labor
fully repudiated class struggle. Without a Marxist
presence, moderate labor leaders were left alone to
preside
over the deradicalization of organized labor in the
early
postwar period.
TO date, labor historians have posited three
theories
to explain the postwar rout of labor. ^ Ronald
Schatz argues
that changing demographic patterns brought
younger, less
skilled workers into plants who lacked the
radicalizing
experience of having organized CIO unions in
the 1930s.
^
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Bert Cochrane posits a "historically contingent" model based
on labor's class collaboration during the war.^ Christopher
Tomlins finds the answer in the CIO's wartime
bureaucratization, growing reliance on the state, and
demobilization of rank and file workers.^ What is missing
from these theories is anticommunism. In the cold war,
anticommunism defined Americanism; it gave Americans common
ground across class and ethnic boundaries. However, in
order to embrace anticommunism, one had to renouce class
struggle . Labor leaders joined the anticommunist crusade to
further their immediate ends of gaining access to state
power or to beat out a rival union . In the long run labor
was irrevocably altered by cutting off its left wing and
losing its source of militant union organizing and dynamic
change. Anticommunism precipated an ideological shift to
the right that voided class analysis.
The struggle within the labor movement over communist
leadership provides an excellent window from which to
identify sources of anticommunism on the state and local
level and to see how rank and file members responded to
their leadership's red baiting.
AFL and its American Federation of Teachers
Samuel Gompers founded the American Federation of Labor
in 1886 to promote "pure and simple unionism." He
envisioned an alternative to radical unionism, safely
removed from state repression, that concentrated on
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organizing skilled workers. Since then, the AFL
consistently rejected radicals and communists. Successive
AFL presidents purged radical and communist leaders from
locals of its affiliated unions. In 1938, AFL President
William Green told delegates to the Massachusetts State
Federation of Labor :^
When we find [a communist], we don't try him, we
just kick him out. There is no place in our
movement for them... They can't live with us. We
won't embrace their philosophy, nor will we allow
them to shape our policies.
The following year, Massachusetts AFL delegates passed a
resolution "continuing its opposition to nazism, fascism and
communism."^ At the same time, the AFL's national executive
committee pressured affiliated unions, like the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT), to clean house.
The AFT had a stormy relationship with the AFL since
its inception.^ The union originated in Chicago among
working class elementary school teachers—mostly women
—
with family ties to the labor movement. Its union
principles contrasted sharply with those of the larger and
older National Education Association, a professional
organization servicing school administrators. Initially,
Gompers ignored AFT organizers' request for a charter
because they advocated equal pay for women teachers while he
promoted the family wage. Even after he relented in 1918,
Gompers and other AFL leaders felt closer to the
conservative NEA than to their affiliate, the AFT. In the
early 1930s, AFT membership rolls swelled with younger,
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militant WPA teachers. At the same time, a small group of
leftist teachers gained control of the AFT executive board.
Congressman Dies' House Committee on Un-American Activities
as well as the AFL executive board, disapproved of this
growing radical influence in the teacher's union.
In 1935, AFL president William Green pressured the AFT
to purge its communists. He sent a telegram to the 1935 AFT
convention telling delegates to oust Local 5 in New York
City. Although many conservatives in the AFT agreed with
Green, the teachers resisted being "dictated" to by the AFL.
Green intensified the pressure. He cut off AFL funding for
more union organizers and fired all women organizers. In
September 1939, the AFL executive committee passed a
resolution stating the AFT was run by communists and hinting
that its charter would be revoked. That same month, the
Saturday Evening Post ran an article exposing the AFT as a
"Red" union. In 1940, Green told AFT Convention delegates
to "put your house in order." Although the teachers booed
Green for interfering in their affairs, they followed
through. A year later, delegates voted overwhelmingly to
revoke the charters of four locals in New York City and
Philadelphia.
AFT organizing in Massachusetts followed a similar
path. Women high school teachers in Boston and women
elementary school teachers in Cambridge organized the first
two AFT locals in Massachusetts. Shortly after receiving
their charters, the Boston police struck. AFT organizers
decided not to hold any further organizing meetings because
the strike had given all of labor a "black eye." They
preferred to lay low until the furor over the police died
down. In Lynn, the school committee chairman told the chief
AFT organizer she would be fired from her teaching job
unless she quit union organizing among school teachers.
Negative reaction to the police strike created a hostile
antiunion climate throughout the state that thwarted these
early efforts to organize a teacher's union.
The depression, however, created a different set of
conditions that energized AFT organizing. Two powerful
constituencies—business leaders and veterans—targeted
education for draconian budget cuts. As the depression
deepened, the business community pressed for reduction in
taxes. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's list of ten cost-
cutting measures for municipal governments included larger
classrooms, shorter school days, and reduced salaries. When
businessmen targeted veterans' benefits, the powerful
American Legion launched a counterof fensive against waste
in
education to draw attention away from their own budget
demands.^ The Legion coupled school fiscal issues with
its
attack on subversive teachers.
Some teachers responded to these attacks on
education
by embracing the AFT. Lawrence's Local 244,
chartered in
September 1932 to organize men teachers in the
high school,
signed up 21 men during the first month. From
December 1932
to July 1933, the city of Lawrence did
not pay its teachers.
According to Local 244 's president, Walter A. Sidley,
Lawrence faced "a crisis beyond that of any other city in
New England excepting Fall River . . . because Mayor White is
in complete domination by the bankers and mill owners.
As the teachers went unpaid, membership in Local 244
doubled. By the spring of 1935, when the controversy over
the teacher's oath erupted. Local 244 's membership reached a
high of 81 members. As Sidley spent more and more time on
the teachers' oath battle and statewide AFT organizing,
membership in Local 244 dropped off. By the time the U.S.
entered World War II, seven dues-paying members remained.
After taking on the fight against the teachers' oath,
Sidley next turned to purging communists from the AFT in
Massachusetts. Sidley was a cautious unionist. He embraced
the AFT out of disgust with accommodationist policies of the
NEA, a view shared by his constituents—underpaid male high
school teachers. He described the union as a "national,
non-strike organization of classroom teachers of
constructive, professional policy. "^^ Sidley had little
tolerance for side issues promoted by popular front
unionists. In 1937, he reported to the national office that
his efforts to organize a local in Lynn had failed because
"dissension over C.I.O. and 1936 Spanish Resolution have
prevented any real functioning."^^ After the war ended,
when Sidley tried to revive Local 244, he locked horns with
Mary Cadigan, a dynamic elementary school teacher from
143
Boston who wanted the Lawrence local to include all teachers
and to embrace the principle of equal pay.'^^
Communists led AFT locals in Boston and Cambridge.
Forty Boston teachers chartered Local 441 in January 1936.
After an initial period of disorganization, Local 441
regrouped under George Faxon's leadership and recruited a
high of 100 members in 1940. Faxon, who taught at Roxbury
high school, was first accused of being a communist in
January 1939 when he served as faculty sponsor for the
American Student Union (ASU). HUAC "exposed" the ASU as a
communist front group in summer 1938. Faxon's Roxbury ASU
meetings created a citywide fracas when the Boston School
Committee launched a noisy investigation of "communistic
subversion" in the public schools. Even though none was
found, politicians, newspapermen and educators had a field
day with the incident publicly linking Faxon to the
Communist party. •'"^
In 1940, with Faxon as president of Local 441, the
union organized a "Yanks are Not Coming" committee and
passed resolutions opposing U.S. intervention in the war and
President Roosevelt's preparedness plans. These actions
followed the program of the Communist party during the
period of the Hitler-Stalin pact. In 1939, Faxon replaced
Walter Sidley as president of the Massachusetts State Branch
of the AFT. With Sidley as president, the program for
annual meetings included bread-and-butter topics such as
"Should Teachers Join a Union," "A Real Tenure Law and How
to Get It," and "What Kind of Certification."^"^ With Faxon
as president, a political address by Mary Foley Grossman
titled "School Security in a World Crisis" highlighted the
annual meeting. Grossman, an AFT vice-president, led one of
the locals expelled during the winter of 1940-41. The
crisis she discussed was the growth of reactionary forces at
home and abroad.^® In 1940, with Faxon still president, the
Massachusetts State Branch of the AFT passed a resolution
condemning the maneuvering of Chicago Local 1 against the
four locals under attack by the anticommunist national
19leadership
.
It is not clear from available evidence exactly how
Sidley ousted Faxon and other suspected communists from the
AFT in Massachusetts. He did, however, take credit for
it.^° In September 1943, Sidley and his allies elected
Frances Masterson, an anticommunist loyal to the national
executive board and a respected teacher, as president of the
Massachusetts State Branch. When the AFL held its 1943
national convention in Boston, Masterson met with Irvin
Kuenzli, secretary-treasurer of the AFT, and John D.
Conners, a member of the AFL executive committee, to
discuss
••the problem of the Boston local." According to
anticommunists, Faxon and his cohorts made Mary Cadigan,
an
Irish Catholic elementary school teacher,
president of Local
441 as a "front" for the "small Stalinist
group" that still
controlled the local. It appears, however,
that Cadigan
used the communists, not the other way
around. Nobody
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controlled the feisty Cadigan who succeeded in forcing a
split in the local between her supporters and Faxon's
2
1
supporters. In 1945, Cadigan maneuvered a vote dissolving
Local 441 that ended any influence Faxon may still have had.
She organized a new Boston local, controlled by women
classroom teachers who built an effective grievance board to
2 2defend working conditions for members.
The other AFT local of concern to Walter Sidley and
anticommunists on the national executive board was at
Harvard University. Chartered in 1935, Local 431 quickly
recruited junior faculty members. Membership grew to 172 in
October 1939, right before Hitler and Stalin sealed their
pact, and declined steadily after that. When the local
disbanded in 1950, its president reported that "the Union
never served a genuine economic need of its members here...
[T]he crusading spirits which used to join it now find ADA
or the Progressive Party more suitable for their political
1.23purposes .
"
In the late 1930s, the Communist party organized a
clandestine unit within Local 431. Twenty years later,
former communists in the unit testified before HUAC.^*
Young instructors and teaching assistants joined Local 431
and its Communist party caucus. The AFT's national
executive board intervened in Local 431 -s affairs in
1942
when the local invited Harry Bridges to speak
at a meeting.
The American Legion protested loudly, causing
much publicity
in Boston and in the national press. AFT
President Fewkes
tried desperately to distance the national organization from
any association with Bridges. At the next meeting of the
executive board, the Indiana Council of Teachers Unions
moved to revoke the Harvard charter. Although the ouster
effort failed, the executive board passed a resolution
rebuking Local 431 for causing injury to the AFT "because of
26
unfavorable publicity."
The purge of communists from the AFT in Massachusetts
was less noisy and contentious than in New York City and
Philadelphia. There were no trials, no national referenda
and no convention expulsion votes. A much more organic
process succeeded in the commonwealth. Local anticommunist
AFT organizers, like Walter Sidley and Frances Masterson,
worked behind the scenes to remove communists from statewide
leadership positions. In the Boston local, a savvy unionist
outmaneuvered communists. In other AFT locals, communists
and progressives voluntarily quit to protest the purges.
Carl Walz's local, in western Massachusetts, voted to
withdraw from the AFT to protest lack of due process for
ousted locals. Disgusted with the national executive
board's leadership, they believed the union "failed
signally, in a year of great, crucial issues before
education and the nation, to face national problems...""
In other locals, the issue of communist influence
combined with others making teachers uneasy with the
AFT.
In New Bedford, after a highly successful initial
organizing
drive in 1933, members began dropping out in 1936
over the
"close relationship between the Teacher's Union and the
Central Labor Union. Even though many public school
teachers came from working class families, they were not
completely comfortable with unions. The NEA encouraged this
attitude with its emphasis on "professionalism." Local
262 's secretary in New Bedford told national headquarters:
"The Union seems to be shaking down to those who believe in
Union principles, and those who joined for personal
advantages . "^^ Two years later, she reported that "pressure
and influence of certain clergy caused some of our best
workers to drop out and deterred others from joining. "^°
Public school teachers were neither working class nor
professionals. Even in New Bedford, a strong union city,
teachers shied away from building a union. Hints of
communism scared them away completely.
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Industrial workers were a different story, particularly
those associated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations. The CIO grew out of the split in the AFL
over whether to charter industrial unions. AFL president
William Green and a majority of its executive board members
represented an older model of craft unionism that excluded
unskilled workers. The CIO championed a newer model of
industrial unionism combining all workers on the shop floor,
both skilled and unskilled, into one big unit.
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John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of
America, founded the CIO in 1935 after walking out of the
AFL national convention to protest its refusal to charter
industrial unions. It built militant unions during the
depression organizing the unorganized and drawing workers
away from the AFL in elections mandated by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). AFL president William Green
fought back with vicious anticommunism. He blasted the CIO
in the press, worked with the Dies committee to discredit
CIO affiliates, and maneuvered to put anticommunists on the
NLRB. Green claimed that Lewis led a movement directed by
the Communist International, the worldwide grouping of
3
1
communist parties controlled by the Soviet Union.
Communists did dominate the leadership of several CIO
unions. CIO president Lewis and his successor, Philip
Murray, initially tolerated communists in their ranks
because they were good, hard working organizers and the CIO
needed all the help it could get. When Murray finally
purged Communists from the CIO's affiliated unions in 1949,
more than a decade after the AFL, he found rank and file
members deeply divided over the issue.
Anticommunism became a defining issue among CIO union
members in the late 1940s, but not without persistent
intervention from "outside agitators." These outsiders
included the Catholic Church, congressional committees,
the
FBI, the Truman administration, national media,
and
conservative politicians. Within the labor movement,
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ambitious union officers used anticommunist rhetoric and red
baiting as a tool to eliminate their left wing rivals. By
and large, such maneuvers fell on deaf ears among rank and
file workers who were more interested in their union's
record for improving working conditions than they were in
the political affiliation of their leaders. However, as the
national drum roll against home-grown communists grew in the
postwar period, the effectiveness of targeted union leaders
diminished in the eyes of many rank and file members who
were then willing to jettison communist leaders. Still, the
purge was very contentious, for a sizeable minority of
workers remained unmoved by the national anticommunist
3 2hysteria swirling about them.
In Massachusetts, anticommunists targeted the left-led
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America
(UE)."^"^ From any of the interpretive paradigms of
McCarthyism
—
pluralist, revisionist, or newer "long view"
—
one would expect to find working people very receptive to
anticommunism. However, this is not what the evidence from
the UE in Massachusetts shows. Contrary to what the
literature predicts, anticommunism was not a compelling
concern among rank and file union members until others made
it so
.
The only workers who fit the expected model were those
closest to the Catholic culture of anticommunism. The 1949
UE purge came only when rival union officers tapped into all
available resources—the Church, the press, the state, the
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CIO—and convinced workers that their present union
officials no longer represented their best interests. In
other words, electrical and machine workers abandoned their
union because they were afraid of losing jobs not because
they were guarding national security. Even so, a sizeable
minority of workers in the largest UE locals voted to retain
their tainted union, and workers in the smaller locals
remained loyal to the embattled UE.
Catholic Trade Unionism
Two papal encyclicals, written to counteract Marxist
doctrine at times when Catholic workers were drifting away
from their church, defined the Church's theory of labor.
Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum in 1891 in response to
modern industrialization. He argued against class conflict
and for class harmony. This could be achieved, Leo XIII
stated, if employers and workers respected each other's
natural rights and lived up to their reciprocal duties.
Employers must pay workers "just wages" in return for an
honest day's work. Workers must respect private property
and avoid violence. Leo XIII promoted labor guilds that
brought labor and management under the same roof; he also
endorsed conservative labor unions. Pope Pius XI 's 1931
encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, reiterated Leo's corportist
approach to labor theory. In the midst of worldwide
depression, Pius wrote that: "Sound prosperity is to be
restored according to the true principles of a sane
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corporative system which respects the proper hierarchic
structure of society. "^^ Both encyclicals were classic
conservative texts. They constituted a vigorous attack on
socialism and Marxism, but also included a critique of
modern capitalism. This element of anticapitalism made
Catholic labor doctrine relevant to workers in the 1930s and
early 1940s.
Theologians in each Catholic country were left to apply
papal authority to their own conditions. In the United
States, Monsignor John A. Ryan of Catholic University in
Washington, D.C., became the leading social theoretician.
Ryan represented the moderate wing of the hierarchy. He
managed to fit New Deal labor policy into the American
corporate order. One of Ryan's strongest critics within
the church was Boston's Cardinal O'Connell.
Priests studied the encyclicals searching for a
Catholic response to pressing social problems confronting
working class parishioners. Father Coughlin claimed Rerum
Novarum influenced his ideas more than any other religious
text. Labor priests brought Catholic labor doctrine to the
parish level. Some labor priests, such as Father Charles
Owen Rice in Pittsburgh, marched on picket lines, spoke at
union meetings and worked closely with influential labor
leaders. Others ran labor schools, where workers learned
Catholic labor theory and organizing skills. Some of these
schools were organized on the diocesan level and some were
• u • 4.^ 36
the product of activist parish priests.
Lay activists in the New York Catholic Worker movement
were inspired by papal authority to organize the Association
of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) in 1937. ACTU members
organized Catholic caucuses in labor unions. ACTU chapters
soon opened in Detroit, Pittsburgh and Chicago. Although
not officially sponsored by the Church, chaplains appointed
by local bishops led ACTU chapters. Some local church
authorities, like Boston's Cardinal O'Connell, thought ACTU
too radical and hampered its development.
In the late 1930s, when these efforts were initiated.
Catholic labor theory was committed to industrial unionism.
It supported the right of workers to organize unions to
fight for better working conditions. Catholic labor theory
included a critique of capitalism as well as a denunciation
of communism. It tried to steer a middle course between the
two, sometimes referred to as the third path. By 1945,
however, the Church dropped its critique of capitalism and
focused exclusively on anticommunism . Before 1945, the
Church fought communism in order to build "economic
democracy"; after the war, the goal was simply to destroy
37
communism
.
Rome signalled this change in Catholic labor theory in
response to the growing power of Communist parties in Europe
and the Soviet Union's attack on the Catholic Church in
Eastern Europe. In the U.S., the change led labor
schools, labor priests, and ACTU to redouble their
crusade
against communist labor leaders in the CIO and its
left-led
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unions. For the UE, the cost was enormous. By 1955, a
rival union, the staunchly anticommunist International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (lUE), represented
60 percent of its members. Workers who remained in UE shops
no longer had a union with authority to bargain on behalf of
all workers in their industry.
Historians are still debating the importance of the
Church's role in bringing down the UE and other left-led
unions. Douglas Seaton, a historian of ACTU, concludes the
Church played a "crucial role" in redirecting the labor
39movement m a conservative direction. Neil Betten and
Michael Harrington, however, argue that UE leaders
overestimated the influence of ACTU. They found ACTU to be
disorganized, often at loggerheads with the Catholic
hierarchy, and argued its success came from alliances with
other anticommunist elements. *° Ronald Schatz, a recent
historian of electrical workers at GE and Westinghouse
,
argues that the effectiveness of the Church depended on "a
constellation of factors" including ethnic and religious
background of union members, effectiveness of local leaders,
and the "standing of anticommunist priests in the
community."*^ Other historians, such as Harvey Levenstein
and Ellen Schrecker, argue that the state was the crucial
factor not the Catholic church.*^
In Massachusetts, Catholic opposition to the UE was not
a coordinated statewide effort but rather sprang from local
initiatives led by union members and priests. St. Mary's
154
parish in Lynn ran an influential labor school where
Catholic UE shop stewards and other unionists learned Church
labor doctrine as well as how to run meetings using Roberts
Rules of Order and debating techniques. Graduates of St.
Mary's formed the nucleus of the rank and file Committee
Against Communism which held meetings in the Knights of
Columbus hall to plot the ouster of communist officers.
In Pittsfield, Father Eugene Marshall, pastor of St.
Mary's parish, led a local crusade against the national UE
leadership. Marshall's parish included the sprawling GE
plant as well the homes of most of its workers. He spoke
from the pulpit on several occasions denouncing national UE
officers. In 1949 he told parishioners that an upcoming
union election represented "a choice between Christ and
Stalin." Marshall also sent letters to his parishioners
urging them to attend critical union meetings.
In the Springf ield-Holyoke area, Catholic union leaders
from eight UE locals joined other UE dissidents to form a
national anticommunist caucus within the UE called Members
for Democratic Action. The objective of the caucus was to
unseat national leaders. It opposed progressive resolutions
from the floor of national conventions and ran slates of
candidates. The Springfield anticommunists were active in
the state CIO council and used that position as leverage
against UE locals loyal to the national officers.
In 1950, Catholic anticommunists in Lynn, Pittsfield
and Springfield brought their locals out of the left-led UE
155
and into the anticommunist lUE. In other Massachusetts
cities, such as New Bedford and Boston, Catholic UE
dissidents had less success. The Church played an important
role in the factional fight between the UE and lUE. Without
the Church, there would not have been much of a fight at
all . However , the crucial factor among electrical and
machine workers in Massachusetts was not whether their union
leaders were communist but whether they were effective. The
consequences of the UE ' s expulsion from the CIO was more
important, to more UE members, than was the Church's
denunciation of godless communists.
United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America
Leaders from independent unions in the electrical
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appliance and radio industry founded the UE in 1936.
Young Jim Carey from Philadelphia led the radio workers.
Carey worked as an inspector at the large Philco plant in
West Philadelphia. In 1933, he and a group of other male
inspectors at Philco organized a strike that forced the
company to recognize their union. The unexpected success of
the strike catapulted Carey into union leadership with no
shop floor work experience. The Philco local affiliated
with the AFL as a "Federal Labor Union," an undefined
category for non-craft unions, and the AFL hired Carey to
organize the radio and home appliance industry. For the
next two years, Carey travelled throughout the Northeast
organizing unions in small shops. When the AFL refused
to
grant Carey a charter for a new industrial union of
electrical workers, he approached independent union leaders
in heavy current plants to discuss a merger.
UE ' s early leaders—who were skilled, high wage,
radical workers—organized their industrial union on very
democratic principles that emphasized local autonomy much
more than other CIO unions, such as the United Auto Workers
or United Mine Workers. The UE constitution decentralized
power in eleven districts that elected their own officers
and collected per capita dues directly from their locals.
It kept the number of staff members who could serve as
delegates to national conventions low and restricted
salaries of officers to the highest wage paid a worker in
the industry. When UE anticommunists set about to purge
communists, they knew it would have to be done from the
bottom up, local by local, because of UE • s twin traditions
of democracy and localism.
Delegates to the UE ' s founding convention elected 25
year old Jim Carey as their president. Carey grew up in a
middle class, Irish Catholic family of Al Smith Democrats.
He knew Catholic labor doctrine having studied the papal
encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno. During the
Philco strike and his early organizing days, Carey relied
heavily on the advice of more experienced, anticommunist
,
Socialist labor leaders in Philadelphia. Although Carey's
background was strongly anticommunist, in the popular
front
era, he worked side-by-side with radical UE leaders.
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Julius Emspak, the UE • s secretary-treasurer, grew up in
a socialist household in Schnectady, New York. He learned
union organizing from John Turnbull, an English-born
socialist who founded the big GE local in Schenectady.
Emspak attended Union College on a GE scholarship and
graduate school at Brown University. He quit graduate
school in the early 1930s to return to union organizing at
the GE plant.
Jim Matles, UE ' s director of organization, emigrated
from Rumania with his family in 1929 at the age of 19. They
settled in Brooklyn where he worked in the metal trades as a
union organizer. He probably joined the Communist party
during this time. In 1935, Matles initiated negotiations to
bring the Brooklyn locals into the AFL's International
Association of Metalworkers (lAM). In order to do this, he
down played his own radical politics. When the UE was
organized, Matles quickly abandoned the lAM and brought the
Brooklyn metal workers into the UE, a union where he felt
much more at home.
Carey, Emspak and Matles ran the UE in the late 1930s.
In 1938, Carey became Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO as well
as president of the UE. Most commentators argue that John
Lewis brought Carey into the CIO to appease its
anticommunist right wing. Whatever Lewis's motivation may
have been, Carey posed no threat to his autocratic control
of the CIO. Commentators agree that Carey was ambitious and
enjoyed the limelight. In 1937, for example, while the
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union's GE Conference Board negotiated with the biggest
employer in the industry, Carey grabbed headlines by holding
a press conference and disclosing the content of closed door
negotiations. The Conference Board, controlled by the big
Lynn and Schenectady GE locals, scolded Carey for "popping
off" to the press and barred him—their president— from
further negotiations.** By 1940, Carey was frequenting
Eleanor Roosevelt's salon in the White House, where he kept
her abreast of activities in the labor movement. Ronald
Schatz describes Carey as "personable" while Harvey
Levenstein calls him "cocky." Carey's contemporaries
probably reacted to him in a similar way. Some tried to
grab onto his coattails and some wanted to strangle him.
Carey spent most of his time in Washington attending
functions, rubbing elbows and lobbying legislators while
Matles and Emspak ran the UE. During the popular front era,
Carey co-existed with Matles and Emspak. In 1938, when HUAC
attacked the UE, Carey, Matles and Emspak mounted a joint,
vigorous defense of the union, denying communist influence
and demanding the information on which Chairman Martin Dies
based his charges. A HUAC dissenter revealed the
committee's two sources: John Frey, a member of the AFL's
Executive Committee, and Joe Zack, a former communist turned
informant. Carey sent a circular to all UE members
45
denouncing HUAC and its information.
Although Carey had differences with Emspak and Matles,
he continued to work with them until the 1940 UE annual
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convention. In July, two months before the convention,
Carey endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president allying
himself with other CIO liberals who supported Roosevelt's
preparedness plans. UE News, the union's newspaper
advocated neutrality as did the Communist party during the
period of the Hitler-Stalin pact. However, since CIO
President John Lewis and most rank and file members also
supported neutrality, it did not divide Carey from Emspak
and Matles.
Communist membership in the union became the dividing
issue. In 1941, a conservative New Jersey local wrote Carey
asking if it could pass a rule prohibiting communists, nazis
and fascists from membership. In his column in UE News,
Carey said that they could. At the next meeting of the
General Executive Board, Emspak vigorously opposed Carey's
position. After a heated debate, Emspak 's motion carried.*^
Carey later recalled that he "fell into the position of
being something of a guarterback against the communists - a
quarterback in the effort to throw the communists out of the
CIO."*^ At this point, Carey irrevocably split with Emspak
and Matles by going on the offensive against communists in
the labor movement. In summer 1941, after Hitler invaded
the Soviet Union, the UE News flipped back to supporting
Roosevelt and war preparedness. Again, Carey used his
column to blast the left wing of his union. "Political
acrobats in pink tights posing as labor leaders are a
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disgrace to the union and insult the intelligence of the
membership
.
Delegates at the 1941 convention defeated Carey's
reelection bid for president by a vote of 635 (54 percent)
to 539 (46 percent). Albert Fitzgerald, a respected member
of Local 201 at the big GE plant in Lynn, won. Fitzgerald
had been elected steward, treasurer and president of the
local. In 1940, he joined the GE Conference Board as
District Council 2's representative. Like Carey, Fitzgerald
was an Irish Catholic from an anticommunist background, and
a registered Republican who was considered a moderate.
Fitzgerald, however, was willing to work with Emspak and
Matles, and for this his detractors called him a communist
stooge. Father Marshall of Pittsfield warned parishioners
that Fitzgerald "has a fine name that might disarm anyone,
but he's as Red as the flag of Russia."*^
Carey claimed he lost the 1941 election solely because
of the "communist issue," and spent the next ten years
trying to regain his position. At first, he opposed raiding
UE locals and worked from within the union. His sole
strategy was red-baiting. In August 1946, he joined forces
with ACTU, socialists, and other anticommunists in the union
to form the UE-Members for Democratic Action (MDA).^° One
commentator places CIO President Philip Murray at the
meeting as well.^^ Anticommunism united this coalition. In
1948, Carey told a Congressional investigating
committee
that the group aimed to remove all present UE officers,
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members of the executive board, editors of the UE News,
office staff and national organizers
. The group's
"statement of purpose" declared that UE members had a choice
between "returning the UE to the ranks of respectable CIO
unions with sound union objectives or allowing the UE to
hurry along to its own destruction as a front for the
American Communist Party and its program. "^^ In keeping
with these principles, the MDA condemned the UE '
s
contributions to the Civil Rights Congress and Southern
Conference for Human Welfare, groups they described as
"known Communist front organizations."
Harry Block told the press that UE members were
"overwhelmingly non-Communist."^^ He was right. Yet
delegates at the 1946 annual convention resoundingly
defeated MDA's first slate of anticommunist candidates by
margins of 75 percent and 85 percent. The delegates
defeated another MDA resolution, offered by Frank Hall,
business agent at Local 206 in Springfield, Massachusetts,
that would have barred communists from holding union
office. Such actions show that UE delegates were more
concerned with the record of their leadership than they were
with their politics.
MDA members tried without success to get UE • s District
Council 2—the New England district that included
Massachusetts—to take anticommunist positions. In 1946,
Frank Hall introduced his resolution barring communists
from
membership at the District Council 2 meeting after it had
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been defeated at the national convention. UE President
Albert Fitzgerald attended the meeting to argue against it.
Delegates soundly defeated the resolution
.
Carey and his allies, however, were determined to make
the politics of UE leaders a dividing line issue among
members. Two months after the 1946 convention, Carey sent
the UE News a letter stating: "The issue between me and the
present UE leadership goes solely to the proposition that
our great International Union has become known as a
transmission belt for the American Communist Party. "^"^
Carey had plenty of help red baiting the UE leadership.
ACTU brought to MDA a network of identified anticommunist
union members, many of whom held office in their locals.
Labor priests advised local "Actists"—the term ACTU members
used to describe themselves—while Catholic labor schools
trained anticommunist UE members in parliamentary procedure
and debating skills. Catholic labor doctrine provided the
ideological rationale for purging communists from the labor
movement
.
After the war, the CIO came under increasing national
pressure to "clean house." In February 1947, the Saturday
Evening Post ran a two-part expose by conservative
5 8
columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop on Reds in the CIO.
The UE was one of the featured unions. The Alsops claimed
that 25 percent of all CIO members belonged to unions
controlled by communists, using the UE to explain how
communists seize control of unions. According to the
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article, after Carey "built the electrical workers union up
into one of the strongest in the CIO," he was double-crossed
by cominunists and lost the presidency in a "close, bitter
election." Communists got power, according to the Alsops,
because they forsook everything for the union and worked
harder than anyone else. They recruited "dupes" by preying
on bored assembly line workers and helped them get elected
to local union offices. Once elected, the "dupes" were
manipulated by communists to do their bidding. The article
had all the markings of a planted FBI story.
The UE had been a target of congressional investigating
committees since Congressman Dies chaired HUAC. After the
war, a conservative Congress redoubled pressure on the UE to
"clean house." Ant icommunist MDA members worked closely
with these committees to discredit UE leadership and to
further their own position. In 1947, three months before
holding hearings on communism in Hollywood, HUAC
investigated communism in the UE . Four anticommunist local
UE leaders testified. Two, Joseph Julianelle and Michael
Berescik, led Local 203 in Bridgeport, Connecticut. When
they testified before HUAC, they were in the midst of a
power struggle with the left wing of their local.
Testifying before HUAC was part of their strategy to
eliminate their opposition and gain control of the local.
Julianelle and Berescik led the MDA movement in UE District
Council 2.^^
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IIn July 1947, District Council 2 debated a strongly
worded resolution condemning MDA and its red baiting
activities. Julianelle and Berechik defended MDA at the
meeting, affirming that MDA "is committed to one thing, and
that is to work against the influence of Communism in the
UE." Brother Hannigan, a member of Local 202 in
Springfield, condemned MDA, saying he never heard MDA people
talk about working conditions of people the union
represents. Although MDA people called themselves "a
movement to save the people, really it is a movement to
crack the union wide open and put it in the hands of the
employers. The District Council 2 resolution condemning
MDA passed "overwhelmingly."
In 1948, Carey led off hearings to investigate
communist infiltration of the UE conducted by the House
Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and
Labor. Carey told the committee about the formation of the
MDA and its anticommunist mission. He attacked UE leaders
claiming they harassed MDA members. He also made the
bizarre argument that employers favored communists as UE
stewards because they could not process grievances as
aggressively as anticommunist stewards. Carey also
encouraged Senator Hubert Humphrey to investigate communists
in defense industry plants and sponsor legislation forcing
6 2
defense contractors to withdraw contracts with the UE.
Congressional committees worked closely with UE
anticommunists throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. They
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scheduled hearings on the eve of important union elections
to give anticoimnunists a boost in the local press;
subpoenaed local UE leaders to appear in Washington, taking
them out of the community just before crucial elections; and
held hearings in local communities creating a circus-like
atmosphere of charges and countercharges in the press that
coincided with UE contract negotiations or strike settlement
talks.
Congressional action was the most visible attack on the
UE by the federal government, but not the only. The
Industrial Employee Review Board investigated dozens of GE
and Westinghouse workers it considered "poor security
risks." Often their worst crime was opposing anticommunist
candidates for local UE leadership positions. The Atomic
Energy Commission ordered GE to withdraw recognition of the
UE at an atomic power laboratory.^* Carey used these
actions to scare UE members into thinking they would lose
their jobs unless all communists were purged from the union.
The Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits was another
powerful weapon Carey and his MDA allies used to drive a
wedge between UE rank and file and their leaders. The Taft-
Hartley Act, passed in 1947 over President Truman's veto,
mandated all union officers to file affidavits certifying
they were not members of the Communist party and did not
support any organization that advocated the overthrow of the
government by any illegal means. The law barred union
officers who did not file affidavits from participating in
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National Labor Relations Board elections. At first, CIO
unions united in opposition to this and other antiunion
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Their unity cracked
when AFL unions, whose officers filed affidavits and could
run in NLRB elections, began raiding CIO unions. The UE and
other left-led unions were the last to sign the affidavits.
For UE and CIO leaders, not signing the affidavits was a
question of principle and union solidarity; for Carey, it
was another tactic to win over rank and file workers.
The CIO gave Carey and his MDA allies their most
important boost. Even with all the outside interference
from the state, Carey still could not recapture the UE
presidency with the sole strategy of red baiting. At the
September 1949 UE convention, he did not even bother to run
because he knew he did not have enough votes to win. The
MDA candidate, Fred Kelly from Local 201 in Lynn, lost to
the incumbent president, Albert Fitzgerald, by a vote of
2335 (61 percent) to 1500 (39 percent). Carey did not
become president of a union until 1950, when the CIO purged
the UE and chartered a new union, the lUE. His strategy of
having workers decide between a communist-led UE and
anticommunist-led UE failed. When the choice changed to the
unaffiliated UE and the lUE-CIO, he succeeded.
The CIO purged the UE and other left-led unions over
political issues, not labor issues. The CIO and UE differed
on two policy issues: the Marshall Plan and Henry Wallace's
third party candidacy. Secretary of State George C.
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Marshall made a personal appeal for CIO support of his
foreign policy agenda at its 1947 annual convention held in
Boston. Marshall was the first secretary of state to ever
address organized labor. Because international leaders
studied Marshall's every word, he read from a carefully
worded prepared text. George Baldanzi, the dynamic
president of the Textile Workers Union, had no such
limitation. Speaking from the floor in support of the
Marshall Plan, he drew on delegates' heartstrings. As part
of a labor delegation that toured Europe, Baldanzi
personally witnessed the devastating hunger and need which
he described to the convention. "[I saw] mothers and
fathers like you and I. Our ancestors came from Europe. We
are part of them." He urged delegates to support the
Marshall Plan in order to prevent a communist takeover of
^ 65Europe
.
Delegates also heard Boston's new Archbishop, Richard
Gushing. Gushing' s style was vastly different from that of
his predecessor, Cardinal O'Gonnell. Gushing opened his
remarks by noting the connections between the Ghurch and
labor, ranging from Jesus the worker to the American
hierarchy, all sons of working men. After giving the
American labor movement a hearty endorsement, Gushing
reminded GIO delegates that "everyone knows there are
potential traitors to America in our organizations in the
labor movement." The solution rested with them, he argued.
"American Labor can solve the problem itself in an American
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way within the framework of American Law and in the best
interests of the American people."*^
The CIO convention endorsed the Marshall Plan and
Truman's bid for re-election in 1948. In January 1948, CIO
President Philip Murray called on all working Americans to
support their legislative program/"^ This sent a message to
the UE and other left-led unions that they must toe the line
on the Marshall Plan and Truman's re-election. Murray and
other labor leaders favored Truman over Henry Wallace, the
Progressive Party candidate. Because of Congress's ugly,
antilabor mood, they desperately needed to keep a Democrat
in the White House. Wallace stood little chance of being
elected and would only take votes away from Truman. They
charged that communists supported Wallace because they
wanted to defeat Truman, leaving the country without a
moderating force on the national level and thus create
conditions ripe for revolution. Joseph Salerno, president
of the Massachusetts CIO Council, charged that "The third
party movement of Wallace will accomplish nothing else but
assure the election of a reactionary President and national
6 8
administration.
"
These issues were very important to CIO president
Murray. The postwar strike wave unleashed a forceful,
conservative backlash against labor on the federal and state
level. The Taft-Hartley Act promised to roll back labor's
New Deal gains and to strip it of power necessary to
confront management on a equal footing. In Massachusetts,
the state legislature debated three antilabor bills
introduced in 1947 and 1948 by the Massachusetts Chamber of
Commerce. One made it illegal to exclude workers from
employment for failing to join the union; another required
all votes for union officers to be taken by secret ballot;
and the third required strike votes to be taken by secret
ballot in an election overseen by the NLRB. The legislature
soundly defeated all three measures. Their proponents,
however, put them on the ballot as referenda. State
organizations of the CIO, the AFL and Americans for
Democratic Action ( ADA ) , joined forces to fight the
6 9
antilabor bills. In November 1948, Massachusetts voters
7 0defeated the measures by a vote of two to one.
Murray tolerated communists and radicals in the CIO
because he needed them and respected their organizing work.
By 1948, however, with so many powerful anticommunist
enemies in Congress, and with a growing anticommunist right
wing within the CIO itself, the UE and other left-led unions
became too much of a liability for Murray. He acted by
omission. That is, he failed to stop Walter Reuther's
strongly anticommunist United Auto Workers (UAW) from
raiding UE locals. When the UE boycotted the 1949 CIO
convention to protest UAW raiding, Murray did nothing to
stop the anticommunists, led by Jim Carey, from expelling
the UE. Carey also pushed through a resolution passed
declaring: "UERMWA has been selected by the Communist Party
as its labor base from which it can operate to betray the
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economic, political, and social welfare of the CIO, its
affiliates and members. . . We can no longer tolerate within
the family of the CIO the Communist Party masquerading as a
Thus began an internecine battle between the
unaffiliated UE and Carey's ClO-sponsored lUE that reached
into every local. Because Carey's sole message was
anticommunism, it forced all rank and file members to take a
position on the red scare. At the time, there were 36 UE
locals in Massachusetts representing approximately 44,000
workers. Over half of all UE members in Massachusetts
belonged to one of two locals: Local 201 at the GE plants in
Lynn and Everett and Local 255 at the Pittsfield GE plant.
In June 1950, after a bloody campaign, both locals voted to
affiliate with the lUE. Table 5.1 shows the tallies.
Given the national and international context of these
elections, the UE did remarkably well in Lynn and
Table 5.1 NLRB election results from largest UE
locals in Massachusetts, June 1950
labor union .
"
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Number of
Voters lUE UE
Local 201 (Lynn)
River Works/Everett
West Lynn
11,523
3, 022
52%
61%
45%
35%
Local 255 (Pittsfield)
Source: Lynn Telegram News, May 26, 1950; Be
Evening Eagle, May 25, 1950.
171
Pittsfield. Including data for all UE locals in the state,
the results are even more astonishing. In spite of the
onslaught of anticommunist propaganda, more than half of the
locals stayed with the UE after it was expelled from the
CIO. The smaller the local, the more likely it was to stay
in the UE
.
Table 5.2 shows this breakdown.
Table 5.2 Affiliation of UE locals
in Massachusetts, by size, 1952
Number of
members lUE UE
Less than 100 1 7
100 - 500 3 9
500 - 1000 5 2
1000 - 2000 3 1
2000 - 3000 1 1
More than 3000 2 0
An enormous amount of resources went into winning over
UE locals to the lUE. The CIO contributed $800,000 to the
1950 election campaign; the Steelworkers gave $200,000. The
UAW stopped raiding UE locals. The CIO hired scores of
organizers for the lUE, many of whom were former MDA
members. These resources were concentrated on winning over
the largest UE locals that would bring the largest number
of workers into the lUE. Backed by this formidable array of
money and manpower, Carey finally convinced workers to
abandon the UE.
How then, did these national events play out on the
local level? In order to understand how Carey and his MDA
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allies convinced workers to turn against the UE, we need to
look at what happened inside the locals. First we will
consider the two biggest locals, 201 in Lynn and 255 in
Pittsfield, and then the grouping of locals in Springfield,
most of which voted to affiliate with the lUE.
Local 201, Lynn
Local 201 represented workers in GE ' s large heavy
current plants in Lynn and West Lynn, known as the River
Works plant, and in neighboring Everett. By 1940, the River
Works complex was the largest work site in Massachusetts.
The Everett plant manufactured superchargers and was much
smaller than the other site. Local 201 was the largest UE
local in Massachusetts and in District Council 2, and the
third largest local in the UE. Its vote carried great
weight at national conventions.
GE workers in Lynn began meeting in August 1933 to
organize a union. Alfred Coulthard, a skilled patternmaker,
led the effort. Coulthard was a socialist who emigrated
from England in 1920 and quickly found employment at the GE
plant in Lynn. He worked with the Socialist party and the
Patternmakers League of North America, a craft union
affiliated with the AFL that survived at GE in the 1920s.
When the depression hit, Coulthard was one of the most
highly paid employees in the Lynn patternmaking shop. In
1932, GE laid off Coulthard for six months, rehired him at a
reduced rate of pay, and then laid him off again. When
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management ignored the grievance he filed with the company
union, he quit and turned to organizing
.
Coulthard and other union activists spent a year
organizing the plant and fighting for recognition from GE
.
In 1934, the Lynn group became the first independent union
to bargain with GE . In 1936, Lynn's big independent union
joined forces with Carey's Federal Labor Union to found the
UE . At its inaugural convention, delegates wanted Coulthard
to serve as secretary-treasurer, but he declined because he
wanted to spend his time organizing Local 201. Julius
Emspak became UE ' s embattled secretary-treasurer.^"^
Instructors at a Catholic labor school run by St.
Mary's parish, Lynn's biggest Catholic church, first
introduced anticommunism as an issue in Local 201 's affairs.
The Boston Archdiocese organized the labor school in 1941
when it decided to expand its labor school program into
industrial cities surrounding Boston. Lynn was the only
city where a new labor school took root.
The Boston labor school program grew out of
unsuccessful efforts to organize an ACTU chapter. Cardinal
O'Connell never approved of ACTU or its Boston sponsor, the
Catholic Worker movement."'* He gave them no monetary
support while retaining absolute control over their
affairs.''^ In 1939, the small Boston ACTU group decided not
to associate with the national ACTU organization because
they were "not so well organized or so stabilized to
be in a
position to take an active part in a national
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7 6organization. " The Archdiocese responded by organizing
its own Catholic Labor Guild and by instituting a series of
labor school classes -
Organizers within the Archdiocese planned the labor
school as an antidote to communist run labor schools that
attracted Boston workers in the popular front era. The
school met one night a week, for three to four months. At
first, organizers only recruited AFL unionists but, as
enrollment decreased in 1939-40, they also admitted CIO
unionists and women. Enrollment peaked at 70 students in
1940. At the Boston school, students listened to lectures
on Catholic labor doctrine, labor law and labor
7 7legislation
.
The first session of the Lynn labor school opened
somewhat tentatively in November 1942. Rev. John J. Downey,
a new schoolmaster appointed by Cardinal O'Connell in early
1943, brought new energy to the program. Classes in Lynn
met on Sunday nights and were taught by three men: Downey,
Augustus Keane, a high school teacher, and William Macksey,
a "well known labor leader." The Lynn school taught
ethics
and Catholic labor doctrine as well as more practical
subjects like public speaking and parliamentary procedure
Lynn's Catholic workers and union leaders welcomed
the
labor school. They endorsed the school's principal
message
of labor-management cooperation and anticommunism.
In June
1943, the school held a gala banguet to mark
the closing of
its second session. Organized by Local 201
stewards, 150
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supporters attended the banquet. People who could not
attend listened to the speeches on the local radio station.
Father William J. Smith, a Jesuit, New York ACTU organizer,
and founder of the Crown Heights labor school in Brooklyn
gave the main speech. He exhorted the audience to "build a
labor movement that is absolutely free of the spirit of
class conflict" and will fight against "sinister Communistic
influences . "^^
Local 201 leadership took a dim view of Father Smith
and St. Mary's labor school. It reported to UE national
officers that Fathers Smith and Downey made a "virulent"
attack on the leadership of Local 201, accusing the
executive board of being "90% communistic" and incompetent
in handling grievances. According to the local, the public
attack from the labor school "coincides with a current
disruptive campaign of a group of [stewards] and members,
mainly from building 64, River Works, in the membership
meetings . "^°
At the opening banquet of the labor school's third
session in October 1943, 500 people showed up to hear guest
speaker Father William J. Kelly, a member of the New York
Labor Relations Board. In the late 1930s, Kelly served as
ACTU chaplain, mediated labor disputes for the New York
chapter, and taught at ACTU's labor school in Brooklyn. Leo
Barber, president of Lynn's Central Labor Union and St.
Mary's Labor Association, served as toastmaster at the
banquet. Kelly focused primarily on Catholic labor
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doctrine, particularly Leo XIII ' s Rerum Novarum that
stressed labor-management cooperation. Lynn Mayor Arthur
Frawley echoed the call for industrial peace, arguing that
there would be no need for strikes or lockouts if employer
8
1
and employee followed the teachings of Pope Leo XIII.
St. Mary's labor school disbanded, probably in the
summer of 1944, when the Boston Archdiocese withdrew its
support due to policy changes in the Chancery made by its
new Archbishop, Richard Gushing. Father John J. Ryan, the
priest in the Chancery who supervised the Church's labor
activities, told Gushing that the Church's "normal and
traditional means of pulpit and press" reached far more
workers than the labor schools and was a more effective
method of teaching Catholic social doctrine. In Church, he
argued, "we have them under ideal conditions, namely, under
the formality of Catholics, with workers, organized and
unorganized, as well as managers and employers, in the same
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capacity .
"
The closing of St. Mary's labor school illustrates the
often ambiguous role of the Catholic church in fighting
communism. On the one hand, the school was effective in
organizing Catholic stewards and rank and file members to
challenge the left-leaning leadership of the local. Its
banquets brought Catholics together across class lines
to
oppose communism in the labor movement. The
Archdiocese, on
the other hand, seemed uninterested in building
an
organization to battle communists for control of
union
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locals. Church leadership required absolute control of its
projects. St. Mary's labor school was too messy and too
remote from Boston for that kind of control. Father Downey
reported to the Chancery that the school ' s 45 students
included "one communist, one very pink Jewish female lawyer,
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and three non-Catholics." The Church hierarchy wanted to
fight communism on its terms.
After St . Mary * s labor school closed, the next
organized effort to combat communism in Local 201 surfaced
in March 1947 when a group of GE workers met at the Knights
of Columbus Hall to form the Committee Against Communism.
Archie Shields, a spokesperson for the committee told the
84press that:
The purpose of this committee is to prevent a
communist from holding any elective office or
appointive position in our local. It is a known
fact that we have them in our local, and in
responsible positions at that. It is felt, that
with all the criticism being made against us, that
we should clean up our own house... It is quite
possible that the results of this committee could
set a pattern that would be followed throughout
the nation, local by local... [The situation]
demands that the spotlight be brought to bear on
those who seek to undermine our way of life.
Shields reported that many UE shop stewards attended the
meeting, but none of the officers participated. He
announced that the committee would hold its next meeting at
Local 201 's headquarters and invited the press to attend.
The origins of this committee are not clear. Some
organizers were Catholics with close enough ties to the
Knights of Columbus to use their hall. They may have
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participated in the St. Mary's labor school a few years
earlier. The goals of the committee are identical to those
of MDA, the Carey-ACTU alliance formed in the summer of 1946
to oust the national leadership. Perhaps Shields or some
other committee members attended MDA meetings. The Lynn
anticommunists chose to use a different name, which suggests
that if there was a direct connection, they did not want to
reveal it.
Shields 's use of the media was clever and calculated.
It is doubtful he had permission to hold the committee's
next meeting in Local 201 's union hall. By inviting the
press, he guaranteed coverage if the local officers denied
them use of the space. Shields 's reference to "all the
criticism being made against us" shows the impact of the
Alsop brothers anticommunist article in The Saturday Evening
Post. Local 201 figures prominently in the article because
UE president Albert Fitzgerald came from the Lynn local.
Shields relied on the unfavorable national publicity to
generate local interest in the committee.
Local politicians also generated negative publicity
about the danger of communists in the labor movement.
Representative Kendall Sanderson from Marblehead, a wealthy
seaside resort town, neighboring working class, industrial
Lynn, worked with the Chamber of Commerce and other
conservatives to promote antilabor legislation. Sanderson
claimed that the goal of his bills was to "rid unions of
Communist domination."" In March 1947, shortly after the
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formation of Shields 's Committee Against Communism,
Sanderson held hearings in Boston to investigate a Local 201
strike vote taken in January 1946 . At the hearing,
Sanderson questioned labor representatives about the
Committee Against Communism. Sanderson knew about the
anticommunist committee from Reverend Wilcox, the minister
of Lynn's Unitarian-Universalist Church who was leading a
local crusade against the UE.®^ Wilcox reported to the Lynn
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Kiwanis Club that Local 201 was "Communist dominated."
Shields told the press that Local 201 's business agent,
Fred Kelly, knew about the formation of the committee but
had nothing to do with it. Kelly represented local UE
officers who initially opposed the anticommunist MDA as
being divisive to the labor movement, but jumped ship before
1949 when they saw how red baiting could advance their
career. Kelly never worked in a factory in the electrical
industry. While attending a local business school, he
worked as an usher in a local theatre and as a clerk in
a
local grocery store. His father belonged to Local
201 's
executive board in the late 1930s. When Kelly graduated
from business school, his father got him a job as a
clerk in
the local's office where he kept the books and
supervised
distribution of the local's newspaper. Kelly began
working
closely with Al Coulthard, one of Local
201 's founders and
its business agent, and took the title of
"Assistant to the
Business Agent." Kelly became a member of
Local 201 when
the membership revised its by-laws
permitting office staff
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to join the union. As a member of Local 201, he ran for the
office of "Assistant Business Agent." After serving a stint
in the Army during the war, he returned to Lynn and ran for
Coulthard's position as business agent when Coulthard left
Lynn to serve on the Massachusetts State Labor Commission
.
As Local 201 *s business agent, Kelly sat on the national GE
Negotiating Committee where he failed to distinguish
himself . ®®
In July 1947, when District Council 2 debated a
resolution condemning MDA and its tactics, Kelly spoke out
8 9
strongly against anticommunists active in his local.
I despise this stuff and have seen too much of
it... I want the respect of [MDA] people in my
Local, but I won't join them in a trade union
hall. We should fight for the principles for
which the trade union was formed. In the past six
months this group has spent time, energy, and
somebody's money to fight Communism, while we got
the Taft-Hartley Law.
Kelly also blasted James Carey, MDA ' s figurehead, for
lacking interest in rank and file members. "For the past
ten years Carey wouldn't come to any union meeting, but let
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a group of manufacturers come to town, and he attends."
Sometime in the next year or so, Fred Kelly had a
conversion. By November 1948, he was working with
anticommunists in Local 201 to embarrass national officers
and drive a wedge between them and rank and file
members.
By June 1949, Kelly had become MDA's choice
to stand in for
Carey and run against Fitzgerald for president
of the union
When he accepted the nomination, he promised
to "clean
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house" of "left wing pinkos" and "undesirable like
9
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Communists." Kelly's conversion was part of Carey's
calculated strategy. Carey had to win the support of big
locals in order to regain control of the UE. Perhaps Carey
himself wooed Kelly.
The first break between Local 201 leadership and the
national office came in September 1948 when a majority of
the executive board voted to send UE national officers and
CIO president Philip Murray a telegram urging them to sign
the non-Communist af f idavits . At a general membership
meeting in November 1948, anticommunist members provoked
criticism of the editorial content of UE News. The local
Communist party had distributed a leaflet in Lynn that was
similar in content to the front page editorial of UE News.
It called on workers to hold Truman to the campaign promises
he made in order to steal the thunder of third-party
candidate Henry Wallace. Local 201 anticommunists argued
that the leaflet showed the Communist party dominated the
UE. The membership instructed Kelly, their business agent,
to contact the national office and find out "how the paper
is operated and who is responsible for its editorial
policy." They also wanted to know how to stop the paper
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from being delivered to their homes.
Around this time, anticommunists at the Everett
supercharger plant introduced resolutions at membership
meetings condemning communist infiltration in the UE. As a
result of their complaints. Local 201 set up a committee
to
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investigate the allegations and to make recommendations for
further action by the members. In March 1949, the committee
recommended that Local 201 "urge national officers to use
all nationwide communication systems within their power to
combat charges that the UE is Communist dominated and to
insure the UE membership that they themselves are not
94Communists .
"
Anticommunists did a good job using national publicity
to stir up dissent among the rank and file. They continued
to press for compliance with the Taft-Hartley non-Communist
affidavits, an issue that tended to make national officers
look guilty. If they were not communists, why did they
refuse to sign the oaths? In March 1949, Local 201 's
executive board sent a second telegram to national officers
demanding they file the af fidavits . At the same time,
anticommunists began tapping into international cold war
tensions as well. In April 1949, the membership voted to
wire the Massachusetts Congressional delegation and
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urging them to pressure the
United Nations to demand a new trial for Cardinal Mindzenty
of Hungary and to work for release of prisoners from slave
labor camps in the Soviet Union. Eastern European workers
were particularly concerned about these issues and wanted
their union to take a stand against Soviet aggression.
No one knew, however, how many converts the
anticommunists recruited. One vote suggested skilled
workers still backed the UE. In April 1949, the
AFL's
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attempt to win over die sinkers at the River Works plant
came to a head when the NLRB scheduled an election. The Die
Sinkers International Conference, an AFL craft organization,
was the only union on the ballot. The UE could not be
listed because its officers refused to file the non-
Communist affidavits. The UE mounted a vigorous "no union"
campaign to maintain the status guo. The final vote was 91
(55 percent) for "no union" and 71 (45 percent) for the Die
Sinkers. Although this was only an election among a small
fraction of the work force, it shows these highly skilled
workers were not ready to abandon the UE.
At a Dayton, Ohio meeting in May 1949, the MDA
nominated Fred Kelly to run against Fitzpatrick. Three
hundred delegates attended the meeting to plan a "war" on
the left wingers. Kelly told fellow anticommunists
:
"You've got to put up with Commies spying in your local.
Give them as little information as possible. Fight them
9 8
every inch of the way."
A week after he returned to Lynn, the first open
battle
between Kelly and Fitzpatrick erupted in a membership
meeting. The Kelly forces wanted to hold a referendum
in
the local on whether Kelly or Fitzpatrick should
be elected
president of the UE. The outcome would lock all
delegates
into voting for the winner at the national
convention,
prevent splitting Local 201 -s votes, and deliver
a large
block of votes to the winner. Kelly gambled
on winning the
referendum. The resolution calling for the
referendum lost
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at the afternoon membership meeting attended by day shift
workers, but won at the evening meeting when Kelly
supporters packed the hall. Throughout the day, the River
Works and Everett plants buzzed about the open split between
Kelly and Fitzpatrick who had been once been close
friends
.
The next day Fitzpatrick put out a flyer headlined
"What's Happening in Local 201?" He claimed that nine out
of thirteen executive board members supported him, and that
the entire board had previously rejected unanimously the
idea of a referendum. He accused Kelly of "staging a plot"
and described the resolution as unconstitutional. But
Fitzpatrick ' s effort to shore up his position backfired.
Four executive board members said they had been tricked into
having their names used on the Fitzpatrick flyer. Ray
Wilson, a National Guard captain said: "I hate Communism
and do not stand for the party-line Commies who are trying
to sabotage this union." The executive board set a date for
the referendum election and a pre-election rally to which it
invited the press. '^^^
Four weeks later. Local 201 members voted between Kelly
and Fitzpatrick. The national office and Fred Kelly
exchanged angry telegrams, both sides blaming the other for
disrupting the real work of the local. Fitzgerald told
Kelly that he was "promoting [his] personal ambitions for
office" instead of doing the business agent's work. Kelly
pointed out that the Daily Worker published similar charges
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under a pirturo of Fitzgerald. He objected when tho
nat ional office set up a sate 1 I iLc ol I i cu in l.ynn and scrit
oicjauizers in to "disorganize the organized ."
Kelly won 72 percent of tho vote; Fitzgerald won 28
percent. Approximately 63 percent of eligible workct:. voted
in the referendum. Turnout for ol finer and steward
elections hovorod ,il)oid to porr<Mit . Kf^Uy ran hor.t in the
West I.ynn plant (7.1 p(^rront ) .nid wcur.t in the I'lverott
Eupfi cti.irqor plant ( f. 7 percent). Lynn's local newspaper
repoitod Kelly won heeause he waged a "militant li()lit
acjciinst Communistic inflnences that brou(jhl support from
both Catholic and Protestant clergy." Kelly al::o had h<'lp
from ACTU organizers. Fitzpatrirk, accord inq to the i:)apor,
had onc(.> befMi very popul.n in Local ?0 1 but lost suppcji t
wlKMi he ()iom()tc(l iicnty Wallace loi piesidcnt the previous
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ye. 1 1 .
In Scptembui I'M'), at th.' national UK convnlion,
Kit/.pat.ick defeated Kelly by a vote ui 233B to 1500. some
Local 201 delc.,.,tcs, includinci Fitzpatrirk, disret,arded
tho
referendum vote an.l <li<l .uvt vote (nr Kelly. The
|..IIowmu,
month, Kelly tried nnsucc<-.s I u 1 1 y to uns.'at I'aul
Seymour, a
UK loyalist, ar. presi.lcnt ..I Dist.icL Council .
Numeiically, it was a veiy close vote. .n> loi y
26J lo. Kelly. hy b).-al, liowevi, :;.'ymou.
won handily: 53
ic. ::eymou,, M lo, Kelly, and ^ split their voto.^°^
These
Ucjures suqcjest that without concentrated .uqani/inq hy
.Hd icommunistS, UE workers chose to reman,
wrth
.
heai un.ou
1 R6
in spite of the red baiting. They also point to the pattern
of the 1950 elections when the lUE won big locals where it
concentrated all its efforts and lost smaller locals that it
ignored. Both elections attest to the underlying strength
of local control.
When Kelly lost to Seymour, he and his followers walked
out of the District Council meeting to openly plan a
secession movement. On October 28, 1949, a majority of
Local 201 's executive board voted to stop paying per capita
dues. On November 13th, 2,000 people attended a meeting
called by Kelly to form a new union. James Carey, the main
speaker, presented Kelly with a charter for Local 201, lUE-
CIO. While Carey spoke, hecklers challenged him to prove
that UE leaders were communists. Carey replied: "I don't
have to prove it, the FBI will. The time has long since
come when Communists must be cleaned out of the CIO and the
American labor movement ."
For the next six months, the UE and lUE worked
feverishly to position themselves for NLRB elections in all
GE plants scheduled for May 1950. Kelly's sole message was
anticommunism and red-baiting. In a flurry of campaigning
just before the election. Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin,
CIO president Philip Murray, and Jim Carey came to Lynn to
pitch the same message. Tobin broke precedent by taking
sides in a labor dispute because the election represented
vital issue of Americanism, not an issue of trade unionism.
He came to Lynn as an American fighting communism. "No
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other issue exists here... It is my political duty to drive
Communists out of the unions." Murray said "I hate
Communism because it speaks evil. Communism is the very
antithesis of democracy." He told the crowd he had talked
to Fitzgerald, Emspak and Matles many times trying to
convince them to change their ways, but they refused.
Alfred Coulthard was the UE ' s most prominent speaker.
When Tobin announced he would visit Lynn on behalf of the
lUE, Coulthard agreed to break his silence and openly side
with the UE. To do this, he resigned from his position on
the Massachusetts State Labor Board. Coulthard was highly
regarded in Lynn; UE members named their union hall after
him. Two thousand members jammed the hall to hear him
speak. He talked about the formation of the union, how mucl
it had meant to workers in the plant, and how much it had
accomplished. He stressed that communism was a false issue
the real issue being which union would do a better job
representing workers. Coulthard surprised many old timers.
In 1941, he wrote a harsh editorial in the local's newspape
equating communism with nazism and condemning communists in
the labor movement. "Men are not free if they are members
of the Communist or Nazi Party... This writer will go out o
a limb. There should be no room for leadership in a
Democratic set-up for an avowed disbeliever in
Democracy. "^^^ Coulthard's 1950 endorsement of the left-
led UE carried great weight and helps account for the
closeness of the vote in Lynn.
188
Fred Kelly reaped many rewards for changing sides.
Murray appointed him to fill Fitzgerald's seat on the CIO
executive council after the UE ouster. Within the lUE,
Kelly had to step aside for Carey who was elected president.
However, he was elected president of lUE's District Council
2, a position which he turned into a full-time job.^°^
The split between the lUE and the UE in the River
Works, West Lynn and Everett production units remained
fairly constant in the early 1950s. In May 1950, the vote
was 55 percent (lUE) to 44 percent (UE); in December 1953,
in another NLRB election, the tally was 54 percent (lUE) to
46 percent (UE). The lUE did not win over more workers even
after the full gale force of McCarthyism hit Massachusetts.
Anticommunism among workers in Local 201 grew slowly
throughout the 1940s. The Catholic church was a constant
force in promoting anticommunism and attacking local UE
leadership. St. Mary's labor school trained Catholic UE
stewards and activists in ant icommunist Catholic labor
doctrine and organizing skills. The labor school had ties
to active ACTU chapters in New York. Some Local 201
anticommunists also worked with MDA, the national Carey-
ACTU alliance formed to oust the UE leadership from within.
Anticommunist activists used Local 201 membership meetings
to criticize national UE leadership on its foreign and its
failure to sign the Taft-Hartley affidavits. When Fred
Kelly, Local 201 's business agent, was converted,
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anticommunists could coordinate better local attacks on UE
leadership with statewide and national UE efforts.
Kelly's most important ally in Massachusetts was John
Callahan, business agent of Local 255 in Pittsfield.
Local 255, Pittsfield
Local 255 also represented GE workers. The electrical
giant came to Pittsfield in 1903 when it bought out Stanley
Electric , a local , well-established company that
manufactured alternating current generators. Prior to World
War I, 6,000 Yankees and "old immigrant" Irish and Germans
worked at GE . War-time production opened up jobs to newer
immigrants, primarily Italians, Poles and other eastern
Europeans. World War II brought women into the plant. At
peak production in the early 1940s, 12,000 people worked at
GE in Pittsfield. Working men and women from industrial
towns all over the Berkshires considered GE jobs to be the
108best in the area.
The UE chartered Local 255 in 1939, three years after
its founding. Union men from the big GE local in
Schenectady, one of UE • s pioneers, organized the Pittsfield
local. As in Lynn, Pittsfield workers most receptive to
these early organizing efforts were high paid, high skilled
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welders and winders.
John Callahan, Local 255 's leading anticommunist
,
helped organize the GE local serving as shop steward and
officer before becoming business agent in 1945. He was an
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embattled leader, who frequently feuded with local leaders
and national officers. Unpredictable, he often surprised
other union leaders with sudden policy changes. Callahan
was also impressionable and thin-skinned, and a willing
anticommunist when influenced by like minded people.
UE loyalists in Pittsfield believed Callahan began
working with Carey as early as the 1943 annual convention,
which he attended as a delegate for Local 255. The
convention that year was a spectacle of patriotic unity
until the issue of James Carey was raised. By 1943,
national officers had broken irrevocably with Carey.
Convention delegates voted down a resolution endorsing Carey
for another term as secretary-treasurer of the CIO. When
Local 255 's convention delegates reported back to the
membership meeting, they failed to mention the anti-Carey
resolution. Callahan took the floor, disclaiming
accusations he said were made at the convention that he was
working for Carey. Callahan made a motion requesting a
national officer attend their next membership meeting and
defend him.-^^° This episode helps us understand Callahan's
character. If he was not working with Carey, as he claimed,
why make an issue out of it?
Father Eugene Marshall, pastor of St. Mary's, the
largest Catholic church in Pittsfield, led the anticommunist
crusade in Pittsfield. His church overlooked the sprawling
GE plant and serviced most Catholic GE workers and their
families. Marshall admired Father Charles Owen Rice of
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Pittsburgh, the most well known labor priest in America.
Rice led the ACTU movement in Pittsburgh, and was Carey's
most valuable ally in MDA even though Rice did not think
very highly of Carey's leadership ability. Rice had a
popular weekly radio broadcast in Pittsburgh from which he
preached an uncompromising message of anticommunism. He
masterminded the ouster of communists from UE ' s big
Pittsburgh local and was Marshall's mentor.
Marshall used the pulpit to warn GE workers about the
dangers of communism within the UE. One sermon, delivered
in June 1946, compared the "two ways of life—Christian and
Communistic." In it, he preached that parishioners should
be concerned about the spread of communism. He explained
that communist minorities exercise influence because other
people were lazy and did not bother to get involved. This
is how communists took over in Spain, Mexico and Russia,
according to Marshall. Allowing Reds to remain within the
borders of the United State threatened national security.
Marshall's words echoed the concerns of eastern
European workers. In February 1948, Local 255 passed
unanimously a resolution "condemning the Hungarian
Government for their treatment of Cardinal Mindzenty." The
lack of opposition shows the importance of events in
eastern
Europe to workers with relatives now living under Soviet
rule. The resolution called on UE • s national officers
to
take the same position and to publish a public
statement in
UE News.''^^ National officers failed to respond
to the
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resolution and UE News editorial policy continued to attack
the Marshall Plan, positions that increased the pull of
ant icommunism among eastern European workers.
Marshall told his parishioners to help the cause by
fighting communist influence in the UE. He cautioned the
working class audience not to be fooled by union leaders.
Albert Fitzgerald "has a fine name that might disarm anyone,
but he's as Red as the flag of Russia." Marshall implied
that local leaders were also communists. "I suppose not
more than three percent of the union here is Communistic,
but the delegates they sent to the convention in Milwaukee
last month voted to support the Red top."^^"^
Callahan was one of those delegates. Upset by
Marshall's implication, he issued a statement to the
Berkshire Eagle: "I cannot possibly conceive of any basis,
other than vicious rumor, on which such charges are made.
It is as ridiculous to say that our national organization is
dominated by communists as it is to imply that there are
communists within our local which are dominating its
activities. "^^* Two months later, however, at the State CIO
Council meeting, Callahan worked with the constitutional
committee to pass an amendment prohibiting members of the
Communist party, or any communist, fascist, or nazi
organization, from holding office. When Callahan returned
to Pittsfield from the meeting, he held a press conference
to take credit for the amendment
. ''^^
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Callahan acted on his own at the state CIO convention,
shocking Local 255 officers who also attended the meeting.
Pete Jacquot, president of Local 255, called an emergency
meeting at his house as soon as he returned from the CIO
convention to tell other union leaders about Callahan's
actions. He opposed the Callahan amendment; other officers
who did not attend the meeting agreed with Jacquot. They
wanted to take action against Callahan and his wife, who
worked in the union office and had considerable influence
over him. Jacquot argued against it. He convinced the
group it was more important to maintain unity in the face of
scheduled discussions with GE on the "wage-price question."
He only wanted to warn them about what Callahan was doing in
case he tried to push through a similar amendment to the
local's constitution.
Callahan reversed his position the following summer
when he supported a strongly worded resolution condemning
the anticommunist MDA at a District Council meeting.
Callahan said the MDA, Father Marshall and the press were
"smearing the UE" and making it difficult for them to
collect PAC contributions from members. He reported that
"now people are coming down who are disrupting our
meetings
and we can't do our business. We are improving
because some
good friends of mine who have been involved with
[MDA] and
attended some of their meetings, are fed up."^^'
Perhaps
Callahan learned local officers disagreed with
his
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anticommunist activities at the state CIO meeting and
decided to pull back.
The disruption Callahan reported probably came from
Catholic anticommunists. Marshall recruited GE workers in
Church-sponsored groups, like the Holy Name Society, and
helped them organize an anticommunist bloc within Local 255.
They aimed to drive a wedge between UE members and national
leaders. They spread rumors that other CIO leaders said UE
Secretary-Treasurer Matles "sold them down the river" with
the latest contract; and they urged members not to
contribute to the UE ' s PAC because the money went to
Russia. -^^^
By 1948, Callahan joined the people he condemned the
year before. Partly, it was to retaliate against the
national office. During the six-week nationwide strike
against GE in early 1946, the UE national office sent Ed
Turkowski to Pittsfield to assist Local 255. Callahan
chafed at Turkowski ' s presence, believing the national
office did not trust him to conduct a militant strike. He
denied the charge, claiming the national office failed to
credit "the fine job that has been done here and the fact
1 19
that we enjoyed unusually strong community support."
Callahan also joined the anticommunists because, like Fred
Kelly in Lynn, he too had a "conversion." President Truman
met with Callahan and helped woo him to the anticommunist
cause during a whistle-stop campaign swing through
Massachusetts in 1948.
195
Callahan and other anticommunists in Local 255 used the
Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits as an issue to
discredit the national leadership. In October 1948, a month
after Local 201 in Lynn demanded compliance, Local 255 's
executive board demanded that national officers "explain
their position In November, members passed a
resolution denouncing the editorial policies of the UE News
for never criticizing the Soviet Union, for failing to
congratulate Truman on his victory, and for opposing the
Marshall plan.-^^^ Local 201 in Lynn made similar complaints
during the same month. Whether Callahan and Kelly followed
a nationwide MDA strategy or simply coordinated efforts, it
was not a coincidence that both locals took similar actions
at the same time.
Father Marshall played a key role in this period as
well. Supporters of the national office wanted to get the
November anti-L7E News resolution rescinded. In January
1949, Marshall wrote parishioners on St. Mary's stationery
urging them to attend an up-coming membership meeting and
"vote your convictions." He said the meeting would
"uphold
or denounce the men who had the moral courage to be
real
Americans and stand by the USA... [Now is the time for]
the
right wing [to] be organized and make its presence
felt."'^
The Callahan-Marshall forces pushed through a
resolution asking all Local 255 officers and
District
council president Paul Seymour to sign
non-Communist
affidavits. Anticommunists claimed they wanted
the
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affidavits "solely for our own reassurance" and not to force
compliance with Taft-Hartley . '^^^ Father Marshall
distributed postcards to UE parisioners telling them to
"Vote American—Vote for Christ. "^^* The meeting marked the
beginning of the open split between anticommunists (right
wingers as they called themselves) and unionists loyal to
the national officers (left wingers as they called
themselves )
.
Two weeks later, anticommunists sponsored a resolution
condemning UE Field Organizer Gerard Steinberg for trying
"to disrupt the affairs of Local 255 by seeking to persuade
certain of its members to act in a manner that would be
detrimental to the welfare of the local." Anticommunist
officers barred Steinberg and Albert Smith, UE International
Representative, who still refused to sign non-Communist
affidavits. Callahan called a press conference after the
meeting to denounce Smith and Steinberg as "troublemakers"
and "disrupters."^" A week later, the Springfield Union
published an editorial written by Callahan demanding UE
national officers sign non-Communist affidavits. He claimed
GE workers were not joining the union because it had a "red
tag" on it.-^^^
in spring 1949, while Fred Kelly orchestrated the
referendum idea for the Lynn local, Callahan pressed
national officers to sign the affidavits. Callahan
called a
press conference to announce that Fitzgerald,
Matles, and
Emspak had been invited to the May 26th general
membership
meeting where they would be asked to sign the affidavits "in
the presence of the assembly." The next day, May 24th,
Callahan informed the national officers of the meeting by
registered letter. Callahan timed the letters to arrive in
New York on May 25th, one day before the meeting. They
wired back: "None of the UE National Officers will
participate in any such staged monkeyshines with you and
Fred Kelly . "^^"^
In June 1949, Callahan surprised everyone with an "off
the cuff" talk to the Pittsfield Rotary Club on the "inside
story" of the 1946 strike. Callahan accused the national
office of wanting to incite violence by sending a "known
Communist from St. Louis" to help the UE field
representative organize a "goon squad" to overturn cars and
use lead pipes against police. He divulged to the Rotarians
that only his level headed leadership and close cooperation
with the Pittsfield police chief prevented the violence the
communists wanted. National news media reported
Callahan's remarks. GE • s publicity department made good use
of the information, reporting in their newsletter that:
"Reds were sent to Pittsfield to organize goon squads."
The UE national office reacted angrily and quickly
to
Callahan's speech. In order to save face within the
union,
Callahan made a retraction in the press. After denying
that
he said the UE national officers "wanted or
encouraged
violence during the strike period," he launched
into a
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renewed attack on the UE leadership:
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Communists thrive on bloodshed, disorder and
unemployment... for a number of years the national
office of our union has been influenced and
controlled by persons who are either Communists or
Communist sympathizers. I did not charge that all
our national officers are Communists, just two out
of three. But the reputation of the third for
following the Commy line is well established.
Callahan was a loose cannon. In May 1949, when he
joined the national GE Negotiating Committee, he wrote
Charles Wilson, GE ' s president, offering to withdraw the
Conference Board's wage demands in response for a promise to
maintain current job levels. Callahan wrote privately,
without authorization from or knowledge of the Conference
Board. Wilson rejected the deal . ^"^^
Callahan's unauthorized communication with Wilson
outraged the rest of the GE Negotiating Committee, which
immediately removed him from the committee. District
Council 2, however, had to ratify the removal. The vote
proved more of a referendum on the open split between right
wingers and left wingers than on Callahan's actions. Fred
Kelly, Callahan's strongest defender, argued the motion was
a subterfuge to "smear a guy who has turned to the right
wing." District Council 2 delegates narrowly rejected the
ouster motion, 281 to 311. Local 255, Local 201 in
Lynn,
and smaller, strongly anticommunist locals in Bridgeport,
Connecticut supported Callahan. At the same meeting,
Callahan and Kelly combined their votes and defeated
District council president, Paul Seymour, and UE
national
representative Albert Smith as delegates to the
national
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convention. It was the first time either man had been
opposed for election as delegate.
Both sides fought hard in the struggle for control of
the UE. Since its formation, UE built a reputation for
solidarity with its striking locals. In District 2, the big
Lynn and Pittsfield locals gave generously to small locals
on strike. As the right wing/left wing split deepened,
local leaders had to choose whether to support a striking
local based on the politics of its leaders. Workers at
Keystone Manufacturing Company, a small shop outside Boston,
waged a long bitter strike in spring 1949. Local 261,
Boston's big amalgamated that remained loyal to national
officers, represented Keystone. Local 255 sent Keystone
workers a mere $62.47. A local officer explained the
collection was so meager because "our people resent the fact
that [Local 261] Business Agent, Hannegan, was sent to
picket the [MDA] conference, where that money could have
helped feed some of the strikers. "^^^ Callahan participated
in that MDA conference and helped get Fred Kelly the right
wingers' endorsement to run against Fitzgerald. In sharp
contrast, when striking workers at Singer Sewing Machine
Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut asked for help. Local 255
sent $2,500.^^^ Officers of the Singer local were firmly in
the anticommunist , right wing camp.
Callahan and his allies copied Kelly's unit-vote
strategy to deliver more votes for anticommunist
candidates.
When Local 255 met following the 1949 convention,
right
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wingers sponsored a motion instructing Local 255 delegates
to vote for Fred Kelly as president of District Council 2.
The motion finessed direct election of delegates by
empowering the executive board, now controlled by right
wingers, to appoint the delegates. At a later meeting,
right wingers pushed through a motion stating "any delegate
who violates the wishes of the membership will be
immediately removed from office." When District Council 2
met, Kelly lost to incumbent president Paul Seymour by a
narrow margin. Pete Jacquot, Local 255 president, voted
against Kelly in defiance of the right wingers' mandate. Up
to this point, Jacquot had remained neutral. The day after
the District Council meeting. Local 255 's executive board
suspended Jacquot from the union he helped build by a vote
of 21 to 12.-^^^
Once the CIO expelled the UE, the split between right
wingers and left wingers within Local 255 turned into a
battle between the UE and the lUE. Father Marshall threw
his weight behind the lUE. At Sunday mass on November 20,
1949, the day of a membership meeting to discuss seceding
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from the UE, Marshall preached from the pulpit:
Do you want to belong to a bona fide American
trade union or do you wish to belong to a party
line union... I don't think there is any
alternative for a loyal American citizen... Any
man who prefers to follow the Messrs. Fitzpatrick,
Emspak and Matles is in absolute disobedience to
the directives of the Holy Father, lacks the
common sense of a patriotic citizen and is a
Catholic in name only. It's a choice between
Christ and Stalin.
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There was no uncertainty in Marshall's position. James
Carey spoke that afternoon praising Callahan for working "to
oust the Communist influence from the National and local
organization." Like Marshall, Carey's only message was red-
baiting. He criticized UE national officers on foreign
policy issues without ever mentioning any trade union
issues. "This is a fight between the American worker and
the Communist Party." Callahan echoed Carey's message,
telling members "we're preventing you from turning over our
money to the Communist Party. "^'^^
Local 255 split into rival camps. The NLRB scheduled a
representation election for May 1950. As in Lynn, both
sides campaigned feverishly in the final days. Father
Marshall did everything he could to defeat the UE. Ten days
before the vote, he brought Father Charles Owen Rice, ACTU's
national chaplain and pre-eminent labor priest, to
Pittsfield. The program, sponsored by the Knights of
Columbus, was broadcast over a local radio station. Rice
praised Marshall as "one of the most outspoken and
courageous priests in the United States" before tracing the
development of Catholic labor doctrine. When asked about
the UE-IUE election, he said GE workers were fortunate
because they had the opportunity to "come to grips with
the
Communist menace." According to Rice, communism was the
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only issue in the election.
Left wingers understood well the influence of
Fathers
Rice and Marshall among union members. Hoping
to outflank
202
the priests, a UE delegation called on Marshall's bishop in
Springfield, a man with more moderate views. They asked him
to assure GE workers they were free to vote their conscience
in the election. With such a statement in hand, they
planned to tell union members the election was a personal
matter, not a "choice between Stalin and Christ." But the
plan backfired. The two hour meeting ended with no public
statement from the UE delegation or the Bishop.
The Sunday before the election, Marshall and the pastor
at the other Catholic church in Pittsfield preached against
the UE . Both priests quoted liberally from two documents:
Albany's Bishop Gibbons 's statement denouncing the UE as
"Communist controlled and Communist dominated" and J. Edgar
Hoover's report finding "every member of the Communist party
is pledged to sabotage our country if war should come with
Russia." While Marshall preached, the women of St. Mary's
annual breakfast gathering heard Regina Kirkpatrick,
publicity director of the National Catholic Lay Women's
Retreat Movement, denounce the UE. "You are either going to
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be on Our Lady's side or Satan's side."
The final drive of the campaign brought James Carey
back to Pittsfield. Two days before the election, he
"revealed" new information that local UE field organizer
Gerard Steinberg was a "dangerous Communist... and traitor
to our nation." In a new twist on red-baiting, he invited
Steinberg to sue him for defamation of character implying if
Steinberg did not sue, then the charge must be true.
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Callahan repeated the Steinberg charge at a noontime gate
rally the day of the election. He quoted a report prepared
by a CIO investigating committee that was staffed with UE
dissidents, and distributed a leaflet detailing the charges.
"We have more Jerry," he taunted, "We welcome a suit." It
was impossible for Steinberg to refute the charges on such
short notice. The tactic served to bring the issue of
communist infiltration home to Local 255. It worked well,
and gave Callahan and his anticommunist allies a new issue
to present as workers filed into polling places to vote.
The anticommunist lUE carried Local 255 with 70 percent
of the vote, a larger margin than in Lynn. Undoubtedly,
Father Marshall was an important factor in the victory.
After the vote, the winners paraded past St. Mary's Church
with a casket labelled "UE" and waved to Father Marshall who
140beamed back from the steps of his parish. His message
was particularly well received among eastern European
immigrants concerned about the Soviet takeover of Poland and
persecution of Catholics in that region. Another factor was
the lack of a leftist tradition in the local. UE loyalists
in Lynn came closer to staving off anticommunists than their
counterparts in Pittsfield because of the endorsement they
received from Alfred Coulthard.
There was only one issue in Pittsfield, and it was not
a trade union issue. At the victory celebration, Callahan
reminded supporters: "Communism has been repudiated in
Pittsfield. The issue in this fight was communism."
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Callahan did not gain professionally when the lUE was
formed, as Kelly and other anticommunist organizers did. He
built his personal image by embracing anticommunism.
Through it, he gained the endorsement of Father Marshall,
rubbed elbows with famous people like President Truman and
Philip Murray, and worked directly with James Carey. Local
Ibusiness leaders in the Rotary listened raptly when he
spoke, and they praised his leadership.
(
Sprinafield/Holyoke Locals
Springfield is the largest urban area in western
Massachusetts. It sits on the Connecticut River, which
provided both power and transportation necessary to develop j
a robust, diversified manufacturing economy in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Springfield '
Armory anchored the local economy. Established in 1776, it
manufactured weapons for successive wars, and fostered metal
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working and machine tool building throughout the region.
By 1949, there were ten UE locals at metalworking and
machine shops in Springfield and Holyoke, its sister city.
Combined, these ten UE locals represented over 8,000
workers. The largest. Local 202, represented 3,000 workers
at a Westinghouse plant that manufactured electrical, radio,
and automotive machine parts. The other locals scattered
among machine shops varied in size from 1,300 to 25 workers.
Local 206 represented 1,300 workers at American Bosch, a
machine shop that manufactured magnets and diesel injection
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equipment; Local 278 represented 1,200 workers at Chapman
Valve, a machine shop that manufactured valves for fire
hydrants. The rest of the locals represented 700 or fewer
workers
.
Organizers at the big Westinghouse local helped found
the UE. They secured a Federal Labor Union charter from the
AFL and followed Carey into the UE. Matt Campbell, an
older, skilled toolmaker and Scottish immigrant, led the
Westinghouse local. According to labor historian Ronald
Schatz, the Westinghouse union enjoyed a "cozy" relationship
with management, an experience that shaped Campbell's
attitude toward organizing. At the 1937 convention, he
questioned whether the union needed to spend union its funds
on organizing.
Campbell served on the UE • s national executive board
and as president of District Council 2 until his death in
1941. Carey, Campbell and Harry Block (Carey's friend and
ally from the Philadelphia Philco local) formed the
conservative wing of the UE executive committee. Campbell
supported the young Carey, nominating him at the 1937
convention and seconding his nomination in 1940. Campbell
told delegates he had never met a man or woman who could
take Carey's place. At national conventions, Campbell led
floor fights against foreign policy resolutions sponsored by
left-wing UE officers and supported the right of locals to
exclude communists, fascists and nazis from membership
.
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Historians Ronald Schatz and Ronald Filippelli
characterize Campbell as a cautious unionist, allied with
the anticommunist wing. In a more recent work, Robert
Forrant challenges this description. In 1935, Campbell ran
for mayor of Springfield on a third party labor ticket. The
party's electoral strategy hoped to recruit homeowners,
small businessmen, office workers as well as workers. In a
period of popular front politics, Campbell and his labor
party allies refused to work with the Communist party. His
philosophy followed Leo XIII 's vision of labor-management
cooperation and fervent anticommunist.''"**
Campbell's conservative unionism and anticommunism
rubbed off on UE locals in the Springf ield/Holyoke area, or
perhaps he simply mirrored the beliefs of Springfield's
metalworkers. After his death in 1941, others continued
fighting for the conservative tradition he represented.
John Paran, an assembler turned business agent for the
Westinghouse local, consistently voted for Carey and the
right wing slate of national officers. He served as
spokesman for opposition to foreign policy resolutions
sponsored by the left wing. At the 1948 convention, the
national press guoted Paran when he questioned the
"Americanism" of speakers favoring the majority report. "I
am sick and tired of hearing about the faults of the United
States," he told the delegates. "I'd like to hear about the
faults of Russia. "^*^
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Springfield UE anticommunists worked together to
advance their agenda. When the Chapman Valve local
sponsored a resolution in 1946 barring communists from
holding office in the union, they picked Frank Hall,
business agent at the Bosch local to speak for them at the
national convention . Although convention delegates
defeated the resolution, Hall reintroduced it at the next
District Council 2 meeting where delegates again voted it
down.^*^ By 1949, Tony Cimino, an assembler at
Westinghouse , led the Springfield right wing group. Cimino
attended national MDA meetings and belonged to its executive
committee. In summer 1949, he passed out buttons in
Springfield with the slogan "I helped build UE-CIO, not UE-
CP.M148
In most Springfield locals, the right wing was firmly
entrenched. Members of Local 220 at Package Machinery
elected Leo Messier, an assembler and leading anticommunist
,
to thirteen consecutive terms as their president. In other
locals, however, the right wing and left wing battled for
control. The Bosch local, for instance, equivocated in
relationship to the national office.
In September 1946, the national office launched an
ambitious program to present its views on national economic
affairs to its members. Julius Emspak impressed delegates
with the importance of distributing UE literature at a time
"when distortion of the news become a threat to the peace
and security of ourselves and the world.
"^^^ The leaflets
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were easy to read with clear graphics and cartoon
characters. The national office sent its first UE Leaflet
of the Week, "Why High Food Prices?", to Bosch in November
1946. A handwritten notation on the circular read
"Table. "^^° Five months later, the national office wrote
the Bosch local announcing a reduction in the price of
pamphlets and noting that the local had not ordered any
copies. A handwritten notation on this circular read
"Reject. "^^^ The Bosch local rejected other literature as
well, including the revised edition of the UE Handbook and a
pamphlet written by James Matles titled "The Members Run
152This Union — An Answer to The Saturday Evening Post."
At the same time, however, the Bosch local asked the
national office for assistance with its negotiations. When
the membership rejected a Company proposal on wage
increases, it voted to ask a national representative to sit
in on all future negotiations. Two months later, Bosch
members voted to thank Jack Davis, a UE national organizer,
for his "valuable advice" to their contract committee and
assistance during negotiations . -^^-^ What the Bosch local
wanted from the national office was trade union assistance,
not propaganda.
Ralph Forsstrom, a toolmaker at Bosch, led the left
wing within the local. He came to the company during the
war, serving as steward and then as president in 1946. When
Frank Hall, a leader of the anticommunist UE group in
Springfield, left Bosch in 1947, Forsstrom ran for Hall's
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position as business agent narrowly defeating Ralph
Chicketti, an anticommunist rival. Forsstrom remained loyal
to the national office throughout the 1948 presidential
election campaign. His endorsement of the Wallace candidacy
and opposition to the Marshall plan cost him support among
the rank and f ile . At a general membership meeting in
September 1948, Forsstrom' s detractors pushed through a
resolution calling on the local's president to "instruct the
Business Agent in his duties in line with out policies, that
of the National CIO policies ^^"^ Even so, Forsstrom won
reelection as business agent in 1948 again defeating
Chicketti
•
At the GE local in Holyoke, ant icommunists led a
similar effort to purge local officers loyal to the national
office. In January 1949, anticommunist members tried to
oust their business agent, Leon Massa, "who is considered to
have extreme left tendencies." The effort failed, however,
and Massa was reelected with 68 percent of the vote.
Anticommunists also accused their president, Robert
Halliday, of leaning to the left, and tried to prevent his
election as a delegate to the UE national convention.
Halliday denounced the red-baiting insisting he was
"bitterly opposed Communism, its philosophy and its
principles." The battle, he argued, was about seniority,
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not communism
.
While Forsstrom, Massa and Halliday struggled to
maintain a principled position, other local UE officers
in
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the greater Springfield area bolted to the anticommunist
camp. William Lieberman, an assembler and president of the
Westinghouse local, was one of the turn-coats. Although
anticommunists maintained a strong presence in his local,
other Westinghouse members and officers supported the UE
national office on its record of trade union achievements.
The animosity between men on each side of the issue ran
deep. When Lieberman suddenly embraced anticommunism in
October 1949, right before the CIO ouster, union members
were puzzled. One Westinghouse worker told a reporter that
Lieberman "always used to go along with the national
officers, then all of a sudden he switches against them and
is all for the right wing. He and Paran have been anything
but buddies for ten years. Now they are pals. How
come?"^^^ Like Callahan and Kelly, Lieberman wanted to be
on the winning team.
When the split between the CIO and the UE finally
occurred, anticommunists in greater Springfield, led by Tony
Cimino, sprang into action. Locals firmly controlled by
anticommunists immediately announced membership meetings to
vote on seceding from the UE . Westinghouse, Chapman Valve,
Van Norman, Montsanto and Package Company held meetings for
"members only," thus excluding UE national representatives
and organizers and preventing any meaningful debate on the
issue. An officer of the Westinghouse local said they
barred outsiders so no one could "dictate how the vote
should go." All of these locals opted out of the UE by a
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unanimous or an "overwhelming" vote. At some, the executive
board had already voted to secede and members merely
ratified their decision. -^^^
UE international representative Albert Smith
acknowledged the union had little chance of keeping any
Springfield locals except for the Bosch local and a small GE
local in Holyoke.^^^ At Bosch, UE leaders banked on the
leadership of business agent Ralph Forsstrom. However,
Bosch hamstrung Forsstrom 's efforts to shore up support for
the UE. While Forsstrom was running for reelection as
business agent in November 1949, right after the CIO ousted
UE, Bosch officials jumped right into the breach. The
company sent workers a notice announcing that they
"decline [d] to participate in any formal dealings, such as
negotiations or arbitration" with UE representatives.
According to UE loyalists, Bosch was scheduled to bring an
offer to the table on seniority right when they broke off
negotiations. Completing these negotiations would have
boosted Forsstrom 's standing among union members. A few
days before the election, Bosch fired Forsstrom for "being
away from his job on union business" and barred him from
entering the plant. His anticommunist opponent Ralph
Chicketti hammered away at Forsstrom 's failure to negotiate
contract provisions on seniority and a pay raise. The
Chicketti campaign leaflet charged that other Springfield UE
shops received raises while workers at Bosch only got "talk
and promises because [our] leaders spend all their time
talking about Henry Wallace." Bosch workers elected
Chicketti by a narrow margin of 693 (53 percent) to 620 (47
percent )
.
The victory emboldened Chicketti to put the issue of
secession before the membership. Tony Cimino, now field
director for the lUE in New England and leader of the
anticommunist forces in greater Springfield, backed
Chicketti 's move. Cimino 's new lUE job was full time,
allowing him to quit working as an assembler at Westinghouse
and devote himself fully to union organizing. Cimino
spoke at Bosch gate rallies urging workers to attend the
scheduled membership meeting and vote for secession. He
stressed the importance of remaining affiliated with the
anticommunist CIO, saying the Red UE could not protect their
interests. The lUE relied exclusively on red-baiting. Its
flyer proclaimed that "the old UE is the last major
stronghold of communism in the United States. If a decision
must be made between labor policy and Communist policy, the
old UE always follows the commie line." A UE flyer called
for unity, pointing out all the ways Bosch was using the
breach to stifle contract demands.
The local Communist party cell in Springfield played
right into the lUE ' s hands. It distributed "An Open Letter
to Tony Cimino" at the Bosch plant backing the UE and
attacking the lUE for colluding with Big Business to "get
workers behind the cold war program." It predicted that
"honest rank and filers" who know class struggle requires a
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strong, united labor movement will reject the lUE. UE
leaders reacted quickly distancing themselves as far as they
could from the Communist party flyer. They circulated their
own flyer condemning the party leaflets and warning members
against them. "We reject and condemn," wrote the UE , "such
open interference in the internal affairs of our union by
the Communist Party, and warn them to cease their disruption
of our union. "^^^
The damage was done, however. Six hundred Bosch
workers voted to withdraw from the UE and join the lUE.
When the lUE collected enough cards, the NLRB scheduled a
representation election for June 1950. The UE ran as the
incumbent, arguing that management would not bargain with
the lUE. This did not make sense, however, since Bosch
already refused to bargain with either side. The lUE ran on
the sole issue of anticommunism . Tony Cimino helped shape
the message. He organized a United Front Committee in
greater Springfield that coordinated anti-UE propaganda.
Its banner read: "Vote Communism Out!" Chicketti
distributed a speech by Congressman Foster Furcolo about
"Communist Infiltration in Labor Unions" to all stewards and
officers. He borrowed $2500 from the national lUE office to
print flyers and newspapers during the campaign. In the
end, red-baiting worked, and the lUE carried the election
964 (57 percent) to 724 (43 percent ). The following day,
anticommunists moved to consolidate their position by
pushing through an amendment to the local's by-laws barring
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anyone from office "who actively opposed the creation of the
lUE-CIO."^^*
The other local UE organizers hoped to retain was the
GE plant in Holyoke. Robert Halliday, president of Local
264 and a UE loyalist, downplayed any right wing/left wing
split in the local. According to Halliday, "if any
distinction exists, it is between staunch labor supporters
and company stooges." He thus tried to draw attention away
from the issue of communism. However, an active
anticommunist group within the local "welcomed the
opportunity to divorce themselves from communist leaders in
the UE."^^^ In early November 1949, when left wing officers
still ran the local, members voted "overwhelmingly" to
remain in the UE . Halliday charged that "political
ambitions of people seeking paid jobs at our expense"
jeopardized their hard won contract. He referred to people
like Tony Cimino, now on the lUE payroll.
The NLRB scheduled an election in May 1950. As in the
rest of the commonwealth, UE and lUE forces pulled out all
the stops in their campaign efforts. Jim Carey, the
principal speaker at a pre-election rally at the GE plant,
predictably hammered home the issue of communist
infiltration in the UE. The UE, nevertheless, remained
confident of victory, announcing when and where it would
hold a victory dance. It was the lUE, however, which
celebrated victory. In a "complete upset," the lUE won by
a
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vote of 233 (55 percent) to 190 (45 percent ). ''^^ Once
again, red-baiting carried the day.
The lUE swept all but two small Springfield locals. It
won at Westinghouse by a vote of 2,335 (72 percent) to 862
(27 percent) and at Chapman Valve by a vote of 794 (73
percent) to 298 (27 percent). At Package Machinery, Blair
Manufacturing, Montsano and Van Norman, the UE conceded
before representation elections and was not even on the
ballot. The only two shops the UE retained were at
Worthington Pump, with 400 workers, and Stacey
Manufacturing, with 50 workers. Tony Cimino, lUE's new
Field Organizer, summed up the outcome well: "The fight to
clean the Communists out of our union started here in
Springfield. It is fitting that every major plant in this
area has seen fit to stay with the CIO and reject decisively
the phony balm of Communism. " ^^"^ Matt Campbell's legacy of
prudent unionism, support for Carey, and uncompromising
opposition to communism continued to make sense to a
majority of electrical and machine shop workers in greater
Springfield
.
In his study of UE organizing at GE and Westinghouse,
labor historian Ronald Schatz found that older, skilled
workers supported the UE while younger, unskilled workers
supported the lUE. Robert Forrant, in his study of the
Springfield Bosch local, concurs. Some data from this study
support Schatz -s contention as well, but not all. When
the
Bosch local voted to secede from the UE in December 1949,
31
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members opposed the move. Of the 17 UE loyalists whose job
classification is ascertainable, 11 skilled workers,
including five machinists, two mechanics, two toolmakers,
one grinder and one calibrator, joined six unskilled
workers, including four machine operators and two
inspectors, to oppose secession from the UE. According to
this small sample, skilled UE loyalists outnumbered
unskilled UE loyalists two to one. Of the 11 anticommunist
lUE organizers whose names appeared in newspaper accounts
and whose job classification is ascertainable, six were
skilled workers, including three machinists, one toolmaker,
one steamfitter and one engineer, and five were unskilled
workers, including four assemblers and one inspector. These
data suggest lUE organizers split evenly between skilled and
unskilled workers.
Forrant's work also adds a descriptive dimension to
Schatz's thesis. Forrant found a higher proportion of
skilled workers among all workers in Springfield than in
comparative Massachusetts cities, as well as a high ratio of
skilled to unskilled workers in Springfield's metal trades.
Among Springfield's labor leaders, Forrant identified a high
proportion of highly skilled workers. Schatz's thesis and
Forrant's description do not match. If Schatz is correct,
we would expect Springfield to be a UE stronghold with all
its skilled metal workers. On the contrary, anticommunism
gained an early foothold in Springfield. In 1949 and
1950,
every large local bolted from the UE. Perhaps the
problem
217
is that Schatz»s thesis fails to credit two other important
sources of anticommunisin, Catholic labor theory and Soviet
aggression in eastern Europe, that may have more saliency
than skill level.
The scanty hard data from Pittsfield tend to confirm
the Schatz thesis. As a whole, GE workers in Pittsfield
were less skilled than Springfield's metal workers. In
Pittsfield, the ratio of skilled to unskilled union
organizers was 1:3; in Springfield, the ratio was 3:2. As
Schatz predicts, in Pittsfield the percentage of skilled
organizers in the UE was higher than in the lUE. Among UE
loyalists were seven skilled workers, including a winder,
machinist, press operator, lathe operator, taper and two
welders, and ten unskilled "employees." Among lUE
organizers were three skilled workers, including a
machinist, toolmaker and electrician, and 18 unskilled
"employees." Unfortunately, there is no ascertainable data
for Lynn's GE workers.
Conclusion
The fratricidal struggle between UE loyalists and lUE
dissidents vividly illustrates how anticommunism operated o
the state and local level in Massachusetts. Anticommunism
was not an issue among rank and file union members until
others made it so. Ambitious labor leaders, like
politicians, latched onto red-baiting to promote partisan
goals
.
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Workers were not easily won over. The strong localist
tradition within the UE blocked Jim Carey and his
anticoininunist MDA allies from capturing the UE from within.
UE members cared more about their leaders' trade union
record than their political beliefs. The CIO's expulsion of
the UE turned the tide for Carey. For union members, this
was a real issue that affected their working lives. Losing
CIO support weakened the UE. Before the split, workers
chose between communist and anticommunist leaders, a
political issue not a trade union issue; after the split,
workers had to chose between the UE and the CIO.
Three factors account for rank and file affinity with
the lUE and its program of virulent anticommunism. The
Catholic church persuaded many workers to embrace Pope Leo
XIII 's vision of labor peace, mediation between labor and
management, and denunciation of class conflict. For some
workers, the moral force of Catholic labor theory carried
more weight than labor union principles. Eastern European
workers, who may been Catholic as well, linked domestic
communism to Soviet agression in their homelands. Also, the
lUE attracted younger, less skilled workers who had not
worked with communist organizers during the popular front
era.
Anticommunism provided common ground for Americans.
Green and Murray, who disagreed on organizing industrial
workers, agreed class antagonism hurt labor. CIO labor
leaders and the Catholic hierarchy, who disagreed on the
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role of the state, agreed that conununists disrupted their
vision of mediated labor-management relations. Catholic
workers who promoted anticommunism did so on a moral or
spiritual basis, not a material basis. For them,
anticommunism was anticlassism.
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CHAPTER 6
COLD WAR ANTI COMMUNISM
Domestic anticommunism became virulent in the postwar
era when the cold war upgraded the Communist party from a
national menace to a national enemy. Americans believed
party members belonged to an international communist
conspiracy plotting to overthrow the government of the
United States. When the United States, Canada and England
uncovered domestic spies in their midst, Americans began
agreeing with conservatives who had been worrying about
internal subversion for decades.
Historians continue to debate the primary or principal
source of national postwar domestic anticommunism, usually
referred to as McCarthyism. Robert Griffith sees
McCarthyism as a product of party rivalry; Athan Theoharis
argues President Truman needed domestic anticommunism to
silence critics and mobilize public support for his foreign
policy; Kenneth O'Reilly credits J. Edgar Hoover and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.-^ Whatever the cause,
anticommunism became and continues to be a staple of
American political culture. This chapter looks at that
process through the lens of localism.
In Massachusetts, except for the labor movement, direct
consequences of McCarthyism were relatively mild. No one
went to jail; a handful of teachers and workers lost their
jobs; and draconian laws passed by the legislature were
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declared unconstitutional. A noisy state investigating
commission parroted charges already made by federal
investigating committees. The commission did shut down the
Communist party, but failed to silence liberal critics. The
relative mildness of McCarthyism in Massachusetts attests to
the strength of the liberal lobby.
The same groups of people sponsored anticommunist
initiatives during the cold war as had during the depression
and war years: rank and file Democrats from Boston,
conservative Republicans, Legionnaires , veterans groups , the
Catholic Church and professional anticommunists . In that
respect, nothing changed over the three decades of this
study. However, other manifestations of anticommunism did
change. In the early cold war, anticommunist legislators
introduced substantially more bills. When national and
international events tipped the balance of public opinion in
their favor, they succeeded in gaining passage of their
bills.
Historian Robert Griffith and others argue that state
anticommunist initiatives in the 1950s were "derivative" of
national initiatives and that state legislatures "responded
almost slavishly to the force of federal law and precedent
and to the anxieties aroused by national leaders."^ This
local study of anticommunism in Massachusetts demonstrates
how much Griffith overstates the case. Socially
conservative Irish Catholics hardly needed to model the
federal government; their anticommunism ran generations
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deep. In the 1950s, young solons fighting "Reducators" at
Harvard and MIT revered South Boston's Tommy Dorgan, a key
anticommunist player from the depression era and "father of
the teachers' oath," as an elder statesman. In the 1950s,
as in the 1930s, liberal Yankees and conservative Irish
Bostonians continued to act out a century old morality play.
McCarthyism was simply a new context.
Village McCarthyism
In the postwar period, local anticommunists shut down
politically unpopular activities in their neighborhoods.
These village McCarthys cast a wide net in their search for
subversive people. To them, the Progressive party fronted
for the Communist party; books about the Soviet Union
tainted libraries; and a party member's basement woodworking
shop subverted neighborhood boys. Most of these local
anticommunist initiatives occurred in and around Boston
before Senator Joseph McCarthy's rise to power. State and
local factors, in conjunction with national and
international events, spawned postwar anticommunism in
Massachusetts. What McCarthy sparked was a revival of far
right wing groups.
Individuals worked with local public officials to stop
the Communist menace in their neighborhood or town. Boston
continued to be the stronghold of local anticommunist
sentiment and activism. A 1952 incident involving Otis
Hood, Communist party chief in Massachusetts,
epitomizes
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such attitudes. Hood and his family lived in row house in
Boston's Roxbury section. He liked working with his hands
and set up a woodworking shop in his basement. On spare
evenings and weekends, Hood invited neighborhood boys to the
shop and taught them how to use the tools. As they became
more proficient, he let them use the shop whenever they
wanted. A school teacher who lived with her family in
Hood's neighborhood learned about the informal woodworking
shop. Knowing who Hood was, she reported it to her school
principal who called the FBI and Boston police. It is not
clear what happened next; Hood did close his workshop
although he said it was because he "lost too many tools."
For Tommy Dorgan, unofficial spokesman for Boston's
anticommunist crusaders, the school teacher was a local
heroine. "Think of the danger [Hood] might have done had
not an alert and patriotic school teacher learned of his
plan. But for her, the minds of many Roxbury children might
be twisted by the poison our enemies are spreading.""'
In the postwar period, all radical groups were suspect,
not just the Communist party. In 1946, the Mayor's office
denied permits for the Socialist party to hold political
meetings on the Boston Common and Boston police arrested
picketers demonstrating in favor of granting amnesty to
conscientious objectors.* In 1947, Boston City councilmen
voted to ask Mayor Curley to shut down a meeting featuring
Mrs. Gerhardt Eisler. Eisler was filling in for her husband
who had been detained by federal immigration authorities
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when he refused to cooperate with HUAC. The meeting took
place at the New England Conservatory of Music as scheduled.
In Curley's absence, acting Mayor John B. Kelley rejected
the City Council's suggestion. Had Curley decided, he may
well have sided with the City Council as he would later do
in February 1949.^
The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts (CLUM)
lobbied officials at the New England Conservatory of Music
on behalf of Mrs. Eisler. Conservatory officials reported
to CLUM that "we always work very closely with the FBI when
this sort of program comes up and they have requested us to
allow these meetings to be held in Brown Hall as they would
rather have them here instead of having to look them up in
dark allies or back lots."^ Two years later, the FBI
changed tactics. Instead of just observing what it deemed
to be Communist party or front activities, it shut rhem
down
.
In January 1949, the party's Worker's School postponed
its opening when the owner of the hall they had rented
revoked the lease. The owner claimed FBI agents pressured
him to cancel. When CLUM investigated on behalf of the
school, the FBI's Special Agent-in-Charge denied any
involvement. There is some evidence that pressure came
from
a local VFW commander as well.' Whatever the
source, it
became harder and harder for the party and groups
on the
Attorney General's subversive organizations
list to find
auditoriums to hold meetings.
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In January 1949, the Tremont Temple Baptist Church
revoked an agreement to rent its Lorimer Hall to the Civil
Rights Congress the night before a scheduled meeting. The (
church's attorney claimed organizers' failure to disclose
CRC was a "communist organization" when applying to use the
hall voided the agreement.® In May 1949, the Boston YWCA
cancelled a contract with the Spanish Refugee Appeal, a
group affiliated with the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee, to use their facilities for a meeting.^ In
August 1950, the manager of Ruggles Hall in Roxbury locked
the door on a rally sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress,
claiming the police ordered him not to open the doors. '^^ In
March 1951, the Boston City Council voted to ask the Mayor
to prohibit use of a Masonic Temple for a meeting featuring
Harry Bridges. Although Acting Mayor Hurley rejected the
Council's petition, the owner of the building was too
frightened to let Bridges into the hall.'''^ In June 1951,
the Hotel Bradford cancelled a meeting sponsored by the New
12Englanders Concerned for Peace.
In November 1951, the Massachusetts legislature passed
a bill outlawing the Communist party. One provision of the
act made it illegal to rent halls to subversive groups.
From this point on, there is no evidence of last minute
cancellations, as there had been since 1946, probably
because the party and groups close to the party stopped
trying to use large public halls. One exception occurred in i
January 1954. The Boston Freedom of the Press Committee
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hired a hall within the Boston Conservatory of Music for a
song recital by Albert Alphin. When Conservatory officials
learned the Committee was a front for the party's newspaper,
The Daily Worker, they agreed to let the event take place
and announced that the FBI and Boston police would be on
hand. American Legion commander, John P. Swift, called out
his troops as well. He announced Legionnaires would picket
the auditorium bringing search lights to take moving
pictures of everyone going in and out of the hall. At that
point. Conservatory officers voted to cancel the recital and
the Charles Street Meeting House hosted the event. '^"^
To many Bay State anticommunists , the Progressive party
was synonymous with the Communist party. The Lawrence chief
of police denied local Progressive party candidates a permit
to operate a sound truck during the 1948 campaign.-^* Boston
police arrested Walter O'Brien, state chairman of the
15
Progressive party, as he spoke from a sound truck m 1950.
In the summer of 1950, police arrested Arthur Jones and
Robert Dubin, state leaders of Young Progressives of
America, for picketing at Revere Beach, a popular bathing
beach just north of Boston. Jones and Dubin decided to
fight their case asserting their right to free speech. When
Jones took the stand to testify, the trial judge leaned over
the bench and asked: "Are you a Communist?" Jones's lawyer
objected on the grounds of relevancy but the judge overruled
the objection. When Jones refused to answer the guestion.
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the judge held him in contempt of court. A higher court
later reversed the trial court's finding of contempt. '^^
Local anticommunists targeted schools and libraries as
well as unpopular political organizing. Again, this
activity took place before 1953, the height of McCarthy's
power. In 1948, the Lynn school board passed a regulation
requiring all teachers to take an oath swearing they were
not members of the Communist party. Board member Philip
Sisk, a popular young Catholic attorney and veteran,
sponsored the regulation. He had won election to the board
by a greater margin than any other candidate on the ballot
including the Mayor. When the Lynn League of Women Voters,
the Public School Association of Lynn and the Lynn
Progressive party flooded the board with letters of protest,
it agreed to reconsider the issue at the next monthly
meeting. Sisk defended the regulation. "Communism isn't a
political party or belief," he argued, "it's a world
ideology." The school board upheld the regulation by a 5-2
vote.
In Scituate, the school board passed a regulation
requiring sponsors of meetings held in school facilities to
ensure people with "certain opinions" would not speak. A
group of veterans initiated the regulation in response to an
event organized by a liberal group, the Scituate Forum, to
discuss the situation in Korea. Apparently the veterans
felt some of the speakers expressed unpatriotic views.
The
Scituate Forum organized a delegation of local residents
to
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meet privately with the school board. They argued the new
regulation was too vague. In response, the board prepared a
statement for meeting sponsors to sign affirming they "do
not individually or as an organization advocate the
overthrow of the government by force" and are not
"affiliated with any organization that does so advocate."^®
At the same time as veterans monitored Scituate Forum
meetings , veterans in Brookline investigated their public
library. In August 1950, Dr. McGrath, a Brookline dentist
and head of the Americanism Commission at his local American
Legion post, inguired how many copies of Seeds of Treason
the library held. Seeds of Treason was an anticommunist
tract about the Alger Hiss case written by Victor Lasky. A
young library assistant informed Dr . McGrath that the
library ' s book selection committee rejected the book based
on unfavorable reviews such as the one appearing in the New
York Times describing the book as "biased and prejudiced."
Dr. McGrath was incensed. His legion post sent a letter to
the library's board of trustees with copies to the press.
The incident guickly became a national cause celebre among
anticommunist publishers.
The Chicago Tribune headlined its story "Library Favors
Commie Books in Boston Area; Refuses to Circulate Seeds of
Treason." The story described Brookline as "embroiled in
cold ideological war."" Boston papers reported the library
"banned" the book. Publisher's Weekly picked up the story
241
and the American Library Association launched an
investigation.
The incident amounted to a tempest in a teapot. The
library assistant had given Dr. McGrath inaccurate
information. The book committee had merely postponed its
decision whether to buy the book in order to review another
book on the same subject due out in September. Because of
all the publicity, the town librarian herself read both
20books and recommended both be purchased.
Two years later, the Boston Post's new owner, John Fox,
picked the Boston Public Library as the first target of his
anticommunist crusade. In September 1952, the library urged
patrons to inform themselves about communism by mounting a
lobby display of materials on the Soviet Union available in
the reference section. The Boston Post blasted the library
for holding "Red literature" that set off a chain reaction
among anticommunists . The Boston City Council summoned the
library's trustees to appear in council chambers to explain
their policy; the American Legion voted to ban all pro-
Soviet materials at the library; and Boston's Catholic
newspaper questioned whether the library was adequately
"supervising" patrons who requested the material. In the
midst of all this scrutiny, the library's board of trustees
voted three to two to maintain the present policy.
Patrick
McDonald, a steel merchant and president of the Council
of
National Catholic Laymen's Societies, and Judge Frank
J.
Donahue cast the two dissenting votes.
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As controversy over the Boston Public Library mounted,
ant icommunists in Cambridge rushed to investigate their
library's holdings. They found that the Cambridge library
had been banning all "Communist tinged material" for the
past ten years and that the seven member board of trustees
and town librarian were in complete agreement about the
policy
.
The FBI played a shadowy role throughout this early
period of cold war anticommunism. Its presence in Boston
pressuring building owners not to rent facilities to radical
groups has already been noted. There is some evidence that
the FBI were active in other parts of the state as well. In
January 1947, Worcester's mayor, Charles Sullivan confided
in library director Philip Morgan that he was suspicious of
Thurston Taylor, one of Morgan's librarians. In 1944,
Taylor gained some notoriety when he prepared a book list on
the Soviet Union, then an ally of the United States. In
1945, the Communist party invited Taylor to bring a book
display on the Soviet Union to one of its meetings, which he
did. Two years later. Mayor Sullivan told Taylor's boss he
thought Taylor was a subversive and should be investigated.
The library director agreed with the Mayor's assessment but
heard nothing further. A year later, in 1948, charges
concerning Taylor's loyalty resurfaced in the Catholic
Messenger, the weekly newspaper of the Worcester
Archdiocese. When the Messenger's editor refused to
reveal
his sources, the Worcester city council decided
it better
investigate. They asked Mayor Sullivan for information but
he referred them to the "original sources." In December
1948, Taylor appeared before the council and was questioned
by Democratic aldermen George Wells and Harry McGrath.
After hearing Taylor, and with no substantiation of the
charges, the council gave Taylor a unanimous vote of
22
confidence
.
Around this same time, FBI activity was also reported
in Ashby, a small town north of Worcester on the New
Hampshire border. Dorothy Wilder, a local schoolteacher,
subscribed to the Nation, World Events, the Guardian, and
the Call. Wilder belonged to the Socialist party but was
not current with her dues, and had donated money to the
Progressive party in 1948. When the FBI sent Ashby ' s chief
of police a list of local communists, he reported to Wilder
that her name was the first one. Wilder was furious. "Does
[my choice of reading material] make me an FBI Communist?
We ought to challenge such irresponsible charges of village
McCarthys. "^"^
Rumors about FBI lists circulated in other communities
as well. In June 1950, the Cambridge city council decided
to investigate the loyalty of everyone living and working in
Cambridge. The council instructed the city manager to have
the chief of police obtain the FBI's list of Cambridge
Communists. But the FBI demurred, replying that their
lists
were confidential and had never been disclosed.
Undeterred,
Cambridge anticommunists turned to other sources.
Police
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chief John King had already compiled a list of more than 100
people based on information from the American Legion and
twenty citizen informants. The list included a minister,
two Harvard professors, and a prominent attorney. King said
everyone on the list was "in the upper social strata. Not a
single common worker is mentioned."^* City councilman John
Lynch asked for funds to reprint the pamphlet "Reducators at
Harvard University" sent to him by Robert Conner of Colorado
Springs. In 1951, Lynch sponsored a resolution calling for
the purge of 50 suspected "Reds" at Harvard including
President Conant and historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. As
it had in the 1930s, Cambridge's cultural struggle between
working class residents and Harvard's elite spilled over
into local politics.
Another shadowy source of local anticommunist
initiatives is what historian Ellen Schrecker characterizes
as a "wide-ranging anti-Communist network" whose members
"came into their own during the McCarthy period, staffing
the main organizations in the field and imposing their
agenda on the rest of the nation. "^^ Well known figures
associated with this network spoke in Boston on several
occasion. In 1947, Joseph R. Matthews, HUAC ' s former
research director, testified at a state legislative hearing
as an expert on domestic Communism. He spoke at length
about communists at Harvard. Cambridge Mayor Michael
2 6
Neville introduced Matthews to the committee. Matthews
returned to Boston in 1954 to participate in an "anti-
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subversive seminar" sponsored by the American Legion.
Another network speaker at the seminar was Bella Dodd, a
former Communist party member in New York and one of a
coterie of professional witnesses.
In 1953, Louis Budenz gave an "educational talk" to the
newly formed state commission investigating communism and
subversion in the commonwealth. Budenz, a former editor of
the Daily Worker, made countless appearances at trials and
before federal and state investigating committees. The
Massachusetts commission asked him for advice on how to
2 8
"ferret out hidden communists."
When Budenz renounced the evils of "godless Communism,"
he returned to the folds of the Catholic Church. Boston's
Archbishop Cushing embraced Budenz ' s return to the Catholic
faith. When Budenz came to Boston in 1953 to testify before
the state investigating commission, Cushing announced he
would ask Budenz to help him form "anticommunist cells" in
Boston. Cushing called on Budenz again in 1959 to help
him write a pamphlet for high school students outlining
"Nine Rules For Fighting Communism." According to Cushing,
he and Budenz also collaborated on a college level textbook
to expose the dangers of communism. There is no evidence
that these plans came to fruition.
Later in 1959, Cushing ran into problems when he
hastily put together a series titled "Questions and Answers
on Communism" that ran in the Boston American, a
Hearst
publication. The series was timed to coincide with
Soviet
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Premier Nikita Khruchev's visit to the United States.
Gushing relied on priests in the Archdiocesan office to
research and write the series. They relied on familiar
sources from the anticommunist network that smeared liberal
groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and that were
very anti-Semitic. One Gushing article criticized
"international bankers" and recommended Gatholics read the
American Mercury, a anti-Semitic publication that claimed
the Jewish religion was un-American. Gushing apologized
profusely to Jewish and liberal leaders, taking
responsibility for not reviewing the articles more
closely. The incident shows how connected local activist
priests were to the national anticommunist network.
Another older network promoted local McGarthyism as
well. This grouping consisted of anti-Semitic ultra
conservatives, including some who had been active since the
1930s. During the 1954 election campaign, as criticism of
McCarthy mounted nationally, these local conservative
zealots rushed to his defense. A group calling itself
Democrats for American Action, a parody on the liberal group
Americans for Democratic Action, sent a flier to selected
Massachusetts Democrats. "On Guard!" it warned. "Keep
Senator McCarthy on the job... The ADA and its favorite son
Adlai Stevenson are enemies of Senator McCarthy... We are
enrolled Democrats who do not want our party captive of
the
ADA, the welfare staters, pinks and phony liberals."
Another group. Citizens for McCarthy, organized by
the same
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people, sponsored a pro-McCarthy rally featuring HUAC
counsel Roy Cohn and Rabbi Benjamin Schultz as speakers
.
The crowd filled Boston's Fanueil Hall and wildly cheered a
proposal to hold a bigger pro-McCarthy rally in the Boston
Garden.
Mrs. John Beaumont of Cambridge, vice president of
Citizens for McCarthy, belonged to the National Council for
American Education, a group founded by Allen Zoll. Zoll
also founded the American Patriots, an anti-Semitic group
that featured speaking tours for Gerald L.K. Smith,
Elizabeth Dilling, and leaders of the Bundt. In 1947, when
the Attorney General put Zoll's group on the subversive
list, he founded the National Council. In 1949, the
National Council published the pamphlet "Reducators at
Harvard University." Bernard McCabe, secretary-treasurer of
Citizens for McCarthy, founded America First of
Massachusetts in 1954. Other officers of America First were
3 3former Coughlinites
.
McCarthyism in the State House
Anticominunist initiatives resurfaced in the
Massachusetts legislature after the crisis of World War II
passed. Between 1947 and 1962, legislators introduced over
70 bills, resolves and resolutions to thwart the perceived
cominunist threat in Massachusetts. Rank and file urban
Democrats sponsored ninety percent of these initiatives.
A
coterie of Boston Democrats from heavily Irish wards
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introduced two-thirds of the bills. The wards they
represented included all income levels. Wards 6, 7 and
10/11 were predominantly low-income Irish; Wards 16 and 17
were predominantly middle-income Irish; and Ward 20 was the
only high-income Irish ward in Boston. Anticommunism was
common ground for Boston's Irish Democrats. Only one of
Boston's two Italian wards elected representatives who
joined the anticommunist activists. It was Ward 3 where a
mix of Italians and newer immigrants from Eastern Europe
lived. The latter supported their representatives'
anticommunist bills much more enthusiastically than the
34former
.
Democrats from Cambridge, Somerville, Worcester, New
Bedford and Fitchburg introduced one-quarter of the
anticommunist bills. The Cambridge and Somerville
legislators, like their Boston counterparts, represented
predominantly Irish constituencies. The Cambridge city
council was as active as Cambridge's state representatives
in promoting anticommunist initiatives. FBI informants
named Worcester, Fitchburg and New Bedford as strongholds c
communist labor organizers. When the media focused
statewide attention on a particular area, local
anticommunist officials jumped into the spotlight by
sponsoring bills to meet the perceived danger. A small
group of conservative, suburban Republican legislators
introduced the remaining ten percent of the anticommunist
bills and resolves.
Ant icommunist legislators sponsored bills and resolves
to expose communists; keep communists out of schools, public
office and public jobs; and shut down the Communist party.
One-third of the bills and resolves concerned state
investigating commissions—establishing them, continuing
them, or expanding their powers. One-quarter of the bills
concerned education—firing teachers who were members of the
Communist party, firing teachers who took the 5th Amendment,
increasing the penalty for violating the 1935 teachers' oath
law, and taxing schools that refused to fire communists.
Anticommunist legislators did not always agree on the best
strategy. One education bill would have forbidden the
teaching of "atheistic Communism" while two education bills
would have required it. Twenty percent of the bills aimed
at keeping communists and fellow travelers out of public
office and public jobs. One of these bills would have
required all candidates to file a non-Communist oath;
another would have required all voters to file a non-
Communist oath. Only ten percent of the bills aimed to
outlaw the Communist party or prevent it from organizing
publicly.
These postwar bills and resolves did not represent new
concerns to Massachusetts legislators. Irish Democrats
and
conservative Republicans had sponsored similar bills and
resolves during the depression. Two had been enacted:
the
1935 teacher's oath law and the 1937 Special
Commission to
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Investigate Subversive Activities in the Commonwealth. What
was different was the increased number of bills introduced.
Democratic party leaders did not share the same
enthusiasm for these anticommunist initiatives. Of all the
bills introduced by rank and file Democrats, none was
enacted. In Massachusetts, a bill or resolve does not
become law unless it is supported by party leadership. Most
bills were never reported out of committee; others were
reported out with the recommendation that they ought not be
adopted or that they be referred to the next session. From
the mid-1950s on, most of the anticommunist bills were
simply referred to the state investigating commission for
further study. Boston Democrats did succeed in winning
passage of their resolves to establish special investigating
commissions, although party leaders insisted on procedural
safeguards and limited powers. Both commissions came at
times of intense national pressure—the first when U.S.
troops were fighting communists in Korea and the second when
three federal investigating committees focused a blaze of
national media attention on alleged communists at Harvard,
MIT and Boston public schools. The first commission met
over the winter of 1950-51 but was not revived during the
next term. The second commission lasted for ten years,
from
1953 to 1963.
The legislature did pass three significant
anticommunist bills in 1948, 1949 and 1951, all before
the
full gale force of McCarthyism hit the state or
the nation.
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Republicans sponsored two of these bills and the first
investigating commission sponsored one. The first law dealt
with communist teachers, the second with communists holding
public office, and the third outlawed the Communist party.
The last, a sweeping measure, was modeled after Maryland's
Ober Act.
Barnes Bill, 1948
Rep. Kendall A. Sanderson, a conservative Republican,
sponsored this bill on behalf of Attorney General Clarence
A. Barnes. The proposed law aimed to ban teachers at public
and private educational institutions suspected of being
communists or teaching communist doctrine. Sanderson, a
lawyer, lived in Marblehead, a wealthy Yankee seaside resort
town sandwiched between two industrialized, immigrant towns,
Lynn and Peabody. In 1946 and 1947, Sanderson strongly
supported three very regressive bills designed to cripple
unions. When the antilabor bills failed to pass in the
legislature, Sanderson and his allies in the Chamber of
Commerce brought them directly to the voters by referendum.
All three measures were soundly defeated in 1948.
Clarence A. Barnes, the Massachusetts Attorney General,
initiated the bill. Barnes was also a lawyer and a
conservative Republican. At a hearing before the Committee
on Education, Barnes said the bill was only a first step.
To stop subversion in the commonwealth, he argued
"Communists must be driven underground." Barnes acted from
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his own prejudices, not from any factual basis of concern.
When asked at the hearing why laws already on the books were
not sufficient to protect students from communist
subversion, Barnes replied that he had never tried to
enforce them. When pressed further, Barnes admitted that
nothing had ever come up to even spark an investigation.
The American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars also
testified in favor of the bill. A host of prominent
educators, led by President Conant of Harvard, opposed the
biii.^^
The Committee on Education rejected the original Barnes
bill. In its place, the committee sent out two milder
amendments to existing laws: one prohibited persons
convicted of violating the 1919 state sedition law from
teaching and the other imposed $1,000 fine for violating the
1935 teachers' oath law. When the bill reached the floor of
the House, Edmond J. Donlan, dean of the Boston
anticommunists in the House, proposed an amendment mandating
the Department of Education to publish a monthly bulletin
"naming teachers who are teaching treasonous, subversive or
seditious doctrine or using books that do." The House
rejected the Donlan amendment and the original Barnes bill,
and passed, along with the Senate, the Education
Committee's
amendments. 3^ The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
breathed a collective sigh of relief. "CLUM ...
felt that
the amendments were mild in character in
contrast to the
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original Bill which could have wrecked freedom in
educational institutions."^'''
The Barnes bill was one of seven anticoinmunist bills
introduced in the 1948 legislative session. Various Boston
Democrats sponsored all the rest. Five of the six were
either withdrawn by their sponsors or referred to the next
session. Only one, a bill to establish a special commission
to investigate communists and other subversive groups, made
it to the House floor. A similar bill had been introduced
the year before but had died in committee. A triumvirate of
Boston Democrats, John F. Collins from Ward 11, William J.
Fitzsimmons from Ward 16, and Gabriel Francis Piemonte from
Ward 3, sponsored these bills. At a hearing in 1947,
Collins, who would become Mayor of Boston in 1958, told the
Committee on Constitutional Law that "Communism in America
today is a festering sore gnawing away at the vitals of our
American way of life."^^ The Committee also heard from
Joseph R. Matthews, former research director of HUAC, who
testified as an "expert on Communism." Matthews told the
Committee that Harvard was one of three national
universities whose professors had the "most significant
record of supporting Communist fronts." He singled out
Harvard geology professor Kirtley F. Mather and MIT
mathematician Dirk Struik as prime examples of his charge.
In 1948, an even larger group of anticommunist
proponents testified before the Committee on Constitutional
Law in favor of the resolve to establish a state
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Iinvestigating committee. Ten Boston Democrats appeared for
the bill along with Tommy Dorgan, "father of the 1935
teachers' oath" and now Clerk of the Probate Court in
Suffolk County. Other witness included representatives from
the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American
Veterans and the Boston Civic League. The Committee,
however, was unwilling to endorse a probe of communists in
the state and voted ten to four to refer the bill to the '
next session. The House concurred.
Why did the 1948 legislature pass the Barnes bill but
not the Coll ins/Fitzsimmons/Piemonte bill? One reason is
because Republicans favored it . To get an anticommunist
initiative just out of committee, it had to be supported by
Republicans as well as Democrats. Democrats, it seems,
supported Republican anticommunist initiatives but
Republicans did not support Democratic ones. Perhaps
Republican animosity toward Boston Democrats overrode shared
concern about substantive issues. The Barnes bill was much
less sweeping in scope as well. Even the Civil Liberties
Union could live with it. Thus, the Barnes bill was an easy
'
way for legislators to placate media critics and fend off
the call for a state investigating commission.
Sanderson Bill, 1949
Kendall Sanderson returned in 1949 with a bill to
prohibit members of the Communist party and other subversive
organizations from holding public office. The bill
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languished in the Committee on Public Service for five
months, a sure sign that party leaders wanted to kill the
bill. In early June, the Committee brought it to the House
floor with the recommendation that it be referred to the
next session. The House rejected the Committee's
recommendation and passed an amended version of the bill,
proposed by Charles W. Hedges, a Republican from Quincy,
that added a provision requiring all public servants to take
an oath promising to defend the Constitution and oppose the
overthrow of state or federal government. There were no
recorded votes on the House amendments.*^
Senate Democrats tried to amend the Sanderson bill to
require registration of communists, but failed. Senate
Republicans tried to amend the Sanderson bill by striking
out the words "a member of the communist party." Had the
amendment passed, the law would have applied only to
"members of an organization that advocate the overthrow of
the government by force or violence."*^ The distinction
would have preserved first amendment rights of Communist
party members, at least until it was determined to be a
subversive organization. This amendment failed too and the
bill passed by a narrow margin of 23 to 17.
The House considered two other bills introduced by
Boston Democrats in 1949. Both failed. Ralph Sullivan,
from Boston's Ward 17, proposed a bill to "prevent teaching
of atheistic communism and safeguard Christian ideals in
American education." The bill passed the house but died in
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the Senate. Sullivan worried about the threat communism
posed to religion and community values. Vincent Mannering,
from Boston's Ward 10, worried about the political threat of
communism. He proposed legislation to outlaw the Communist
party as a political party and to require registration of
party members. Although party leaders succeeded in keeping
Mannering 's bill bottled up in committee, the proposal to
outlaw the Communist party did not go away.*^
In 1949, as in 1948, one difference between the bill
that passed and bills that did not pass was party
affiliation of the sponsors. Kendall Sanderson was the key
Republican legislator promoting anticommunist initiatives in
the House both years. He must have had some support from
Republican party leaders to get these two bills through the
House. Sanderson's bill also came on the heels of the
federal government's exposure of communists in public
employment. Since passage of President Truman's Federal
Loyalty Program, the FBI uncovered people it claimed were
Communists working for the federal government in the Bay
State
.
Whatever the truth of the charges, these people were
harmless souls, caught in the anticommunist cross fire of
national politics. John Galardi, a fifty year old
machinist, worked at the Boston Navy Yard. At a hearing
before the Civil Service Commission, he admitted
subscribing
to the Daily Worker but denied belonging to the
Communist
party. The Commission and Loyalty Review Board
rejected
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4 5Galardi ' s denial and fired him. The Boston Navy Yard
fired Leon Galandzy because belonged to a faction within the
Ukrainian Association that supported the Soviet Union.
Galandzy denied the charge and exposed the government's
source as the disgruntled wife of his arch-rival within the
association.^^ The FBI also investigated Frank Baker, a
mail carrier from Brockton in the summer of 1948. Frank was
an eccentric character who threw himself into organizing for
a series of left wing religious groups. The federal
government fired another postal employee, William Eubanks of
Cambridge, after 25 years of service because he belonged to
the N.A.A.C.P., subscribed to the Nation, and attended a
Scott Hearing lecture and a Paul Robeson concert. He also
bought copies of the Daily Worker "from a persistent girl"
48
because it was easier than saying no.
Other, more dramatic evidence of communist infiltration
in Massachusetts helped generate support for the Sanderson
bill as well. In April 1949, Herbert Philbrick, a member of
the Communist party in Massachusetts, stunned the Bay State,
as well as the nation, when he surfaced as an FBI informant
and testified in New York City against top CP leaders.
Philbrick exposed a small group of college professors and
professionals that comprised a party cell in the Boston
area. His biggest fish was Professor Dirk Struik
of MIT.
Philbrick 's testimony helped build a stronger ant
icommunist
climate in Massachusetts, especially in the
Boston area.
258
Committee to Curb Communism, 1950-51
In 1950, Boston Democrats submitted two petitions for
resolves to establish special investigating committees.
Reverberations from Philbrick's revelations and the outbreak
of war in Korea pushed the legislature to adopt one. It was
a messy fight with rank and file anticommunist legislators
pitted against party leaders, the governor's office and
influential liberal lobbying groups. As one participant
later recalled, "[the committee] was born in a storm of
controversy."^^ The fighting, however, took place outside
public view; once it came time for a roll call vote, the
measure carried by an impressive 91 percent.
Bernard Lally, representing Boston's Ward 17,
introduced the first petition in January. It called for
appointment of a special commission to "investigate the
infiltration of communist doctrine into teaching systems and
persons sympathetic to such doctrines." The Committee on
Constitutional Law promptly reported the petition out,
recommending that it be referred to the next session. Once
the Lally petition reached the floor of the House, however,
legislators jumped to support it. Clarence Telford, a
Republican from Plainville, a small town in the Berkshires,
moved to increase the scope of the commission to "all
communistic activities in the commonwealth." Legislators
adopted this amendment by a lopsided vote of 95 to 35
and
sent the petition to the Joint Rules Committee.
Here,
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however, party leaders exerted more influence and the
50petition died in committee.
In early February, Donlan, who represented Boston's
wealthiest Irish ward, introduced the second petition to
establish an investigation committee. His Order called for
a special committee to investigate the Communist party and
communist-front activities in the commonwealth. The
petition languished in committee until July. A month after
North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, prompting President
Truman to order U.S. air and naval units into action,
committee members voted nine to six to send the Donlan Order
to the floor of the House. Seizing the moment, Donlan
immediately moved to suspend the rules and begin debate.
Both Democrats and Republicans rushed in to help shape the
legislation. Sherman Miles, a Republican from the Boston's
Yankee Ward 5, wanted the committee to investigate groups
"which are actively engaged in communist indoctrination or
in propaganda against the military efforts of the United
States in support of the United Nations." Charles Hedges, a
Republican from Quincy, offered an amendment to have the
committee investigate individuals as well as groups. Joseph
Ward, a Democrat from Fitchburg, moved to give the
committee
51
$100,000 to conduct their investigation.
While these and other amendments were being debated.
Democratic and Republican party leaders tried to derail
the
legislation. Democratic floor leader Robert Murphy
argued
to his colleagues that the FBI was much better
suited to
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handle this kind of investigation and urged them not to open
up this can of worms. Republican floor leader Charles
Gibbons tried various parliamentary maneuvers to suspend
consideration of the petition, and finally succeeded in
getting the bill referred to the committee on Ways and
Means. At 7 p.m., the House recessed without having voted
on the measure.
The next afternoon, the committee on Ways and Means
reported the Donlan Order out of committee with the
recommendation that the $100,000 appropriation be stricken.
With no further debate, legislators adopted the committee's
amendment and Order by a vote of 190 to 19. The party
leadership had lost their battle and they knew it. Only
twelve Republicans and seven Democrats went on record in
opposition to the Committee to Curb Communism.
^"^
Vigorous opposition from the liberal lobby made
legislators wary enough to include procedural safeguards in
the legislation. The committee was required to tell
witnesses the subject of their investigation and to seek
only evidence "relevant and germane" to the subject.
Witnesses had the right to counsel and the right to
supplement their testimony with a statement that would be
made part of the record. People named in committee hearings
had the right to file statements or appear before
the
committee. The House version of the Order required a
stenographic record of all testimony, but the Senate
struck
. • 54
this provision.
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The Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate appointed four Republicans and four Democrats to the
committee. Philip Bowker, a Republican Senator from
Brookline, became chairman of the committee. A career
politician, Bowker served in the House from 1933 to 1940
before being elected to the Senate. When not performing his
legislative duties, Bowker sold voting equipment for the
Automatic Voting Machine Corporation. Bowker quickly
assured liberal critics that the committee would not engage
in "witch hunting. "^^ Donlan, the Order's sponsor and the
only other Boston legislator named to the committee was the
only member publicly identified as an anticommunist
crusader. The committee hired William Costello, a former
FBI agent, as its counsel and went to work.
The committee's first order of business was to send a
delegation to Washington, D.C. to gather information.
Representatives Donlan, Michael Batal, a Democrat from
Lawrence, and Edward DeSaulnier, a Republican from
Chelmsford, spent three days in Washington where they met
with the officials from the U.S. Attorney General's office,
the FBI, and HUAC. According to Donlan, they returned to
Boston with "a whole suitcase of material.
"^^
The committee began meeting in January, 1951 and issued
its report on March 30, 1951. It was a cautious committee,
wary of being in the spotlight. Cornelius Dalton, a
conservative political columnist, blasted the committee for
"letting themselves be frightened by the letterhead
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57liberals." The committee held no public hearings and
heard all witnesses in executive session. It summoned
leaders of the Communist party but all invoked their
privilege against self-incrimination. The committee
complained it was hampered by a lack of information. Since
no state body compiled information about local communist
activity, the committee depended on whatever information the
FBI and HUAC were willing to share. ^® Thus, the committee
had no startling new information to disclose in its report.
The committee reported the Communist party in
Massachusetts had approximately 900 members concentrated in
Boston, a cluster of industrial towns north of Boston (Lynn,
Peabody and Salem), and the twin textile cities of New
Bedford and Fall River. It concluded the Communist party
was "not a legitimate political party, nor [was] it a
movement whose goal is Socialism or some modification of our
present political system." The report named ten top leaders
of the party, giving brief biographical sketches of each
one, and concluded that the party had gone underground.^^
The report focused its fire on two communist front
groups, the Professional Club of Boston and the "Peace
Front," groups Philbrick exposed two years earlier in his
testimony at the New York Smith Act trial. According to the
report, the Professional Club was "the most important
section of the Communist party in Massachusetts"
because its
members were "instrumental in carrying out a
program of
psychological and intellectual sabotage." Drawing on
a
favorite local metaphor that places Boston at the "hub" of
the nation, the committee described the Boston Professional
Club as a "focal point from which Communist influence in our
cultural community radiates throughout the nation . .
•
influencing or duping others in positions of influence."
The committee described this phenomenon as a "matter of
great concern. "^°
The committee also blasted the "Peace Front" in Boston,
the "intellectual and psychological sabotage campaign of the
Communist * s Fifth Column. " Peace Front propaganda "softened
the American people" making them unsympathetic to national
defense efforts in Europe and Far East. It aimed to create
public opinion favoring withdrawal of troops in Europe and
South Korea. According to the committee, this was not a
legitimate peace initiative but a ruse to pave the way for a
Communist takeover.
The committee did not investigate communism in labor or
industry, probably because the FBI and HUAC did not give it
any information in these areas. It did note the
"comparative ineffectiveness of the Communist drive in the
textile industry" and claimed it needed more time to examine
communist infiltration in the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers Union of America (UE) and the Union of
Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA). As for
probing communist subversion in the defense industry, the
committee said the FBI was better qualified to carry out
1 62that work.
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Massachusetts "Ober" Act, 1952
The Committee to Curb Communism proposed sweeping
legislation to deal with the menace of communist subversion
in Massachusetts. At the heart of the bill was a provision,
similar to Maryland's Ober Act, outlawing the Communist
party. ^"^ Other provisions established a special subversive
activities division in the attorney general's office; beefed
up the already existing Barnes bill and Sanderson bill; and
proposed a loyalty oath for attorneys. The committee also
recommended that it be continued for another year.^*
These recommendations were not unanimous. Two
Republicans and one Democrat filed dissenting reports.
William Hayes, a Republican lawyer from Waltham, believed
the pressing need was not new legislation "but a well-
informed public." Federal laws, he argued, were sufficient
to deal with subversive activity in the state. Hayes also
disagreed with singling out lawyers. Sumner Whittier, a
Republican patrician from Everett, one of the hotbeds of
communist activity according to the report, and Donlan felt
it was too soon to pass an Ober Act type law while its
central premise was still being tested in the courts.
The crucial legal issue was whether the first amendment
protected the Communist party. If it was a political party,
like the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, then its
members were entitled to constitutional protection; but, if
it was a dangerous conspiracy, then government was free to
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act. In 1951, after the committee filed its report, the
Supreme Court settled the issue by upholding convictions of
top Communist party leaders in United States v. Dennis .^^
Citing world events, the Court found that the CP met the
"clear and present danger" test. It also relied on the fact
that the CP was an organized political party. "It is the
existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger," wrote
Chief Justice Vinson. Once the Supreme Court ruled, the
door opened for federal and state governments to curtail
speech and associational rights of communists.
The committee filed its report and recommendations for
legislation on April 2, 1951. Party leaders again tried and
failed to derail the bills. Both the House and the Senate
rejected proposals to have the Committee on Constitutional
Law consider the bills during recess. Donlan, apparently
still concerned about the constitutionality of the bill,
moved to substitute it with an order to revive the
committee. The House rejected Donlan 's amendment and passed
the committee's legislation by a vote of 201 to 17. The
bill stalled in the Senate until Senator Silvio Conte, a
liberal Republican from western Massachusetts, proposed a
substitute. Conte • s bill trimmed back the worst excesses of
the committee bill but retained its central provision
outlawing membership in the Communist party. On November
16, 1951, the last day the legislature sat, the
Senate
6 7
passed Conte ' s bill.
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The new law attacked the Communist party head on. It
defined subversive organizations as "any form of association
of three or more persons . . . established . . . for the common
purpose of advocating, advising ... [the] overthrow by force
or violence ... [of] the government..," and declared them
illegal . The law specifically named the Communist party as
a subversive organization and set up a mechanism for state
courts to determine whether other groups were subversive.
People who remained members of a subversive organization
faced three years in jail and a $1,000 fine. Anyone who
destroyed books or records of a subversive organization
faced one year in jail and a fine of $1,000. Renting a hall
to a subversive organization carried a maximum penalty of
6 8
one year in jail and a fine of $1,000.
The same day the Senate passed this sweeping bill, it
rejected another bill that had already made it through the
House. The other bill was brought on behalf of Boston's
Tommy Dorgan, sponsor of the 1935 teachers' oath. Dorgan's
petition instructed college presidents at public and private
institutions to expel communists and communist sympathizers
from their teaching staffs. The bill remained bottled up in
committee until October, 1951 when it reached the House
floor and guickly passed without a voice vote. The Senate,
however, rejected the Dorgan bill just moments after it
69
passed the Committee to Curb Communism's legislation.
This suggests that in the Senate, at least, the
liberal
lobby still had some clout. It also suggests
that the
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Communist party had become an easy target for legislators
warily looking over their shoulders at bad press. When it
came to private education, however, Harvard and other elite
universities in the state were still off limits. But not
for the House. As Donlan said, "President Conant gives aid
and comfort to the enemy when he leaves the impression that
70Communism is just an 'unpopular political opinion.'"
The commonwealth brought only two indictments pursuant
to the new law: the first in 1951 against Professor Dirk
Struik of MIT and the second in 1954 against the Otis Hood
and seven Communist party leaders in Massachusetts. Both
indictments were dismissed in 1956 when the Supreme Court
ruled the federal government had preempted the field of
sedition.
Although the legislature passed this sweeping law
proposed by the Committee to Curb Communism in 1951, it did
not agree to revive and continue the committee the next
year. Boston Democrat Timothy Mclnerney introduced a
petition to reestablish the committee, but it died in
committee. "^^ Boston Democrat William Keenan introduced the
only other anticommunist initiative in 1952. His bill would
require college presidents to fire communists and communist
sympathizers. When the Committee on Education recommended
it be referred to the next session, the House quietly
acquiesced. ''^ Without the pressure of being at war with
communist North Korea and China, party leaders succeeded
in
containing localist anticommunist sentiment.
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Massachusetts Special Commission On Communism.
Subversive Activities and Related Matters
Within the Commonwealth. 1953-1963
In 1953, however, the tide turned once again and the
legislature launched a new commission. This time outside
pressure came from congressional investigating committees.
In the first half of 1953, the Velde Committee (HUAC),
Jenner Committee (SISS) and McCarthy Subcommittee all held
hearings in Boston. The Velde and Jenner committees focused
on "subversion in higher education" and competed with each
other to land the most prestigious witnesses and make the
most sensational charges. Beginning in February 1953,
Robert Gorham Davis, Granville Hicks and Daniel Boorstin
gave dramatic testimony to HUAC about Communist party
activities at Harvard in the 1930s. Another ten witnesses
also testified, about half cooperated with the committee.
Witnesses who refused to name names in executive session
were called back to testify at public hearings so that they
could be "exposed." Wendell Furry was the only
uncooperative witness still teaching at Harvard in 1953.
Anticommunists inside and outside the university called for
Furry 's dismissal. After much maneuvering, the Harvard
Corporation suspended Furry for three years rather than
7 3firing him outright.
In March, 1953, the Jenner Committee (SISS) began
hearings in Boston on the same issue. Two more Harvard
teachers, Helen Deane Markham and Leon Kamin, took the
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Fifth. Again, the Harvard Corporation did not fire them
outright, angering federal inquisitors and local
anticommunists alike. A week after Harvard's announcement
suspending Markham and Kamin, the Jenner committee called
Markham back for further testimony. When she continued to
assert her fifth amendment privilege, Jenner called Herbert
Philbrick to "prove" she was a Communist. All Philbrick
could do, however, was repeat hearsay information from
someone he "believed to be a Communist party member" who had
told him Markham was a member of the party.
Other, less famous Massachusetts educators also refused
to cooperate with the Jenner committee. Since the state
employed these teachers, however, they were fired as soon as
they asserted their privilege against self-incrimination.
One was George Faxon, a Boston high school teacher and a
target of local anticommunists since 1939 when he organized
a meeting for the American Student Union. Elizabeth
Guarnaccia, another teacher who took the Fifth before the
Jenner committee, resigned before she was fired. Mary
Knowles, the Norwood town librarian, also resigned following
her appearance before the Jenner committee.
The legislature reacted to this spotlight of national
publicity by establishing its own investigating commission.
Boston Democrats, James Burke, Edmond Donlan and John
McMorrow, and Cambridge Democrat, Francis Good introduced
three different bills in 1953. Good was fulfilling his
campaign pledge to fight subversion. An advertisement he
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ran in the 1952 campaign assured voters a vote for him would
"Aid In The Fight Against Communism"''^ In May, Senate and
House leaders appointed a committee to consolidate the bills
into one. This committee included Senator Bowker, former
chairman of the Committee to Curb Communism, Senator John
Powers, a Boston Democrat, and Representative Paul McCarthy
from Somerville. All three would be appointed to the new
commission. Bowker assured his colleagues the committee
would draft a resolve creating "the broadest type of
investigation we have ever had in the Commonwealth."
Projected targets were "communist infiltration in religion,
education, legal profession and labor. "^^
This committee drafted a resolve broader in scope than
that the 1950 Committee to Curb Communism. They modeled
this new investigating commission after that of the House
Un-American Activities Committee, copying language directly
from the federal legislation to define the scope of the
state's investigation. Unlike HUAC, however, they included
safeguards similar to those adopted for the Committee to
Curb Communism. The resolve was introduced in the Senate in
late June, 1953, and flew through both chambers in less than
7 8
ten days without one word of opposition.
Members of the Massachusetts Special Commission on
Communism, Subversive Activities and Other Related Matters
met for the first time on September 15, 1953. Although
dependent on the legislature for renewal each year and for
funds to conduct investigations, the special commission
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quickly took on a life of its own. Before examining the
workings and impact of the commission, we will look at the
legislature's response to the special commission.
1954 and 1955 were the high water mark of number of
anticommunist bills and petitions introduced in the
legislature. As in the past, Boston Democrats sponsored
most. Democrats from Worcester, Fitchburg, Lawrence and New
Bedford also introduced anticommunist bills. Many
overlapped; many copied previous bills; some proposed to
increase penalties of existing legislation; and none was
enacted. With the exception of legislation dealing
specifically with the special commission, the legislature
passed no new anticommunist initiatives after 1953. Most
bills never made it out of committee; many were referred to
the special commission for further study.
The first change in the mission of the special
commission came a year after it began meeting. Angered by a
watered down, generalized first report, Joseph Ward, a
Fitchburg Democrat, proposed an amendment mandating the
special commission to name names. On a voice vote, the
House voted Ward's amendment down, 42 to 69. But, when Ward
called for a roll call vote, his amendment passed by a vote
of 114 to 69. Clearly, lawmakers had some misgivings about
the new investigating commission, including its chairman,
Philip Bowker, who moved to strike Ward's amendment. The
House revised the language of Ward's amendment, calling
for
the commission to name names when it had "credible
evidence"
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the person belonged to the Communist party. This satisfied
legislators in both houses and it passed.
The legislature also agreed to help out the special
commission with unruly witnesses. Some leaders of the
Communist party were particularly rude and scornful of
commissions. Because they took the Fifth, however, the
commission had no power to punish them. The legislature
created a new misdemeanor for "behaving in a disorderly or
contemptuous manner before [the special commission]." No
one was ever prosecuted under this provision.®^
Anticommunist legislators continued to be frustrated
with the commission's inability to force uncooperative
witnesses to testify. In 1955 and 1956, Representatives
Charles lanello and Edmond Donlan, ardent Boston
anticommunists, introduced legislation empowering the
commission to grant immunity to witnesses who took the
Fifth. Once witnesses are granted immunity, they can no
longer invoke the privilege against self incrimination and
further refusal to answer questions is punishable with
contempt. However, the legislature was unwilling to grant
the special commission this much power and neither bill made
81
it out of committee.
In 1954, 1955 and 1956, resolves continuing the special
commission for another year passed quickly and without
incident. However, from 1957 on, opponents and supporters
squared off against each other at hearings to continue the
commission. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts,
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Massachusetts Council of Churches (representing Protestant
churches), and Boston Bar Association opposed continuation
of the special commission. Members of the commission,
veterans organizations and Catholic lay groups favored
continuation. In 1959, Bowker boasted that "nest after nest
of Communists in Massachusetts were cleared out...
Recruiting among Communists in Massachusetts has reached a
new low and I ascribe it to the work of the Commission."
Henry Lyons, appearing on behalf of the Archdiocese Council
of Catholic Men and Women, argued it was "foolish to spend
millions in Europe and the Near East . . . and then let down
82the guard at home .
"
The commission's supporters and opponents exchanged
bitter, acrimonious charges during hearings in 1957 and
1958. Anticommunist legislators were entrenched in their
position. As Donlan said, "It's a fight against death, not
a basketball game." When the chairman of the committee
holding hearings on the resolve to continue the special
commission rapped the gavel to get order, people in the
audience shouted back "Shut up" and "Let's investigate him.'
The audience jeered Howard Whiteside, Jr., attorney for the
Civil Liberties Union. Christopher lanello, a particularly
fervent Boston anticommunist, yelled: "He's the one who
appeared for all the Communists. I think we should
83investigate him."
The Boston Archdiocese of the Catholic Church
vigorously supported continuation of the special commission
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The Archdiocese Council of Catholic Women, the Archdiocese
Council of Catholic Men, Catholic Daughters of America and
the Holy Name Society all sent representatives. Henry Leen
appeared as the personal representative of Archbishop
Cushing to testify in favor of continuing the special
commission
.
A few legislators voiced opposition to the commission.
In 1958, Isaac Hogden, a Republican from Belchertown, moved
to refer the resolve to the next session, but his motion
lost 24 to 59. The next year, Mary B. Newman, a Republican
from Cambridge and former member of the special commission,
moved to refer the resolve continuing the commission to the
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next session. Her motion failed by a vote of 18 to 81.
During the 1959 session, the legislature did reject a
request from the commission for more funding. In 1962, Mrs.
Newman tried again to end the commission; once again, the
House passed up a chance to disband the commission.
Cracks appeared in the special commission too. William
Randall, a Republican commissioner from Framingham, moved to
change the language of 1954 provision mandating the
commission to name names from "shall" to "may." Randall's
amendment carried; no vote was recorded. From then on, the
commission was authorized to name names, but not required to
name names.
Instead of just terminating the special commission, the
legislature let it die a slow death. Even though the Senate
had censured McCarthy and the Supreme Court had ruled
the
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federal government preempted the field of subversion, the
Massachusetts legislature needed to keep up the appearance
of opposing communist infiltration in the state. The
legislature waited until 1963 to let go of its commission to
investigate subversion. That year, the resolve to continue
the commission quietly died in committee.
Investigating Communists
Members of the Special Commission on Communism,
Subversive Activities and Related Matters Within the
Commonwealth assembled for the first time on September 15,
1953. Two senators, three representatives and two
"civilians" sat on the "Red Probe Committee." Over the next
decade, they investigated subversion in schools and
universities, labor unions, churches, and liberal "front"
groups. The commission called hundreds of witnesses and
issued lengthy reports on the "Peace Lobby" and other
Communist "front" groups (1955), the International Fur and
Leather Workers' Union (1955), the Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America (1955), Dirk Struik
(1957), and the Communist party (1958). In these reports,
the commission named 134 Communists and fellow travelers.
Most of the people named refused to cooperate with the
commission; some had left the party years earlier and were
willing to discuss their own activities but refused to
disclose names of their associates. . The apex of the
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commission's activities and influence lasted from the fall
of 1953 through 1955.
The Senate sent Philip Bowker, a Republican from
Brookline, and John Powers, a Democrat from Boston. Bowker,
who had served as chairman of the Committee to Curb
Communism, was elected chairman of the special commission as
well. Powers, an Irish Democrat from South Boston, served
in the House from 1939 until 1946 when he was elected to the
Senate and quickly became Democratic floor leader. He was
an aspiring party politician, sometimes compared to James
Michael Curley in his rise from poverty to political power
broker. Like Curley, his roots were deep in anticommunist
,
Irish Catholic Boston. He served on the special commission
until 1958 when he left the Senate to run for Mayor of
Boston, an election he was favored to win but lost in the
closing days when newspapers tied his campaign to Boston's
latest financial scandal. When Powers left the special
commission, the Senate President appointed James W.
Hannigan, Jr. to replace him.
The House sent two Republicans, William Randall of
Framingham and Mary Newman of Cambridge, and one Democrat,
Paul McCarthy of Somerville. Randall served on the special
commission until 1959 when he resigned. He started his
service as an enthusiastic communist investigator. In 1954,
he boasted to his hometown Rotary Club that the special
commission held frequent conferences with Senator Joseph
McCarthy who he described as "a hard worker and very
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85tenacious." Five years later, however, Randall had
enough. He dissented from the special commission's annual
request for extension because "[t]he whole subject of
communism in this state has been thoroughly looked at and
further investigation is not called for." When the
legislature revived the special commission, he resigned.
George Thompson, a Republican from Swamscott, replaced
Randall
.
Paul McCarthy represented Somerville in the House for
nearly 20 years when he was appointed to the commission. A
strong anticommunist , he served with Bowker and Powers on
the joint committee that drafted the resolve establishing
the special commission. When he died in 1955, Roger Sala, a
Democrat from North Adams, took his place. In 1959, Ralph
Cartwright, a Republican from Randolph replaced Sala.
Cartwright resigned a year later and was replaced by John
Barry, a Democrat from Peabody.
Mary Newman was replaced in 1955 when she lost a bid
for reelection. After regaining her seat, she became one of
the few legislators willing to take a stand to shut down the
special committee. John T. Tynan, an activist anticommunist
Democrat from Boston's Ward 6, replaced Newman serving on
the special commission until 1963. Tynan shepherded annual
resolves to continue the special commission through the
legislature as public support waned in the late 1950s an
early 1960s.
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The governor appointed two "citizen" members to the
special commission, George Cashman, a lawyer and former
judge from Wellesley, and Richard Buckley. Cashman actively
involved himself in the work, of the commission. He often
served as spokesman for the commission, bringing the
prestige of his judicial office to the work of the
commission. In December 1953, he made the first trip to
Washington on behalf of the commission to coordinate work
with federal agencies and congressional committees. Cashman
proposed a "mutual assistance pact" to the Jenner, Velde and
McCarthy committees. When he returned to Boston, the
special commission met with the governor, speaker of the
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House, and Senate president to hear his report.
Richard Buckley, the governor's other appointee, acted
as the commission's unofficial liaison with the American
Legion. A former commander of the Massachusetts Department
of the American Legion, Buckley maintained close ties to the
organization. Unaccountably, his name disappeared from
commission reports in 1957 and no new appointee took his
place
.
Once assembled in September, 1953, the special
commission's first order of business was to hire counsel.
After seeking suggestions from the Massachusetts and
Boston
bar associations, they selected Thomas Bresnahan of
Newton,
a willing anticommunist . Like his counterparts on
congressional committees, Bresnahan honed his talents
as a
cross examiner to make uncooperative witnesses
appear in the
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worst light possible. Once a witness took the Fifth,
Bresnahan followed up with a series of preposterous
questions knowing the witness could not deny them outright.
Claiming the privilege against self incrimination made
witnesses look like they had something to hide. Bresnahan
examined most witnesses and wrote the commission's reports.
Although personnel on the special commission changed
during the decade of its existence, a core group of ardent
anticommunists remained to shape its work and output.
Powers, Tynan, Cashman and Bresnahan formed this bloc.
Bowker's role remained somewhat ambiguous since he sometimes
appeared to be concerned about criticism from liberals. For
instance, on the floor of the Senate in 1954, he moved to
strike the House amendment requiring the special commission
to name names. The following year, however, he responded to
a lawsuit filed by five prominent attorneys to enjoin the
commission from naming names by threatening to tear up the
summons and read the names from the Senate floor where he
would be immune from contempt charges. ®® It is hard to tell
whether Bowker was concerned with his image or with civil
liberties. As time went on, however, he identified more and
more with the anticommunist crusaders.
Once assembled, the commission sought a close
relationship with federal investigating committees,
reserving a special place of awe for Senator McCarthy. The
commission remained a very junior partner, however, often
left in the dark and never given sensational
disclosures to
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release. McCarthy always kept those for himself. In
November 1953, William Teto, a machinist from the Fitchburg
General Electric plant and former UE employee, surfaced as
an FBI informant before McCarthy's subcommittee holding
hearings in New York City. McCarthy kept the Massachusetts
commission on pins and needles refusing to release Teto to
testify in Boston. Meanwhile, McCarthy grabbed the
headlines on communist subversion in Massachusetts defense
plants by releasing Teto ' s information about Communist party
cells among UE loyalists in Lynn, Everett, and Fitchburg.
After making outlandish promises about Teto ' s revelations,
the special commission called Ernest Stolba as a stand-in
for Teto. Stolba was Teto's "close friend and confidant"
who had no direct knowledge of "subversive" GE workers and
could only give the commission names he had heard Teto
mention over the kitchen table. ®^ Eventually Teto made it
to Boston but not until McCarthy had shifted the spotlight
onto other targets.
Such shabby treatment did not seem to bother the
special commission. In January 1954, when McCarthy
scheduled hearings in Boston, the special commission invited
him to confer with them in executive session. McCarthy
declined, because his "schedule was too tight," inviting
them to attend his hearings instead. Wanting to appear
cooperative, McCarthy told the press the commission was
"welcome to any information we have about Communists
in
Massachusetts." Members of the commission attended
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McCarthy's public hearing the morning of January 16 and then
took him out to lunch at the Boston Club. Bowker and one of
the commission's investigators also attended the afternoon
executive session. According to Bowker, "[McCarthy]
provided us with much data that we needed and we told him
what we have been doing. We correlated information
.
During 1954, both McCarthy and special commission
members took pains to play up their mutual cooperation in
the press. In June, McCarthy held hearings in Lynn to
follow up on "subversion" in the defense industry. Again,
he told the press he "wanted to work closely with the
Massachusetts Commission" and "was turning over data from
9
1
some of his files relating to Communism in this state..."
For their part, commission members reported following up
leads from information furnished by McCarthy and Jenner.
The subcommittee on education summoned public school
officials based on information from the Jenner committee.
Powers said his subcommittee investigating unions had
"coordinated its efforts with McCarthy ' s . "^^
Information provided by federal investigating
committees came primarily from four FBI informants. All
were Massachusetts residents who had voluntarily initiated
contact with the FBI. The first informant to surface was
Herbert Philbrick who had infiltrated the Communist party in
Massachusetts in 1940. According to his account, he first
entered the Cambridge Youth Council office to solicit
business for the advertising company he represented. A
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pacifist at the time, he was attracted by the Council
member's youthful idealism and peace work. Six months
later, however, Philbrick was disillusioned. He had risen
rapidly to become chairman of the Cambridge Council, but was
disturbed when leaders of affiliated groups used his name
without first getting permission and when the national board
of the American Youth Congress overturned decisions made by
the local group . Philbrick concluded the Council was
"nothing but a manipulated front for the plans and programs
of a few behind-the-scenes operators" and called the FBI.
For the next nine years, first as a member of the Young
Communist League and then as a member of the Communist
party, he reported on his activities to the FBI . His role
as an FBI informant climaxed in April 1949, when he appeared
as a surprise witness at the New York Smith Act trial of top
93Communist party leaders
.
During his nine years as an FBI informant, Philbrick
never confided in his family. His mother, sister and wife
were as surprised as everyone else when he took the stand in
New York. Philbrick 's mother believed he was trying to make
up for having been rejected by the Army. Once his cover
was revealed, Philbrick joined the select group of
professional witnesses. He was a very good witness.
Philbrick had never embraced the Communist party the way
other professional witnesses like Louis Budenz and Bella
Dodd had, so he could not be discredited on the grounds of
personal revenge or animosity.
283
Ant icommunists in Massachusetts embraced Philbrick as a
local hero. The Boston City Council declared November 21,
1951 to be "Herbert Philbrick Day." The American Legion
feted Philbrick at a dinner banquet bringing in Frank
Gordon, one of the lead prosecutors from the Dennis trial,
as the principal speaker. Gordon praised Philbrick 's
heroism and valuable contribution to the conviction of CP
leaders. Before Hollywood made a movie based on
Philbrick' s life, one of the Boston television stations
broadcast a serialized dramatization of his story.
Philbrick 's publicity generated an interesting
phenomenon of copycat spies. Both William Teto and Armand
Penha, two other informants, admired Philbrick enough to
follow his example. Teto ' s claim is more suspect. There is
some evidence that animosity toward local UE officers
motivated his action as much as Philbrick 's patriotism.
Albert Fitzgerald, UE ' s president, claimed Teto had been
fired by his UE local "because he was a heavy drinker and a
screwball." When Teto surfaced through McCarthy's
committee, the FBI initially disclaimed any connection to
him. Teto however claimed he was inspired to become a
"FBI
counterspy" when he heard about Philbrick. According
to
one report, Teto gave names of thirty suspected UE
communists to the commission.
Armand Penha emerged as an FBI informant in 1958.
Like
Teto, he was a union organizer inspired by Philbrick
's
example. Penha 's claim is more persuasive. He
served with
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Army Intelligence during the war and attended law school at
night after his discharge. Eventually he returned to
Fairhaven, his hometown, to take a job as an inspector in a
local plant . In the early 19 50s , he volunteered his
services to the FBI and began informing the government about
Communist party activities in New Bedford and Fairhaven.
When Penha surfaced in 1958, however, he had only limited,
97
out of date information to give to the special commission
.
Ann Ruth Steinberg, a young Boston University student,
was the fourth FBI informant. Like the others, she
initially surfaced at a federal investigating committee
hearing. The commission patiently waited for her to finish
in Washington before hearing her testimony. She told the
commission about the Labor Youth League, a group she
described as a Communist party front that organized in the
Roxbury and Dorchester sections of Boston. She identified
eleven communists in the group, all of whom were summoned to
the commission where they invoked the privilege against self
9 8incrimination
.
The cominission also reported receiving information
volunteered by patriotic individuals and groups. In
December 1953, Bowker said the commission was investigating
"hundreds" of Massachusetts residents whose names were
supplied by twenty "voluntary informants." The
American
Legion produced the biggest cache of names. In
January
1954, Department Commander Coleman Nee gave
the commission
"case histories of 413 alleged Communists" and
"names of
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hundred of suspected Communists and left-wing sympathizers."
Bowker and Powers praised the Legion's fine work claiming
"the Commission now has a network into the cities and towns
of the Commonwealth on a par with the underground network
operated by the Communists themselves
The commission ' s investigators also supplied
information. They followed known Communist party members
and surveilled meetings of the party's front groups hoping
to identify people attending meetings and associating with
leaders. Once identified, investigators worked up a dossier
on the person, probably relying on information from
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Philbrick and Teto.
The special commission adopted many McCarthyite
tactics. It tried to intimidate witnesses by having
summonses served in the middle of the night. Witnesses had
to appear with only several hours notice, making it very
difficult to secure counsel. Witnesses first testified in
executive session. If they refused to cooperate with the
commission, they found newspaper photographers waiting in
the hall outside the hearing room. Uncooperative witnesses
were invariably called back to invoke publicly the privilege
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against self incrimination.
Like McCarthy, commissioners felt frustrated by lawyers
who represented uncooperative witnesses. Powers charged
that a "dozen lawyers who have thwarted attempts of
federal
committees to check activities of alleged Communists and
subversive organization are wrecking the state's
commission
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as well." According to Powers, these lawyers were "the
number one problem confronting the commission ."
Bresnahan, the commission's counsel, reported: "We can tell
the minute we see a witness come in with one of the
partyline lawyers we're going to get nothing but the Fifth
Amendment ." Bowker wanted to know if "counsel for the
hundreds of witnesses coming before us have been assigned by
invisible forces.
The special commission issued its first substantive
report in June 1955.-^°^ It targeted three organizations,
the New England Citizens Concerned for Peace, New England
Conference for Peace, and the Committee for the Bill of
Rights, the holding company for the Communist party's
newspaper, the Daily Worker. The report named 84 members
and fellow travelers. For some, their involvement occurred
years before and that was noted. The report included
transcripts of testimony from the eight "Peace Advocates"
who had taken the Fifth. Publicizing this testimony may
have backfired a bit because it shows Bresnahan browbeating
witnesses. For instance, Bresnahan asked one witness where
she lived. She replied that he had her address from
previous testimony in executive session. Bresnahan
persisted; she asked if it was really necessary to say
it in
a public session. He then read her address out
loud and
asked if she lived there.
The commission's report called for the firing
of Boston
University instructor Charles Hoover Russell.
When he
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appeared before the commission and took the Fifth, it
promptly informed B.U. officials. The Executive Committee
of the B.U. Board of Trustees requested a copy of the
transcript. After reviewing it, they announced Russell
would not be fired because they were "satisfied Russell
appeared, spoke freely and answered all questions." The
commission disagreed, intimating the trustees were disloyal.
The special commission had a keen interest in the labor
movement and saw itself as a catalyst to assist rank and
file members in removing communist leaders. In December
1953, the commission jumped into the battle between UE
loyalists and lUE anticommunists five days before a NLRB
election at the big GE local in Lynn. James Carey,
anticommunist president of the lUE, was in Boston to address
the state CIO convention and asked to testify before the
commission. In a public session, he gave the commission
names of 200 communists in the UE. He used his appearance
as a campaign platform blasting the federal government for
failing to prosecute UE leaders for perjury in filing non-
Communist affidavits, for failing to put the UE on the
subversive organizations list, and for failing to withdraw
defense work from plants where the UE represented workers,
in his speech to the CIO convention and his testimony
before
the commission, Carey strongly criticized employers
who
allowed workers to remain on their payroll after taking
the
Fifth about membership in the Communist party. Carey
charged communism flourished in Massachusetts because
of the
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"vicious anti-democratic role that some employers play in
perpetuating a Communist conspiracy in their own plants.
Carey's fire was aimed at General Electric. Four days
later, and the day before the Lynn election, GE announced a
new policy. Employees who admitted being a member of the
Communist party would be fired and employees who took the
Fifth when asked about membership in the party would be
suspended. The commission applauded GE ' s decision. Bowker
said the new policy would help the commission. "Witnesses
may not be so quick to invoke their constitutional rights if
they fear that such action will mean their suspension from
employment .
"
In January 1954, Local 1282 of the Distributive,
Processing and Office Workers Union of America (DPOWA) was
negotiating with John Hancock Life Insurance Company for
renewal of a contract that had expired. Local 1282
represented 375 insurance agents. As negotiations bogged
down, union members took a strike vote that carried by a
margin of 7 to 1. With a strike deadline set for March, the
president of the company asked the special commission to
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investigate communist influence in the union.
The commission summoned union leaders including Frank
Siegel, president of the local. When Siegel took the
Fifth,
rank and file members floundered and called off the
strike.
In May, the insurance agents voted to leave the union
and
the company withdrew recognition. The company
never renewed
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the contract and the agents got a $15 per week pay
cut.
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A few months later, the commission intervened in
another labor dispute. Local 21 of the International Fur
and Leather Workers Union was negotiating for a new contract
on behalf of 3,600 workers at the A. C. Lawrence plant in
Peabody when Ben Gold, IFLWU's president, was convicted of
perjury in signing the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavit.
Sensing an opportunity to raid the Fur Workers, the AFL's
Meatcutter's Union petitioned the NLRB for an election. The
company suspended negotiations and the commission summoned
Local 21 's leaders. "^^^
The commission knew Local 21 's officers were not
communists and called on MIT professor Walter W. Rostow to
explain how communist international officers exerted control
over noncommunist locals. Rostow studied the CIO Executive
Committee's report on communist influence in the IFLWU. He
traced a pattern of foreign policy resolutions passed at
IFLWU conventions that "matched" the line of the Communist
party. He also "discovered" a pattern of IFLWU's donations
to groups on the Attorney General's list.
The commission then "exposed" for rank and file members
how the local's leaders had been "duped" into letting
themselves believe that "Communist top leadership was
compatible with good unionism and good Americanism."
When
confronted by the commission, the local's business
manager
turned on Gold and the national leadership denouncing
the
"hard core of Communism in this country." During
the course
of the commission's investigation. Gold resigned,
targeted
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members of the local resigned and Local 21 voted to secede
from the IFLWU. The commission concluded that "a
legislative body can powerfully assist in removing Communist
control over unions" by forcing public attention on the
strategy and tactics of communists and by removing the fear
anticommunists have that they will lose their jobs if they
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speak out against leadership.
The commission had less success with the UE. Its
leaders refused to answer questions when summoned to the
commission; none turned on national leadership as local
IFLWU leaders had. The commission's report named eight UE
organizers and seven UE District Council 2 officers as
members of the Communist party, and called Albert
Fitzgerald, president of the UE , a "dupe." The commission
castigated rank and file union members for permitting
"agents of a foreign power to direct their destinies." It
urged more "vigilance and action" and "express [ed] the hope
that its investigation and report will be of assistance to
union members in crushing Communist control; and, once rid
of Communism, that its members never again permit it
to be
recaptured. "^^^
In December 1953, when GE announced its new policy
of
firing workers who took the Fifth, Bowker hoped
the threat
of losing a job would loosen tongues. Apparently the
threat
did not work since the commission found few UE
members who
belonged to the Communist party. One reason
may have been
that McCarthy got uncooperative witnesses
fired first,
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leaving the commission with no threat. For instance,
Alexander Gregory appeared before McCarthy sitting as a one-
man committee in Lynn in January 1954. Gregory, a 64 year
old naturalized citizen from Bulgaria, told McCarthy "I am
placed in a position today either to testify as a political
informer or lose my job." McCarthy pressed Gregory to talk
about meetings of the Communist party he attended and names
of communists at the meetings. Gregory replied, "I refuse
to answer that under the First and Fifth Amendments on
account it would bother my conscience to be an informer." A
week later, Gregory lost his job at GE.^^* If UE loyalists
like Gregory did not buckle before McCarthy, they were
unlikely to be intimidated by the commission.
Some former GE employees worked to stop the
anticommunist crusade. In December 1953, when Teto named
Nathaniel Mills as a communist, GE fired him. A month
later, McCarthy ejected Mills for disrupting his hearing.
In March 1954, Mills appeared as a witness at a state house
hearing to oppose proposed legislation prohibiting Communist
party members and sympathizers from peaceful picketing.
Mills told the committee he had been a member of the
Communist party in 1951 when it was outlawed and he had not
changed his beliefs since then. This admission prompted
Representative Christopher lannello, a Democrat from
Roxbury, to take a punch at Mills. Both men were removed
from the hearing. "^^^
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since men like Mills and Gregory were never going to
talk, the commission based its report on information from
Teto and Carey. It also relied on "experts" to make the
case. With the Fur Workers, the commission turned to Walter
Rostow; with the UE, the commission turned to Louis Budenz.
The commission cited a chapter, "Red Web in Labor," from
Budenz ' s book. Wen Without Faces, to make its case against
the UE.
The final two reports issued by the commission
concerned Dirk Struik and the Communist party. Both reports
reprinted documents and testimony; neither contained any new
analysis or information. Struik was a mathematician at MIT,
named by Philbrick in 1949 as a leading member of a Boston
cell known as the Pro-4 group. In 1951, HUAC summoned
Struik where he invoked his privilege against self
incrimination. Meanwhile Struik continued teaching at MIT.
When the Middlesex County grand jury indicted Struik and two
others for violating the 1919 sedition statute, MIT
suspended Struik with pay. In 1953, other MIT professors
appearing before HUAC corroborated Philbrick 's charge
against Struik. In 1956, when the state court dismissed
Struik -s indictment, MIT reinstated Struik to his former
position. MIT agreed to reopen Struik 's case if "new events
or new information again raise the question of Professor
Struik 's fitness to be a member of the MIT faculty."
The
commission disapproved of MIT's action. Unwilling to
concede, it issued a lengthy report detailing the
case
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against Struik hoping to rouse public opinion to its
side.^^^
The most interesting feature of the Struik report is
what it omits. This is the commission's only report on
education. There is nothing about Harvard University,
public school teachers, subversive books or any of the other
education issues that concerned legislators or made
headlines in the postwar period. Perhaps the commission had
run out of money and was unable to do more than reprint
material from its files.
The commission's final substantive report, issued in
January 1958, concerned the Communist party itself. One
wonders why the commission bothered; there was no new
information to report, no new names to reveal. It lists 37
people giving "biographical sketches" for each one. The
bulk of the report consisted of lengthy excerpts from their
testimony before the commission sparring with Bresnahan, the
commission's counsel, and refusing to answer questions. The
report reiterated earlier charges against Reverend Donald
Lothrup, pastor of Boston's Community Church. Lothrup had
been a target of anticommunists for twenty years. The 1937
special commission identified Lothrup as a "fellow
traveller"; Philbrick and Budenz named Lothrup as a member
of the Communist party. Still, he and his group persisted.
The attack on Lothrup may have been a response to
mounting criticism leveled at the commission by Protestant
church leaders. In November 1956, the Massachusetts Baptist
Convention passed a resolution condemning the legislature
for continuing the special commission. In 1957, the
Massachusetts Council of Churches led the fight to shut down
the commission.
To conclude, the special commission's greatest success
was turning members of the DPOWA and IFLWU against their
left-led national leadership. Beyond that, the commission
uncovered little information McCarthy, Jenner or HUAC had
not already publicized. The handful of teachers and GE
workers who lost their jobs were fired on account of
testimony at federal committees not the commission
.
Much harder to assess is the intangible political cost
of publishing names of 137 members and sympathizers of the
Communist party. Along with each name, the reports listed
the person ' s street address and brief political biography
.
These were not "innocent liberals"; they were people in or
near the party. Some had already broken with the party and
that was noted in the reports. Nevertheless, it was an
inquisition about unpopular political views and surely must
have chilled the expression of ideas. On a personal level,
the commission invaded the privacy of people it named,
putting them and their politics on public display. The
image of a rebellious Puritan pilloried on the town common
seems apt.
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Conclusion
While anticommunist sentiment was not new in
Massachusetts when the war ended, the cold war gave it an
immediacy most Americans accepted. Local anticommunist
crusaders seized on the charged political environment and
pushed more initiatives through the legislature than at any
other time. While historian Robert Griffith calls this
process "derivative," this study shows it was parallel until
1953, and then reactionary. Few people supported the
Communist party; most tolerated it as a necessary nuisance
within a democracy.
Local anticommunists ' call to outlaw the party
succeeded when the Supreme Court ruled communist organizing
was not protected by the constitution. Anticommunists' call
to expose subversion succeeded because national
anticommunists won that battle on the federal level and
brought their investigations to Massachusetts. The state
legislature had kept anticommunist activists at bay, while
the federal legislature lacked the will or desire.
Anticommunist crusaders dominated the special
commission. They were motivated by the teachings of the
Catholic church, not party politics. Their goal was to
expose un-American behavior among Yankee intellectuals and
their Jewish collaborators. Twenty years later, socially
conservative Irish Catholics aimed their fire at African
Americans infiltrating their schools; forty years later, at
lesbians and gay men infiltrating their parade.
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CHAPTER 7
BAY STATE ANTICOMMUNISM IN PERSPECTIVE
Ant icommunism differed among states, and often among
places within a state, because local conditions differed.
In Massachusetts, class and ethnicity shaped the politics of
anticommunism; national and international events provided
the context for action. In other states, different factors
drove anticommunism. In Texas and Louisiana, for instance,
where the struggle to maintain white supremacy colored all
politics, white Southerners used anticommunism to discredit
the civil rights movement.^ In Hawaii and California,
proximity to communist-controlled China and Korea led
conservative elites to exaggerate the threat of domestic
subversion.^ The unique political culture of each state
shaped anticommunist sentiment and initiatives.
From 1930 to 1960, the political culture of
Massachusetts included a strong, liberal tradition among
Yankee Republicans side-by-side with a strong, socially
conservative tradition among Irish Catholic Democrats.
Liberals' strength and prestige mediated between the far
left and the far right, discrediting both and keeping the
center from collapsing. Because of this, Massachusetts did
not breed demagogues, like California's Senator Jack Tenney
or Illinois 's Senator Paul Broyles, or experience the
excesses of red baiting, as in New York or California. For
the same reason, the Communist party never recruited a large
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cadre of disciplined members in Massachusetts. Liberal
intellectuals attracted to the party maintained independence
not tolerated among less prestigious members.
Liberal organizations in Massachusetts never buckled
under anticommunist pressure as did their counterparts in
other states."^ Leaders of the Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties
Union, but not a chapter, refused to follow its lead and
expel party members from leadership position. Many Bay
State liberals responded to anticommunist hysteria on
principle , not expediency.
The socially conservative Catholic tradition also
rested on principle. Papal authority consistently warned
Catholics about the danger of godless communism, a rival
religion that attracted workers in periods of economic
depression and threatened the underpinnings of democratic
institutions that sustained the church in the United States.
This message inspired Catholics to fight communism as a
moral issue. Father Coughlin's vicious anticommunism and
anti-Semitism went beyond papal authority and attracted
Catholic extremists in Boston.
Based on this unique configuration in the state's
political culture, Massachusetts repressed its communists
reluctantly. Conservative Republicans and Irish Catholic
Democrats sponsored anticommunist initiatives in the
legislature; veterans groups and lay Catholics did the same
on the local level. Massachusetts anticommunists maintained
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an unbroken thread of activity throughout the period of this
study, 1930 to 1960. Indeed, there is ample evidence of
antiradicalism dating at least from the 1919 Boston police
strike, and probably well before too. At times the thread
was stronger, and supported by broader sectors of Bay
Staters, but it was never unbroken. The evidence of
anticommunism and antiradicalism during the Second World
War, expressed as opposition to conscientious objectors and
support for the Christian Front, links the "little Red
Scare" of the depression to postwar McCarthyism.
As in other states, and on the national level,
legislative initiatives peaked during the Korean War. In
one important respect, however, Massachusetts differed from
other industrial states unable to check the rise of local
demagogues. In California, Jack Tenney led a decade long
investigation of subversion in the state.* A leftist during
the popular front era, he turned against former political
associates in 1939 over a union sguabble. As a politician,
Tenney used anticommunism to carve out a base of power
within the fractious California legislature. He held
hearings across the state and filed careless reports based
on flimsy evidence that eventually backfired on him, causing
the legislature to appoint a new chairman.
In other states. Republican law makers personified
anticommunism in their legislatures.^ Republican Senator
Paul Broyles chaired Illinois -s Seditious Activities
Investigation Commission and Republican Representative
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Albert Canwell chaired Washington's Fact-Finding Committee
on Un-American Activities, intentionally modelled on
California's Tenney Committee. In Maryland, Frank Ober, a
conservative Republican lawyer who was not a politician, led
that state's anticommunist crusade.
New York was a slightly different case. There, the
legislature as a whole, rather than one zealous
anticommunist, was deeply concerned about subversion in the
Empire State. One commentator noted: "The intensity [of
interest about subversion] has varied from time to time, and
the terminology has changed slightly, but the pattern of
1950 differed very little from that of 1798."^
Another point of comparison is the level to which state
investigating commissions copied federal committees.
Historian Robert Griffith, among others, postulates that
anticommunism on the state level was "derivative" of
national anticommunism and that state legislatures
"responded almost slavishly to the force of federal law and
precedent and to the anxieties aroused by national
leaders."^ With respect to Massachusetts, Griffith
overstates the case. The Bay State set up its first
investigating commission in 1937, the year before Chairman
Martin Dies launched the House Un-American Activities
Committee in Washington. Its second, short-lived,
investigating commission in 1950-51, owed its existence more
to the outbreak of war in Korea than to HUAC and other
federal committees. In 1947 and 1948, Massachusetts
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liberals successfully fought back a move to establish a
state commission, Griffith's prediction notwithstanding.
Its third investigating commission, lasting from 1953 to
1963, comes closest to fitting the thesis.
In other states, the fit is closer. Historian Michael
Heale concludes that California's committee copied the
methods and targets of HUAC and other committees.® On a
slight variation of the copycat thesis, Washington lawmakers
modelled their Canwell Commission on California's Tenney
Commission. State committees shared personnel and resources
with each other and with federal committees. Historian
Ellen Schrecker found close collaboration among people
connected to an "anti-Communist network" which provided
expertise and information for anticommunists working on the
state level. ^ The Broyles commission in Illinois hired
Benjamin Gitlow, a former member of the Communist party, to
investigate subversion at the University of Chicago and Dr.
J. B. Matthews, HUAC ' s director of research, to interrogate
witnesses at hearings. Matthews testified before
Washington's Canwell commission as well as in Boston.
Unlike these states, Massachusetts was not intimately
connected to this network, perhaps because no demagogic
politician led its anticommunist probe. Instead, shared
informants, like Herbert Philbrick and William Teto,
provided the most important link between national and state
investigations
.
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Even though California's experience mirrored the red
scare in Washington, Heale argues that alone does not
explain what happened. A full analysis incorporates "the
impact of foreign affairs on the state's own political
configuration." In other words, postwar anticommunism was a
product of influences from above and below. This fits the
evidence from Massachusetts as well. In 1953, local
politicians reacted both to diocesan pressure and to that
of federal investigating committees focused on Massachusetts
by establishing its own committee to "clean house."
More work has been done on the state level than the
local level, making comparison even riskier. Don Carleton,
in his detailed study of anticommunism in Houston's public
school system, found a small group of right wing, elite
women, who belonged to the loosely organized national
network of Minute Women, led the crusade. '^^ Conservative
newspaper editors and businessmen aided their efforts. In
Massachusetts, elite matrons, like Zara Dupont, were more
likely to be demonstrating against the execution of Sacco
and Vanzetti than against leftist educators. The Bay State
had its share of right-wing women, but they had much less
influence than the women in Houston. The Houston women led
a moral crusade, backed by the Baptist and Methodist
churches. In Massachusetts, only Catholic women had their
church's support. Right-wing, Protestant women lacked a
religious, moral component in their crusade.
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James Selcraig, in his study of Midwestern
anticommunism, also looks at local factors. He finds
conservative businessmen, conservative press^ Legionnaires,
and anticommunist liberals supported local initiatives.
Although there are many similarities with Massachusetts,
each state had a unique configuration of factors. In
addition to the local actors Selcraig found. Catholic lay
groups in Massachusetts consistently and ardently battled
subversion. Newspapers played different roles in
Massachusetts than in the Midwest. Throughout the Bay
State, many papers, such as The Boston Herald, Christian
Science Monitor, Springfield Union, Berkshire Eagle
(Pittsfield, Mass) decried the excesses of anticommunism.
Of course, there were others that applauded anticommunist
initiatives, like the Boston Post, Boston American, and New
Bedford Standard Times. In the Massachusetts press, then,
anticommunism was a contested topic.
None of the state and local studies look at how
anticommunism operated within the labor movement, and thus
miss an important part of the picture. In Massachusetts,
opportunist labor leaders capitalized on anticommunism to
eliminate their left wing rivals. However, a surprisingly
large number of workers were more interested in the labor
record of their leaders than in their political beliefs,
suggesting that working men and women were much less
concerned about communist infiltration than were politiciar
and labor leaders.
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APPENDIX
PERCENT OF POPULATION THAT IS NATIVE BORN
WITH NATIVE PARENTS, BY RACE, AND FOREIGN STOCK,*
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, IN CITIES OF 50,000 OR MORE, 1930
Worcester
Spring-
r lela
Fall
River
X KJ L.CIJ. 7ft 1 1 ft ft/ O X f J. O O 1 Q C 1 1J. ^ O / J 1 J. 1 A Q Q n n1 ft y , y u u lib , 274
native parents
White** 26 30 39 21
Negro 3 1 2 —
Foreign stock*
Ireland 20 15 13 8
Other Canada 11 5 4 1
French Canada 1 9 10 22
Italy 12 6 8 2
England/Wales/
Scotland
5 5 6 15
Poland 3 5 5 5
Russia 9 3 4 2
Scandinavia 2 9 2 —
Germany 2 1 2 —
Portugal — — — 11
Azores — -
— 9
Lithuania 2 8
Finland 2
Greece 1 1
Other 4 4 4 3
*Foreign stock includes foreign born residents plus people
born in U.S. with at least one foreign born parent.
**This figure includes second generation immigrants.
Source: U.S. Census, 1930
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Cambridge
New
Bedford
Somer-
ville Lynn
Total 113,643 112, 597 103, 908 102,320
Native born-
native parents
White** 27 20 30 34
Negro 5 3 1
Foreign stock*
I reland 20 5 18 13
Other Canada 13 2 18 15
French Canada 4 18 2 7
Italy 8 1 12 5
England/Wales/ 5 15 6 6
Scotland
Poland 3 5 1 3
Russia 2 2 1 5
Scandinavia 2 1 2 2
Germany 1 1 1 1
Portugal 3 10 2
Azores - 14
Lithuania 2 1
Finland
Greece 1 1 X
Other 4 3 7 4
*Foreign stock includes people born in foreign countries
plus people born in U.S. with at least one foreign born
parent.
**This figure includes second generation immigrants.
Source: U.S. Census, 1930
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Lowell Lawrence Quincy Newton
Total 100,234 o D , U b o 71,983 65 , 276
Native born-
native parents
White** 27 17 36 45
Negro — — — 1
Foreign stock*
Ireland 18 13 10 15
Other Canada 6 8 14 12
French Canada 22 16 2 3
Italy 1 18 10 8
England/Wales/
bco uianu
9 11 12 7
Poland 4 5 — —
Russia 1 3 2 1
Scandinavia 1 — 6 2
Germany — 4 2 1
Portugal 2 — — —
Azores - — — —
Lithuania 1 3 — —
Finland — 3 —
Greece 4 — -
Other 4 2 2 4
*Foreign stock includes
plus people born in the
people born
U.S. with at
in foreign
least one
countries
foreign born
parent
.
**This figure includes second generation immigrants.
Source: U.S. Census, 1930
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Medford Maiden Holyoke
Total 59, 714 58 , 036 56,537
Native born-
native parents
White** 36 31 23
Negro 1 1
Foreign stock*
Ireland 14 13 20
Other Canada 17 17 4
French Canada 2 2 22
Italy 4 8 1
England/Wales
Scotland
Poland
7 6
3
8
13
Russia 1 10 1
Scandinavia 2 4
Germany 1 1 Aft
Portugal
Azores
Lithuania 1
Finland
Greece
Other 4 4 4
Foreign stock includes people born in foreign countries
plus people born in the U.S. with at least one foreign born
parent.
**This figure includes second generation inunigrants.
Source: U.S. Census, 1930
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